Integrating professional and managerial expertise: shifting boundaries in UK health and social services by Llewellyn, Sue
THE UNIVERSITY of EDINBURGH
Title Integrating professional and managerial expertise : shifting boundaries in UK





Thesis scanned from best copy available: may
contain faint or blurred text, and/or cropped or
missing pages.
Pages 57/58 (Purchasing power and professionalism) in published papers is cropped in the original
thesis.
Scanned as part of the PhD Thesis Digitisation project
http://libraryblogs.is.ed.ac.uk/phddigitisation
INTEGRATING PROFESSIONAL AND MANAGERIAL
EXPERTISE:






THE UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH
DECLARATION:
I confirm that the work submitted for this thesis has not been submitted in whole or in part for
the award of another degree.
Sue Llewellyn
2
The critical review covers the following published papers:
1. Llewellyn, S. (1993) Working in Hermeneutic Circles in Management Accounting
Research: Some Implications and Applications, Management Accounting Research, Vol.
4, pp. 231-249.
2. Llewellyn, S. (1994) Managing the Boundary: How Accounting is Implicated in
Maintaining the Organization, Accounting, Auditing andAccountability Journal, Vol. 7,
No. 4, pp. 4-23.
3. Llewellyn, S. (1997) Purchasing Power and Polarized Professionalism in British
Medicine, Accounting, Auditing andAccountability Journal, Vol. 10, No. 1, pp. 31-59.
4. Llewellyn, S. (1998a) Boundary Work: Costing and Caring in the Social Services,
Accounting, Organizations and Society, Vol. 23, No. 1, pp. 23-47.
5. Llewellyn, S. (1998b) Pushing Budgets Down the Line: Ascribing Financial
Responsibility in the UK Social Services, Accounting, Auditing andAccountability
Journal, Vol. 11, No. 3, pp. 292—308.
6. Llewellyn, S. (1999) Surgeons are Counters, Physicians are Philosophers, Research in
Healthcare Financial Management, Vol.5, No.l, pp. 25-40.
Note 1: This submission meets Regulation 3.11.13 of the PhD (by Research Publications), as
the candidate is the sole author of these six publications.
Note 2: The critical review shows how these publications form a coherent body of knowledge
(Regulation 3.11.14). In this regard, publications 3, 4, 5 and 6 are all empirical papers set in
the public sector (3 and 6 in health care, 4 and 5 in the social services). All four papers are
concerned with the boundary between professional and managerial work in public services
and how that boundary is changing consequent upon devolved budgeting. Publication 1 sets
out the interpretative methodology that underpins the empirical work. Publication 2 gives a
theoretical understanding of the nature of boundary work.
Note 3: Where these papers are cited in the thesis they are italicized to aid identification by






Aims of the study 10
THEORETICAL THEMES 12
Boundary work as theory 12
The case for integrating expert labour through boundary work 17
Assessing the integrative power of budgets, money and numbers 21
COMPARATIVE EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 28
Methodology 28
Comparing the NHS with Social Services 30
Boundary work in the NHS and Social Services 34
CONCLUDING DISCUSSION 39
Managing expert labour 41
REFERENCES 43
APPENDIX 1 52
THE PUBLISHED PAPERS 54
4
ABSTRACT
INTEGRATING PROFESSIONAL AND MANAGERIAL EXPERTISE:
SHIFTING BOUNDARIES IN UK HEALTH AND SOCIAL SERVICES
DEGREE OF PhD
(BY RESEARCH PUBLICATIONS)
Public sector reform has involved both a re-negotiation of the boundary between managerial
and professional work and a re-thinking of the relationships between practising professionals
and managerial professionals. This thesis is concerned with the nature of the boundary work
that has led to a greater integration between professional and managerial expertise in public
services. It is argued that management and professional discourses are organized around the
central principles of "costing" and "caring", respectively. "Costing" is the key focus for
managers as they grapple with resource constraints; whilst "caring" is the fundamental
concern for professionals in their work with clients/patients. Any integration must address
"costing" and "caring" as the entry points to the domains occupied by managers and
professionals.
The aims of the thesis are first, to understand how the boundary between professional and
managerial work in the public sector has been constituted (including an exploration of how
that boundary is changing) and, second, to trace at the interface between professional and
managerial domains the impact of boundary work through budgets. The empirical work on
which this thesis is based was carried out in two different areas of the UK public sector:
health and social services. The thesis concludes that boundary work has been achieving
integration primarily through the devolution of budgets that create boundary roles (e.g. care
managers, GP fundholders and clinical directors). It is argued that budgets, money and
numbers can be powerful integrators across the boundary between professional and




There is overwhelming evidence, on an international scale, that the public sector is being
reformed, and that a prime aspect of this reform is an increasing managerialization (Hood,
1991,1995; Clarke et al, 1994; Clarke and Newman, 1997; Humphrey and Olsen, 1995; Oakes
et al, 1998; Olsen et al, 1998; Brunsson and Sahlin-Andersson, 2000). The public sector has
become subject to intense pressures for change as Keynesian-type welfare state provision
declines (Hopper, 1999). This reforming of public services has introduced more managerial
expertise, but the status of management (and managers) is not totally secured. The public
sector continues to have a foremost and fundamental reliance on professional labour
(Newman and Clarke, 1994; Harrison and Pollitt, 1994; Leverment and Ackers, 2000).
However, despite the continuing primacy of the professionals in delivering public services to
individual patients/clients, management has gained ground in terms of its influence over
setting the organizational framework for these services (Exworthy and Halford, 1999, p. 1).
The public sector is now dependent upon two broad categories of workers who, amongst other
pursuits, currently vie for organizational supremacy: practising professionals and managerial
professionals'. This thesis is concerned with the shifting boundary both between these two
types of worker and between the work that they do.
In this thesis practising professionals and managerial professionals2 are both regarded as
different types of expert (Abbott, 1988, Schon, 1991). Professional and managerial tasks are
not seen in opposition to each other but as complementary and, frequently, as potentially
overlapping (Davies, 1983; Scott, 1985; Hafferty, 1988; Scarbrough, 1995). However, the
traditional concordat between professionals and managers in the public sector has been closer
to an agreement to work along "parallel tracks" rather than a plan to integrate endeavours
(Clarke et al, 1994; Harrison and Pollitt, 1994; Llewellyn, 1998a, 1998b). Hence the
management of expertise in the public sector presents, in the first instance, an integration
challenge. Integration between practising professionals and managerial professionals involves
some dissolution of the closure they achieve to protect their knowledge base, status and
internal group cohesion (Scarbrough, 1995, p.7).
Integration seeks active connections. The governing principle of integration dictates that
things that were previously separate shall be aligned and put together (Bernstein, 1971).
1
For example, in the health service, the dominant practising professionals are senior clinicians with general
managers as the most powerful managerial professional group.
6
Adherence to this governing principle implies that, within areas of knowledge, purity is set
aside in the pursuit of relevance (Beattie, 1995). Cooper et al (1996) argue that integration is
constituted by mechanisms (or processes) through which some kind of unity is achieved
between different organizational groups and their associated areas of expertise. Boundaries to
areas of expertise are always "...scenes of potential instability." (Power, 1990, p.l 17).
Impure, weakly classified knowledge ("dangerous knowledge" (Johnston, 1978)) is pushed to
the boundary. So positioned, such knowledge becomes available for re-combination within
another area of expertise. For this reason, it is at the boundary that integration (or
differentiation) begins3. In this thesis, the processes through which articulations are
constructed between professional and managerial concerns (Clarke and Newman, 1997) are
studied as boundary work.
Integration also implies that the activity ofmanagement crosses the professional/manager
divide, i.e. that managers manage professionals but, also, that professionals manage managers
and that both professionals and managers manage themselves. Integration is studied as a
condition achieved through boundary work as the division between practising professionals
and managerial professionals is permeated. In any possible permeation, "costing" and
"caring" have formed the "entry points" (Amariglio et al, 1993, p. 164) to the domains of
management and professionalism, respectively. Amariglio et al (1993, p. 164-165) define an
entry point as, "... .a concept or concepts which a theorist uses to enter into, to begin,
discourse about some object of analysis. This entry can be, but need not be, an essence- the
primary truth or the primary determinant cause- in the discourse that results....An entry point
is a concept which will distinctively shape the asking of all questions and which will
condition (and be conditioned by) all other concepts within a discourse....From the point of
view of one school or another, the content and use of the entry point may construct this
school's attempts to define the limits of its discipline." Such a definition posits an entry point
is a central organizing concept from which a discourse flows. Moreover, the limits of any
domain are set by entry points- as they discriminate between activities that are thought to be
intrinsic or extrinsic to the core domain purpose (Llewellyn, 1998a). In the context of
professionals and managers in the public sector, "caring" is the key orientating concept for
practising professionals in their work with patients/clients, whilst "costing" is the central
focus for managers as they grapple with resource constraints. Entry points are pivotal to how
2
Although, in this thesis the terms "practising professionals" and "managerial professionals" are preferred to
"professionals" and "managers" as they indicate some (neglected) similarities between the two groups, for brevity
and ease of exposition the latter set of terms are also sometimes used in the thesis.
3 For example, in the past, administrative expertise was pushed to the boundary of the clinical knowledge base.
Doctors who assumed administrative tasks were generally regarded as failures (Harrison. 1999). But latterly a new
area of expertise has developed at the administrative/clinical boundary, that of medical management (Llewellyn,
2001a).
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the professionals themselves define and understand their work (Llewellyn, 1998a). Integration
through boundary work between practising professionals and managerial professionals in the
public sector must address entry points, as they are fundamental to the traditional divide
between professionalism and managerialism.
Llewellyn (1994) and Llewellyn (1998a) explore the general nature of boundary work as an
integrative process. Llewellyn, 1998a and Llewellyn, 1997 focus on boundary workers (care
managers, and GP fundholders, respectively) as an integrative role that mediates professional
and managerial work4. Llewellyn 1997, (1998a), Llewellyn, 1998b and Llewellyn, (2001a)
discuss boundary budgets as integrative mechanisms across professional and managerial
work. Although boundary workers and boundary budgets as ways of integrating across
boundaries are conceptually distinct, they tend to converge on the integrative power of
budgets. This convergence occurs because boundary workers (care managers, clinical
directors and GP fundholders) all hold budgets and accomplish much of their boundary work
through the exercise of budgetary power.
The published works that this critical review discusses have a common focus on the changing
constitution of the boundaries of expertise in the UK public sector. Two specific areas have
been the subject of empirical work: health care (Llewellyn, 1997; Llewellyn, 1999) and the
social services (Llewellyn, 1998a; 1998b). There is now a large (and growing) body of
research that indicates that the impact of managerialism on the professions in the public sector
is very varied (Crompton, 1990; Keep, 1992; Humphrey et al, 1993; Clarke et al, 1994;
Johnes and Cave, 1994; Laughlin et al, 1994; Ferlie et al, 1996; Goddard, 1997). The "reform
cocktail" (Klein, 1995, p. 191) across the public sector has had different consequences
dependent upon where it was imbibed! General research indications of a differential impact
across public services point to a need for detailed empirical comparative work. This thesis
aims to make a contribution in this area through a comparative focus on boundary work in the
two domains.
Both health and social care have similar goals as they are directed towards therapeutic change
but the professionals within them are located at very different power/knowledge intersections
(Foucault, 1972; 1979; 1980; 1986- see first section under "Theoretical themes" for a
discussion of the relationship between Foucault's "power-knowledge intersections" and
"boundary work"). Such circumstances indicate that there are sufficient commonalities to
make a comparison between health and social services feasible but enough differences to
4
Llewellyn (2001a) continues this theme through looking at clinical directors as boundary workers.
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make such a comparison fruitful. Health care is a more internally differentiated domain than
the social services. Therefore, it is anticipated that the consequences ofmanagerialism will be
more varied in health than in social care (see Llewellyn, 1999). The differential impact of
managerialism, both between health and social care and within health care itself, is explored
in the later section: "Boundary work in the UK health and social services". The empirical
studies {Llewellyn, 1997; 1998a; 1998b and 1999) all followed a qualitative, interpretative
methodology. Llewellyn (1993) gives an account of a particular interpretative methodology:
hermeneutics. A section in this critical review (p. 20ff) outlines how the methodology
underpinning the empirical work described here relates to hermeneutics.
The focus of this thesis is on boundary work as an integrative process between practising
professionals and managerial professionals. In this context it is necessary to understand the
functions of boundaries for professional work. The boundaries between areas of expertise
serve several purposes. First, boundaries differentiate mutually defining points of view
(Cooper, 1990). Second, boundaries shape an area of expertise by controlling the type and
degree of difference permitted within them (Messer-Davidow et al, 1993). Third, boundaries
indicate which area of expertise (and which associated professional group) deals with which
kind of problem. The first boundary function gives rise to the experts' sense of identity,
including feelings of difference from others. The second fosters coherence and prevents
fragmentation within the area of expertise. The third directs users of professional expertise to
the "appropriate" area of knowledge. Several authors have argued that the divide between
practising professionals and managerial professionals relates more to their modes of control
rather than to their status as occupations (see, for example, Abbott, 1988; Crompton, 1990).
This understanding supports the arguments of this thesis as it focuses interest on the
boundaries between the two areas of expertise (rather than on the identification of supposedly
unique occupational characteristics).
Boundary work may arise in several ways. First, there may be a political imperative for an
occupational group to assume some of the tasks normally associated with another. Second, a
new organizational role may be created that crosses previously distinct domains of expertise.
Third, jurisdictional boundaries come under dispute as groups vie for the right to apply their
knowledge (or judgement) to problems that may be addressed in more than one area of
expertise. All three of these developments can be discerned in the discussion of the empirical
papers (see p. 26ff). There have been political moves to encourage professionals to take on
management responsibilities (e.g. the creation ofGP fundholding and clinical directorates
{Llewellyn, 1997; Llewellyn, 2001a)). New boundary roles have been instituted that mediate
professional and managerial work (e.g. care managers, GP fundholders and clinical directors
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(.Llewellyn, 1998a; Llewellyn, 1997; Llewellyn, 2001a)). Negotiations over territorial issues
have taken place between professionals and managers (e.g. managers vying with clinicians to
decide the strategic direction of hospitals (Llewellyn, 2001a)). Moreover, professionals who
have assumed new boundary roles have come into dispute with colleagues (e.g. GP
fundholders' negotiations with hospital consultants over carrying out minor surgery in GP
practices).
Aims ofthe study
In order to extend a discussion of boundary work, this thesis aims:
1. To understand, how the boundary between professional and managerial work in the
public sector is constructed and maintained through a separation between the tasks of
caring and costing (and to trace how that boundary is changing).
2. To trace, at the interface between professional and managerial domains, the impact of
boundary work through budgets.
Two themes provide background theoretical understanding to the pursuit of these aims and
are reflected in the published empirical work that this critical review discusses: the nature of
boundary work; and the integrative power of numbers, money and budgets. These two themes
are discussed next in turn. This critical review then moves to explore the comparative findings
on boundary work in the empirical papers on health and social care before presenting a
concluding discussion. However, first, the next section outlines some limitations of this
thesis.
Limitations and reflexivity
The empirical papers on which this thesis is based were all researched and written after the
introduction of the internal market in health care in 1991, consequent upon the 1989 White
Paper Workingfor Patients and the introduction of contracting, along with the greater use of
costing information in social services, following the Accounts Commission publication,
Squaring the Circle in 1994. These initiatives for public services can be seen as part of a
much wider political agenda to promote deregulation and to assert the values of the "free
market" after several decades of national welfare and industrial concerns (Bonefeld and
Holloway, 1996). This on-going political background created more receptive "conditions of
possibility" (Foucault, 1980, p.243- see below) in public services for the introduction of a
10
greater degree of integration between professionalism and managerialism. The focus of the
empirical papers is, largely, on this greater receptivity.
This limited focus does not deny, however, the existence of considerable professional
resistance to managerial reform (for example, as a counterbalance to Llewellyn, 1997, see
Broadbent et al., 2001 for a discussion of GP opposition to fundholding ). The thesis is, also,
not concerned with the deleterious consequences of more emphasis on financial
accountability and less on professional accountability as a direct result of the reform of the
public sector (see, for example, Ezzamel and Willmott, 1993). In summary, the work is
directed solely towards understanding the areas where professionalism and managerialism
may make a more useful engagement than they have to date and explicating the role of
numbers, budgets, and money in this regard.
In looking at the, possibly, more enabling (than hitherto) role ofmoney in social relations the
thesis draws on the seminal work of Simmel but also uses some more contemporary sources,
for example, Crump, Giddens, Gregory and Hart (see below for detailed discussion). Again,
this does not deny the work ofmany authors on the negative impact ofmoney on society. A
key element in Marx's historical scheme was identifying the way in which "money makes
money" in modern capitalist economies and how the resulting social relations are mystified,
as inherent exploitation is hidden. Strange's (1986; 1997) work on Casino Capitalism points
to the grave consequences on social and political systems when the inherent uncertainty of
contemporary money markets makes gamblers of everyone, but causes an increase in
inequities as some of us can cushion ourselves against this instability while others cannot.
Lack ofmoney is a prime determinant of social exclusion in society as it negotiates access to
both economic and social resources and, hence, peoples' ability to participate in the wider
community (Martin, 1999, p. 12). There has been a rich tradition ofwork on the power of
money to alienate and exclude in exchange relationships. However this thesis is primarily
concerned with the possibility of using numbers, budgets and money as resources to integrate
across disciplinary boundaries in organizations. It can be located within the broad tradition of
using money as a solution to some of our contemporary problems (for another example in this
genre see Hart's (2000) work on money as a collective memory bank where money becomes
information and information money (p.3)).
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THEORETICAL THEMES
Boundary work as theory
As argued above, traditional ways of working for professionals and managers in the public
sector have tended to follow "parallel tracks" without plans to integrate endeavours (Clarke et
al, 1994; Harrison and Pollitt, 1994; Llewellyn, 1998a, 1998b). Therefore the management of
expertise in the public sector presents an integration challenge. How is integration achieved?
The theory of boundary work enables understanding how practices of integration achieve
active connections between previously separate "communities of knowing" (Boland and
Tenkasi, 1995).
Managerial and professional communities of knowing are situated in different social worlds
with disparate viewpoints and agendas. Boundary work occurs whenever interactions and co¬
operative effort between different communities results in some mutual renegotiation of their
previously stable (and separate) identities. As boundaries operate inclusion/exclusion
principles (Cooper, 1990), any flows of resources across boundaries offer opportunities for
boundary work. Fujimura (1988, 1992) argues that concepts, skills, materials, techniques and
instruments can all constitute resource flows. When members of different social worlds
engage with any of these resources simultaneously they will be drawn into boundary work.
This greater engagement, through the mutual exchange of resources, is shown in all four of
the empirical papers in this thesis.
Llewellyn, (1997) is concerned with general practice fundholding. This initiative re¬
established the material, financial ties that had existed between GPs and consultants prior to
the inception of the NHS in 1948 in the UK5. Once the consultants again received income
from the GPs they became much more ready to engage with them over issues that had
previously been problematic for the family doctors. Care management processes improved as
communications from the hospitals to the GPs increased, for example, patient discharge
letters were regularly sent out and new service information was disseminated. In the other
direction, consultants became much more ready to hear the views of GPs, for example, on the
appropriateness of certain secondary care procedures and regimes.
Llewellyn (1998a) discusses the re-negotiation of managerial/professional relations in the
social services. Through this re-structuring, professional "front line" social workers were
5
However, it should be noted that to the extent that GPs suggested to patients that they may wish to pay privately
for hospital treatment a degree of financial reward continued to be conferred on consultants by GPs after 1948.
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required to assume managerial skills. Greater professional engagement with managerialist
agendas resulted. For example, social workers began to view "contracting" in a more positive
light as they perceived that this management tool could result in benefits for their clients.
Llewellyn, 1998b looks at how the concept of "financial responsibility" is ascribed to social
workers from managers in the social services. This paper shows both more professional
engagement with issues concerning resource consumption (for example, a greater degree of
willingness to purchase private sector facilities where these are cheaper) but, also, a degree of
"shoring up" of professional operational boundaries around social work activities as resource
pressures increase.
Llewellyn, 1999 focuses particularly on the managerial techniques transferred to clinical
directors from management and on the differences between surgeons and physicians in this
regard. The paper demonstrates the differential engagement with management techniques as
surgeons adopt more corporate attitudes and show a greater willingness to standardize and
regulate their clinical practices.
Fujimura (1988, 1992) is concerned with resource flows. In a related field of work Star and
Griesemer (1989) introduced the concept of a boundary object. A boundary object inhabits
intersecting social worlds and satisfies the information requirements of each of them;
coherence across social worlds is developed through the creation and maintenance of
boundary objects (see discussion in Star and Griesemer, 1989, p.393). Once in place,
boundary objects manage the tension between divergent viewpoints through being plastic
enough to adapt to local informational needs whilst being robust enough to create
commonalities. Boundary objects may have rather different meanings across social worlds but
their structure is common enough for them to function as a means of translation, co-operation
and integration (see Bowker and Star, 1999, p.292-7). Star and Griesemer (1989) distinguish
four different types of boundary object: repositories; ideal types; coincident boundaries; and
standardised forms. This last category is of the most relevance to this thesis as standardised
forms allow for common communication, can travel over long distances and convey
unchanging information. Budgets can be considered as the standardised form of boundary
object; they represent financial resource flows in quantitative informational terms and, once
devolved, they relate to both professional and managerial social worlds. The devolution of
budgets from managers to professionals is the central concern of three of the empirical papers
in this thesis. Llewellyn, 1997 demonstrates how various forms of co-operation between
consultants and GPs increased though the medium of fundholding. Llewellyn, 1998a focuses
on the impact of budget- holding on care managers and how this role increases the integration
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between "costing" and "caring" as entry points (Amariglio et al, 1993) to the domains of
managerialism and professionalism. Llewellyn, 1998b explores the reactions of front line
social workers to budgetary responsibilities in terms of the translation of professional
functions involved.
Foucault's work draws attention to the various "conditions of possibility" (1980, p.243)
inherent in different social worlds. The multiplicity of political, social, institutional, technical
and theoretical concerns in any domain fosters environments that are heterogeneous with
respect to boundary work. Consideration of the very varied "conditions of possibility" within
different forms of professional work points to the achievement of very varied forms of
integration with managerialism. The empirical sections that follow outline the differences
both within medicine itself and between medicine and social work in terms of a more direct
engagement with management agendas. One key overarching difference between medicine
and social work that relates to Foucault's writing is the greater power/knowledge invested in
medicine due to bio-power (see Rabinow, 1984, pp.257-289). Clinical power to "...qualify,
measure, appraise, and hierarchize..."(Rabinow, 1984, p266) in the regulation of the living
greatly exceeds that of social work power. Although both health and social work derive power
through their concern with therapeutic change in the pursuit of the well-being of the
population, the closer engagement of medicine with the "Right of death and power over life"
(Rabinow, 1984, pp 258-272) protects the clinical domain to a greater extent than the social
work domain from unwelcome managerialist encroachment. Within the clinical realm itself
the very varied power/knowledge intersections in medicine (as opposed to surgery) have led
to very different terms of engagement with management (see Llewellyn, 1999).
The terms of engagement between medicine and social work on the one hand and
management on the other are negotiated through boundary work. Both medicine and social
work, as disciplines, have routinely employed boundary work to enlarge (if possible) their
area of expertise, to distinguish their knowledge from that of other disciplines through the
demarcation of territory and to adjudicate claims to solve societal problems from rival
practitioners. Boundary work achieves the unity of a discipline (see Gieryn, 1983, for a
discussion of the issues of expansion, monopolization and protection in the context of the
demarcation of science from "non-science"). In this thesis, these issues are also relevant but
the central focus is on boundary work as a mode of achieving some merger between the
(previously) separate disciplines of management and professionalism.
One way of thinking about what has kept managerialism and professionalism apart is to use
the idea of an entry point. As argued earlier, "caring" has been the entry point for the
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therapeutic professions of medicine and social work, whereas "costing" forms the entry point
to managerialism.
Boundaries serve two purposes. First, they act so as to differentiate mutually-defining
discourses (Cooper, 1990). Second, they shape domains through regulating the types of
difference permitted within them (Messer-Davidow et al, 1993. Boundary work and entry
points (Amariglio et al, 1993) are mutually implicated as entry points constitute the ultimate
discriminators between activities that are thought to be intrinsic or extrinsic to particular
discourses. "Caring" distinguishes what is or is not appropriate to professional therapeutic
practice, whilst "costing" serves as a focus for managerial activity.
Professional resistance to managerialism is articulated primarily through discourses that posit
the antithetical nature of "costing" and "caring" (Llewellyn, 1997; 1998a; 1998b; 1999). In this
way, boundary work protects the "entry points" to professionalism and managerialism.
Instances of this defensive boundary work are explicated in Llewellyn, 1998a as social
workers seek to maintain "fixed price contracting" as a shield against the encroachment of
"costing" and in Llewellyn ,1998b as front line social workers attempt to pass their costing
responsibilities "back up the line".
In turn, whenever professionals can see instances of "costing" enhancing "caring", the
elaboration and constitution of these concepts changes. For example, in Llewellyn, 1998a
(p.3 7) when "costing" was defined as possibly enabling the "freeing up ofmore resources",
boundary work to align "costing" with "caring" began. And in Llewellyn, 1998a, 1998b
pockets of receptivity towards managerialism began to form through shifting boundaries, as
social workers perceived that desirable forms of professional accountability were being
promoted through "costing".
As argued above, boundary work occurs whenever connections are perceived between the
entry points to particular disciplines but it also proceeds, in defensive ways, in order to protect
cherished professional practices encoded in "entry points" (Amariglio et al, 1993). However
the primary site of boundary work, in knowledge terms, is, as the metaphor indicates, at the
boundary of a discipline. Weakly classified, impure knowledge sits at the boundary of a
discipline (Johnston, 1978). In contrast, research-based theory and technique occupies a high,
hard ground at the centre of a discipline (Schon, 1988, p.67). The centre of any discipline is a
territory where problems can be settled purely on terms dictated by the discipline itself,
whereas, at the boundary, interdisciplinary knowledge has an impact (Douglas, 1982, p. 174).
"Boundary- type" of knowledge makes for instability or permeability (Klein, 1993), with
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respect to the discipline ofwhich it forms a marginal part. In consequence, whenever
professionals assume managerial work they risk ostracism from colleagues, as they are
perceived as engaging in "impure" or "soft" work. As Douglas (1982, p. 174) points out,
"Around this centre [of the discipline concerned] the most forceful exponents find it most
worthwhile to cluster. The fringes are for the fringy. Thus a centripetal force in the
institutional framework of knowledge exerts a magnetism for talent, time and funds." At the
same time these "fringy" boundary roles constitute a prime site for integration between
management and professionalism {Llewellyn, 1998a; Llewellyn, 2001a).
Several authors in the tradition of the sociology of the professions are also concerned with the
"doing" of boundary work. Abbott (1988) uses the central concept ofjurisdiction to theorize
the boundaries that internally differentiate the professions. Both interprofessional and
intraprofessional boundary disputes are discussed in this work. Llewellyn, 1997 draws on this
work to understand professional regression, client and work differentiation and career
progression. Brunsson (1989, 1990, 1994) is centrally concerned with the assignment of
responsibilities as a way of re-negotiating the boundaries of professional work. Llewellyn,
1998b uses this literature to theorize the ascription of financial responsibilities in the social
services. Gieryn (1983) considers the shifting boundaries of forms of expertise in professional
work. In Llewellyn, 1998a this theoretical perspective underpins an understanding of the
encroachment ofmanagerialism on social work practice. The next section ("The case for
integrating expert labour through boundary work") continues to elucidate the links between
"boundary work" and the literature on the sociology of the professions through a specific
focus on the concept of expertise.
Moreover, "boundary work" as a theoretical concept articulates more closely with a
hermeneutic methodology- as the latter rests on the "double hermeneutic" between first and
second order constructs. As boundary work, as a concept, remains close to the empirical
conditions it seeks to explicate (first order constructs) whilst still being able to encompass
second order constructs (or social products), it synthesizes well with hermeneutics. As
respondents articulated their engagement with boundary work at interview, the first order
constructs of hermeneutics capture and synthesise their "micro" experiences. Grand narratives
take a more abstract turn; being concerned with "macro" phenomena and long time/space
distanciations and, hence, with second order constructs (or social products) rather than first
order ones. The following sections expand on boundary work in public services.
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The case for integrating expert labour through boundary work
Several authors have argued that as post-industrial society becomes increasingly dependent on
knowledge workers, the management of expert labour becomes the key critical issue in
contemporary organizations (see, for example, Bell, 1973; Dreyfus, 1979; Crompton, 1992;
Gibbons et al, 1994; Giddens, 1994a; Scarbrough, 1995). Experts produce and communicate
knowledge. Expert knowledge or expertise has superseded capital as the foundation of the
socioeconomic order (Burrell, 1995). Expertise is distinguished from other forms of work by
its close connections with both knowledge generation and power configurations.
Knowledge, expertise, professionals andmanagers
Knowledge legitimizes action (Stehr, 1994). Expertise has an economic scarcity value6. Both
of these attributes are mobilised by experts to take (and maintain) power in organizations
(Fischer, 1990). Expertise links closely to power and is, therefore, is simultaneously a
stimulant and a barrier to change, innovation and progress in organizations (Starbuck, 1992).
Managing expertise is not just about exploiting its competitive advantages but circumventing
its barriers to change (Scarbrough, 1995, p.4). The management of expertise must negotiate
expertise-knowledge-power linkages.
Historically, knowledge-based occupations were synonymous with a professional and
scientific model ofwork, but this is no longer the case. The examples of management
consultancy, IT, and financial services demonstrate that expertise is both wider (and more
applied) than traditional, professional knowledge based in science. Expertise is ""knowledge
in the world" not "knowledge of the world""(Scarbrough, 1995, p.3). The concept of
"expertise" as "knowledge in the world" links professionals and managers in a way that the
idea of "scientific knowledge" does not. As discussed in the introduction, in this thesis both
practising professionals and managerial professionals are regarded as different types of
expert. This understanding breaks with the influential distinction between professionals and
bureaucrats (introduced by Talcott Parsons7). Amongst other asserted differences, Parsons
uniquely tied the notion of expertise to the 'professions'8. In this thesis, managers are also
conceptualized as possessing expertise, for example, in administration, control,
6
This scarcity value diminishes if the expertise becomes "over-supplied" in the labour market or if the "expertise"
in question becomes more easily acquired.
7
Parson's work was subsequently extended by the functional theories of Greenwood (1957), Wilensky (1964) and
Merton (1982).
8 The Parsonian conceptualization of the 'professions' distinguished them from 'bureaucrats' through arguments
about the technical rationality of their expertise, the ethical nature of their practice and the legitimated (by society)
basis of their authority.
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communication, human resources and budgeting. Practising professionals and managerial
professionals in public services are similar in other significant ways. Both of the professional
and management groups considered here work within complex organizations, so the
professions are bureau-professions (Mintzberg, 1993) rather than free-standing associations.
Moreover both professionals and managers manage resources on behalf of others and are,
therefore, engaged in agency relationships (Armstrong, 1989).
The disengagement between professionals and managers
Despite these continuities, traditionally, there has been disengagement between professionals
and managers in the public sector. Currently, the terms of this disengagement are being re¬
negotiated; the empirical research underpinning this thesis focuses on the shifting and
transitional nature of the division between practising professionals and managerial
professionals (as experts in the public sector) as they go about generating, controlling and
applying their expertise. Abbott (1988) uses the central concept ofjurisdiction to understand
how different occupations defend the control and application of their expertise from outsiders.
Sequences ofjurisdictional control occur and jurisdictional boundaries come under attack as
expert groups seek to acquire the knowledge and skills of others whilst retaining a monopoly
on their own (Armstrong, 1984, 1985; Llewellyn, 1997, 1998a, 1998b, 1999). Prior to the
struggles illustrated in the empirical papers in this thesis a modus operandi (see below) had
been established between professionals and managers. This concordat ceded some special
privileges to organizational professionals. Raelin (1985) lists four such rights: discretion over
the parameters of professional work; the freedom to question management's decisions over
professional activities; a reliance on professional norms of evaluation; and the right to engage
in professional activities whether or not these were in the best interests of the organization.
The disengagement between practising professionals and managerial professionals in the
public sector has a complex background. First, historically the public sector was administered
rather than managed. Public sector administrators pre- the 1980s were more akin to diplomats
than to active managers who shaped the direction of services (Greenwood and Stewart, 1986;
Ackroyd et al, 1989; Clarke et al, 1994; Harrison and Pollitt, 1994; Grey and Jenkins, 1997).
The public sector was governed largely by professional autonomy, expressed through
paternalism and technocratic rationalism (Klein, 1995, Llewellyn, 2001a). For example in UK
health care, paternalism dictated that it was, "...the doctor's judgement which would
determine who should get what." (Klein, 1995, p246).
Technocratic rationalism underpinned paternalism by putting, "...problem solving through
expertise..." (Klein, 1995, p.95) at the heart ofNHS decision-making. The example of senior
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clinicians in health care illustrates Scarbrough's (1995) argument on how, "Expertise may be
sustained by its recursive relationships between a group's control of techniques and its
strategic position in decision-making processes."( p.29). Outcomes in the public sector were
the aggregate result of the decisions made by individual professional practitioners rather than
planned in accordance with management's organizational strategies (Llewellyn and Tappin,
2001).
Second, the tasks, attitudes and values of professionals and managers were frequently at
variance. Public sector managers held to administrative values of efficiency, fairness, honesty
and adaptability (Hood and Jackson, 1991). Public sector professionals espoused the values of
planning, meeting needs, trust and stability (Klein, 1995). As, traditionally, the professionals
controlled the ethos and direction of public services, "custodial management" (Ackroyd et al,
1989) prevailed.
Third, practising professionals and managerial professionals operated with different criteria
for the assessment of public sector work. Practising professionals see the value of their work
in terms of the quality of inputs and the process of service delivery, whilst managers assess
outputs and value for money. Practising professionals and managerial professionals judged
each other to be different (see Llewellyn, 1997; 1998a; 1998b).
The potentialfor integration to bring a greater effectiveness to public services
Although these differences create barriers to greater integration between professionals and
managers, there is now a substantial volume of research that points to the greater
effectiveness of public services when practising professionals and managerial professionals
work jointly within them (Scott, 1985; Young and Saltman, 1985; Abernethy and
Stoelwinder, 1990; Shortell et al, 1990). There are a number of reasons for this.
First, although the direction of public services has been the result of decisions made by
individual professionals (see below), practising professionals lack strategic management
decisions made in the context of their one-to-one relationship with clients/patients, they have
not considered how the aggregate result of these decisions shaped the overall service offered.
Professional work has been directed at "micro" care, which is governed by the needs of
individual patients/clients, rather than "macro" care, which assesses the health care
characteristics of populations and organises to meet these requirements (Scott, 1982). For
example, in the NHS in the 1970s when there was some additional financial resource
available, doctors used this to treat patients more intensively rather than to treat more patients
(Harrison and Pollitt, 1994). There had been no "strategic" intent to concentrate resources on
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patients already "in the system" (and allow waiting lists to build up) but this was the result of
individualised professional decision-making. Some integration between professional and
managerial expertise potentially provides a strategic overview of the way that services are (or
should be) developing and helps ensure that any agreed strategic initiatives are successfully
implemented.
Second, there is an increasing requirement for active management in the public sector as
services become more complex (Scott, 1985). In health care, for example, technology has
exploded, medical specialities have sub-divided, consumer expectations have risen, the
significance of risk management has greatly increased, mandatory requirements to produce
unit costs have been implemented, purchasing (or latterly, commissioning) has been
introduced and governments have emphasised partnerships with other agencies (in particular
public-private linkages). In order to track and monitor this increasing complexity, the
information systems of public services have greatly increased in sophistication, and,
consequently, these systems now present a challenge to effective organizing in the public
sector (Bloomfield, 1995). In this context, there is an ever-widening gap between what the
practising professionals can deliver in terms of co-ordination, control and performance
measurement and what stakeholders expect (Townley, 1996). Even from the internal point of
view of the public sector professions themselves, more management expertise is called for.
Third, ideas on the production and use of expertise are changing. Gibbons et al (1994) argue
that the predominant traditional view of knowledge was that it was accumulated (and
assimilated) within disciplinary boundaries in universities. Such knowledge was then
available (in the form of professionally bounded expertise) to be applied to practical
problems. They then offer an alternative view: that expertise is produced in context, through
combining different organizational groups to build on synergies and heterogeneity. In this
way issues are addressed through generating and utilizing transdisciplinary knowledge. Other
work supports this alternative view of knowledge. Schon (1991) presents the concept of
"reflection-in-action": knowledge that is developed through practice in order to cope with
unique, conflicting and/or "messy" situations. Nonaka and Takeuchi, (1995) assert that all
employees should operate as knowledge workers; inventing new knowledge should not be
thought of as a specialised activity. Spender (1992) argues that "communities-in-practice"
(p.412) produce knowledge through emergent processes. Frohman (1997) emphasises that
new knowledge is generated through the achievement of organizational change and how new
knowledge is essential to such change.
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If this "in situ" view of knowledge has increasing relevance, then integrating across the
diversity of professional and managerial knowledges in public services has a potential for
addressing pressing public sector problems. The issues (identified above) of strategic
direction, aggregate delivery, technological advance (in the context of resource constraints),
risk management, rising consumer expectations and public-private partnerships require a
"knowledge in the world" approach. Creating expertise that overlaps professional and
managerial work is a key aspect of public sector management.
The next section explores the theoretical basis for deciding if the use of numbers, money and
budgets has an integrative potential across the divide between managerial professionals and
practising professionals.
Assessing the integrative power ofbudgets, money and numbers
Organizations (public sector institutions and private sector corporations) are now the means
for societies to achieve their ends. All organizations use money, along with knowledge, as
fundamental resources. It is in the context of organizational forms that money as an
integrative resource has a particular significance, as organizations exist to co-ordinate the
many and diverse talents of individuals. Cooper (1990, p. 172) defines organization as "...a
structure that relates people to each other in the general process ofmanaging nature and
themselves." Child (1984) pinpoints the basic structure of organization as achieving, "...the
successful implementation of plans by formally allocating people and resources to the tasks
which have to be done, and by providing mechanisms for their co-ordination." The way that
money is distributed to resource organizational activities can either co-ordinate or,
alternatively, differentiate organizational activities.
In private sector organizations the "bottom line" of profitability drives activities and provides
an integrating focus. Numbers are integral: accounting makes sense of all private sector
organizational resources and outputs in monetary terms. Llewellyn (1994) argues that
accounting casts money into numbers that signify order within organizations. These
accounting numbers integrate through binding organizational space/time in representations
such as profit and loss accounts, balance sheets and internal management accounting reports.
In this way accounting numbers represent the basic organizational realities of profit, loss,
asset and liability; they are also implicated in "... organizational histories, systems of
accountability, moral codes and temporal ordering..." (Llewellyn, 1994, p. 16). All of these
representational forms enable greater integration across organizational sub-units.
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Cooper (1990) points out, "...that representation is a necessary part of the 'knowing'
process."(p. 169). The world is not directly knowable; the world is experienced through
representations (Sayer, 1992, pp. 45-84.). Yet the very familiarity of representations fosters a
"forgetting" of the representational act. There is a tendency to assume that representations
allow unmediated access to the world- and therein lies their power. The signs and symbols of
accounting are the most significant financial representations of the organizational world; they
are also representations that tend to promote the power and influence of those in management
roles. Douglas (1982 p.37) argues that once a representation is accepted from the flux of
possible forms, this particular representation clarifies and fixes knowledge of the external
"reality". In this way accounting numbers construct the organizational "realities" of profit,
loss, asset and liability, frequently privileging managerial interests over those of other
stakeholders. Acceptance of these (potentially contestable) accounting constructions across
organizational sub-units integrates as different activities/functions are dealing with a common
financial "reality". There is a common "forgetting" of the representational role of accounting
as organizational actors come to see accounting as the financial "real thing" that they have to
pay attention to.
Public sector organizations are different to private sector entities with respect to money as a
resource. In the public sector the provision of services is divorced from payments for services
provided. Money to resource activities comes from central government via the tax system.
Breaking the link between payment and provision has a number of consequences. First, there
is no on-going adjustment to the supply of services consequent upon fluctuations in revenue
from consumers. There are no incentives for providers to cut back on supply; indeed supply-
induced demand is a feature of the public sector (Harrison and Pollitt, 1994). Equally, as
consumers pay collectively in amounts that are not dependent on services received, there are
no incentives for consumers to limit demands. Second, without a focus on profitability, there
can be much more scope for the aspirations and career goals of providers to drive the content
of services (Champagne et al, 1997). Third, in the absence of signals from a market, central
government is reliant on signals from providers to make decisions on resource allocation
(Nutt and Backoff, 1992).
When public sector providers solicit resources they put a case on the basis of poor results
rather than good performances, by arguing that needs are not being satisfied or that quality is
not high enough (Brunsson, 1994). For example, doctors have tended to argue their case for
more money through "shroud waving" (Harrison and Pollitt, 1994). Advocacy based on worst
case scenarios for clients/patients (unless more money is forthcoming) has been the traditional
mode of resource acquisition in the public sector (Llewellyn, 1999). This is significantly
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different from the stance of private sector companies who acquire money from their financiers
(the consumers) by attempting to convince them that they have a high quality product or
service to offer.9 Overall, third party payment for public services results in a system with few
incentives for limiting supply or demand and, hence, produces escalating pressures on
resources10. Signals from providers, rather than consumers, direct resource allocation and it is
difficult for governments to know how to act on the basis of such signals, as they are
ambiguous. Policy-makers in the public sector lack knowledge of "allocative efficiency", in
the sense of ensuring that resources flow to those who can make best use of them (Llewellyn,
1999).
Private sector organizations are not immune from these influences, as knowledge becomes the
key competitive resource; private sector organizations are seeking to further integrate their
activities through the use ofmoney. Project-based budgeting, for example, funds
organizational outputs rather than inputs and seeks to mitigate the myopia of functional
groups through cross-boundary budgeting (Llewellyn, 2000).
The financial impact of decisions taken by public sector providers is not obvious to them
(tracing such an impact may often be problematic in the private sector but there are some
indicative mechanisms (e.g. divisional budgets, project appraisal and rates of return)). Global
aggregate budgets have been the norm in the public sector; these give little indication of the
resource consequences of actions and are not well suited to financial control. In some cases
actions consequent on decisions taken in one area of the public sector are actually funded in
another. For example, prior to the transfer of the budget for residential care to the social
services, clients entering residential care were funded by social security (Llewellyn, 1998b).
This situation gave rise to a "perverse incentive" (Wagner, 1988) for social services to make
placements in residential care rather than supporting clients at home as the cost of residential
care was met by social security whereas community care was funded by social services.
Where monetary exchanges take place to resource activities, the source, direction and flow of
the money are significant determinants for which activities are resourced and on how
resourced activities are conducted. Money, as a resource, also integrates (or differentiates)
work activities. Where areas of expertise are jointly funded, participants must work together
to determine how the money is used. But if different occupational groups receive separate
9
There is, of course, no judgement being made here that the quality of goods and services is lower in the public sector then the
private, merely that modes of argument to obtain resources in the public sector have been based on under-achievement.
Arguments about whether or not the public sector is under-funded (as a whole or in part) constitute a very important policy
debate. But this debate is beyond the scope of this paper which concentrates on the issue of resource allocation within the global
budget set by government.
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allocations ofmoney there is no financial incentive for them to co-operate. Where one group
makes decisions that are funded by another, perverse incentives are likely to arise. If the
groups concerned are already diverse in terms of interests then conflict may ensue and the
lack of financial incentives to co-operate is even more telling.
Budgets offer quantification of the financial consequences of plans of action. So action plans
consequent upon different value judgements can be assessed through budgets. Budgets are
also financial limits so they evidence the action feasibility of value judgements; budgets
dictate "what's do-able". Where one professional group holds a budget to purchase services
from another, the former group can exert some leverage over the latter in terms of the services
delivered. Knowledge of this leverage relationship opens up dialogue between the two parties,
(as was the case when GP fundholders re-established links with their colleagues in the
hospitals (Llewellyn, 1997)). Monetary exchanges can be "channels of communication"
(Ezzamel and Willmott, 1993, Llewellyn, 1997).
Budgets are particularly powerful instances of the integrative potential of both numbers and
money. The integrative potential of budgets relies on a principle that applies to both numbers
and money, "...things shall be put together." (Bernstein, 1971). Numbers are intimately
linked to the concept of rationality. The word "rational" is derived from the Latin ratio: a
reckoning (Morgan, 1965, p.32). Rationality began to replace tradition as a basis for the
legitimation of practice during the 19th century (Abbott, 1988, p. 190). Theorists, such as
Weber, predicted an inevitable trajectory of rationalization and disenchantment for the
modern world. Such a disenchanted world provides a context where the reassurance derived
from calculability can potentially replace the sanctity of ultimate values (Power, 1992;
Llewellyn, 1994). From a Weberian viewpoint, faith in the ultimate value of rationality began
to erode other value perspectives. A belief in the ultimate value of rationality enables a
context where numbers can begin to integrate dissimilar domains.
Porter (1998) offers a somewhat different picture on the integrative power of numbers. He
describes how rationalization (through quantification) rather than eroding other values,
renders them compatible, '....numbers are the medium through which dissimilar desires,
needs, and expectations are somehow made commensurable.' (p.86). Numbers are effective
integrators as they summarise complex events in familiar, reassuring and standardized forms.
By providing measurability, numbers constitute standards through which the actions dictated
by different value positions can be assessed. Numbers are "strategies of communication"
(Porter, 1998, p.viii) and provide conduits through which different discourses flow. Clegg
(1990) points out that people make sense of the projects on which they embark in terms of the
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"forms of calculation" (p.7) they have available to them. Numbers reduce, absorb and/or deny
the uncertainty that attaches to human values (and the projects these values give rise to). In all
of these ways, the trust and security that numbers can enable may begin to link dissimilar
"communities of knowing" (Boland and Tenkasi, 1995) or "social worlds" (Star and
Griesemer, 1989; Bowker and Star, 1999).
Numbers allow for a system of counting. From the earliest times man counted his possessions
to establish his status within his social group (Morgan, 1965, p.32). But 'number', as a purely
abstract concept, is not acceptable as a standard of value. In contrast, " Money measures not
only itself, but almost anything else which can be quantified. Money, in its broadest
definition, is the means for comparing -in quantitative terms- two unlike things on a scale
which is common to both of them." (Crump, 1990, p.92).
It was not until the advent ofmoney that incontrovertible comparisons between the wealth of
persons with dissimilar possessions could be made". Nor could satisfactory exchanges
between dissimilar things take place until money provided a common currency. Money was
an essential prerequisite for the move from subsistence production to specialization and the
division of labour (Morgan, 1965, p.l 1). As money provides a common denominator that
reifies value in terms of recognised units (Crump, 1990), money can support highly
differentiated forms of social relations. As Douglas (1982, p.58) points out, "...money in its
nature is essentially an instrument of freedom... [and]... it represents the opening of
opportunities."
Money is a social phenomenon. Yet questions on the meaning ofmoney in society have
tended to be subsumed within the discipline of economics (Frankel, 1977; Simmel, 1978;
Bretton, 1980). Neo-classical economics regards money as a purely functional mechanism
that acts as a medium of exchange, a store of value and a unit of account. Within this
framework, questions of the sociology (or philosophy) of money are not facilitated. In a
neglect of the non-economic aspects ofmoney, ".. .the opportunity to uncover, isolate, and
analyse the social roles, functions, purposes, and effects of a vital, if not the most vital,
ingredient of our social existence...". (Bretton, 1980, p.xiv) is lost.
In so far as the impact of money on social relations was considered within the economic
paradigm its effects were seen as individualizing (Frankel, 1977, p. 17-29.). Influential
sociologists who did touch upon the impact of money on social relations also thought
11 Before money, cattle were used as a standard article for the purposes of exchange. The word "pecuniary" is derived from
pecunia, the Latin for money, which came from pecus, the word for cattle.
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individualization to be the result ofmonetary exchange. For Marx, the crisis of alienation
within society could be ascribed to the increasing abstraction of relationships under
commodity exchange expressed in terms of money. In Capital Marx contrasted the alienation
of labour under abstract capitalist economic conditions, governed through money, with the
concrete and natural social relations that prevailed in pre-capitalist times, when production
was for direct use. Habermas made a conceptual distinction between the "lifeworld" of human
values and the "system world" ofwork; money and power operate as "steering mechanisms"
in the latter while communicative interaction is the "steering mechanism" in the former. In
believing that exchange through money inhibits the communicative interaction that supports
human values (and moral codes) Habermas is similar to Marx. Opinions concur that exchange
facilitated by money is a "silent trade'2" (Morgan, 1965, p.9).
However if the focus on money as a medium of exchange broadens out to a consideration of
the wider social function of money, other ways of thinking about money emerge. Marx
commented on money's, "....socially validated monopoly of equivalence... [as]... it preserves
and reproduces itself incessantly in its distinct form." (de Brunhoff, 1973, p.23). This
formulation opens the way for theories of the social impact of money13. In this respect, the
work of Georg Simmel was an exception to the dominant 19th and 20th century thinking that
linked money exclusively with individualization, alienation and non-communication. As he
feared the undermining of moral behaviour through the pursuit ofmoney, Simmel was
concerned to draw out the implications ofmonetary order for human morality (Frankel, 1977,
p.5). Simmel emphasised the ways in which social relations are expressed through symbolic
images. As society develops, the immediacy of interacting forces between individuals is
partially replaced by "...higher supra-individual formations, which appear as independent
representations of these [sic] forces and absorb and mediate the relations between individuals.
These formations exist in great variety; as tangible realities and as mere ideas and products of
the imagination; as complex organizations and as individual existences." (Simmel, 1978,
p. 174). Examples of such reified social functions are: how the law is embodied in the
judiciary; how the unity of a military regiment is incarnated in its flag; and how the function
of exchange becomes crystallized in money as an independent structure. For Simmel, money
was an extremely potent symbol that expressed images of unity and interdependence in social
relations.
12
Morgan (1965) describes very early forms of trade where not only was there no conversation but there was not even direct
contact between the traders. Members of a family (or tribe) would set the goods that they wished to dispose of and then retreat
and not return until the other parties to the bargain had displayed what they were willing to offer in return and retreated in their
turn.
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Anthropologists introduced the concept of "reciprocal recognition" (Gregory, 1997) as a
counterbalance to "individual cognition". The reciprocal recognition ofmoney as a standard
of value links relations between things to relations between people (Gregory, 1997, p. 12). The
circulation ofmoney depends upon the principle of reciprocity (although there is no need for
two reciprocal benefits to be coincident at a point in time). The constant flow of benefits
maintains (and is maintained by) a network of reciprocal obligations; the circulation ofmoney
and the prevailing social relations are mutually implicated and supportive (Crump, 1990). As
Hart (2000) puts it, "...the pursuit of its [money's] objective foundation is illusory. Money is
a measure of social interaction, no more, no less. We make it up, although most people prefer
to think of it as already made. Above all, the consequences of examining what money really is
are so shocking (because more metaphysical than physical) that the world, prefers, for the
most part, not to think about it... .We have only recently discovered the idea of 'virtual
reality', but in the world ofmoney we have been living with nothing else for a long time."
(p.245; p.253). Because money is something that we "make up" through social interaction, the
relationship between money and trust is a complex one.
Martin (1999) argues that money, "...allows- indeed provides a mechanism for- the
simultaneous 'stretching' and 'compression' of social interaction across time and space...".
Money symbolizes both formlessness and centrality14. As formlessness, it circulates as a
liquid medium that, lacking internal limits, has effects that are simultaneously both far-
reaching and reductionist (Simmel. 1978, p.495). Douglas (1982) points out that, "It is in the
nature ofmoney to flow freely, to be like water, to permeate." Money must be able to
circulate indefinitely across the span of people who are using it (Crump, 1990, p. 95). As
centrality, money is a "stable pole" (Simmel, 1978, p. 121) that sublimates the relativity of all
other things. People can ".. .take comfort from money's symbolic steadiness." (Hart, 2000,
p.264). Through this societally established form of trust, money makes possible an ever-
widening span of interdependence amongst people. This interdependence is fostered as trust
in money reduces social complexity. Money, just as power and truth, functions as a
communicative device that economizes on information; the "liquidity" ofmoney rests upon
both certainty (or centrality) and equivalence (or formlessness) (Frankel, 1977, p.38).
Trust in money also fosters integration, "Money blurs the edges of ideas, of groups, of
personalities." (Bretton, 1980, p.xxvi). In a barter economy, transactions are dependent upon
the social relationship between two people and require a co-incidence of "wants" at the same
14
Although Marx understood money as a social force, the intent of Capital was to expose the way that money is organized to
exploit working people (Hart, 2000, p.266)
14
This is reflected in our metaphors about money e.g money makes the world go around and money is the root of all evil.
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moment in time. But, in a money economy, the whole society guarantees the functioning and
acceptability of the money the two parties utilise. Exchanges are freed from the constraints of
transitory individual needs. A monetary transaction takes place through a promise
underwritten by a society. This promise recalls money's function as a means of keeping track
of our exchanges with others-as a way of remembering. Hart (2000) points out that money
and language are the primary cultural infrastructures that allow people to communicate with
each other, "Communities share meanings by means of markets and conversation, through
objective and subjective exchange." (p.321).
Simmel recognised how money comes to embody the potentiality of power, as it is, "...the
most certain, and most powerful, means of attaining not only known or immediate ends
chosen by the individual but also the most remote: even the as yet unformulated desires which
he might conceive." (Frankel, 1977, p. 13). But, the paradox at the heart of the power of
money is that it is nothing outside of the objects, services or rights to which it gives access. It
is argued here that Simmel's analysis ofmoney (as interdependence and power) is basic to
present day thinking ofmoney as a resource. When money is used as a resource to
accomplish valued ends the metaphorical associations of individualization, alienation and
non-communication are not always helpful. Money as a (re)source can be a source of
integration.
Having considered the potential for budgets to accomplish boundary work through exploring
some theoretical material on the integrative power of numbers and money, and the role of
numbers in establishing trust, this critical review now moves to look at the empirical work of
the thesis.
COMPARATIVE EMPIRICAL FINDINGS
This section focuses on the four empirical papers- Llewellyn, 1997, 1998a, 1998b and 1999.
Before discussing the contribution of these papers to boundary work, the methodology that
underlies the research projects on which the papers rely is described.
Methodology
The methods employed in all four of the empirical papers were qualitative and relied on semi-
structured interviews, supplemented by documentary sources (see specific papers for further
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details). Interviews (rather than, for example, focus groups) were conducted as the empirical
papers present the "strategising" (Barry and Elmes, 1997) of the professionals concerned. It
was thought that individuals would be more likely to reveal this strategising in one-to-one
interviews rather than in the more open and public forum of a focus group. In presenting the
empirical findings, the papers use narrative accounts (see Llewellyn, 1999) for an exposition
of narratives in management and accounting research). The methodology underlying these
methods is set out in Llewellyn, 1993. Key aspects of this methodology (along with
illustrations of its use in the empirical papers) are discussed in this section.
Llewellyn (1993) draws some linkages between hermeneutics and interpretative research in
management. Hermeneutics locates social action as a text-analogue i.e. the understanding of
social action is analogous to textual interpretation. This understanding is based upon four
areas of congruence between verstehen in the social sciences and textual interpretation. In
Llewellyn, 1993 these areas are summarised as four hermeneutic propositions:
Proposition One: The 'sense-content' of action and text must be drawn out; comprehension
cannot be immediate or unmediated.
Proposition Two: The text or the action has both personal and social significance, its social
dimension implying the possibility of institutionalization.
Proposition Three: The text or the action may transcend its encompassment within its initial
circumstances and develop meanings in other social contexts.
Proposition Four: Textual interpretation and social understanding are both essentially 'open'
in nature.
That these propositions are basic to the hermeneutic endeavour can be seen by locating them
within Giddens' notion of the 'double hermeneutic' (1976, p. 162; 1982, p. 11; 1984b, p.284).
The researcher encounters in the social world a realm that is already meaningful to the agents
involved. Agents' interpretations have been accomplished by reference to their own values
and beliefs and by what they perceive as the 'contextuality' of their action. 'Contextuality' is
here equated with the 'setting' of the action and defines the agents' awareness of the processes
and structures that they use to orient and make sense of their action (Giddens 1987, p.215).
Thus Proposition One implies that the 'sense-content' of social action must be explicated
through these first-order constructs (Giddens 1984b, p.284) but is not restricted to such
constructs. That the 'sense-content' of action is not confined to agents' own reasons, motives
and values lies in its nature as a social product (Propositions Two and Three). Consequently
researchers can construct 'second-order constructs' using their own 'technical' language which
re-interpret the action, events and experiences of the researched (Proposition Two). However
as human action is essentially an 'open work' (Proposition Four) the researched may choose to
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appropriate the 'second order constructs' of the researchers. Hence these 'second-order
constructs' may re-emerge as 'first-order constructs' presenting as fresh research material and
so on.
These four hermeneutic propositions have implications for empirical research, Llewellyn,
1993 summarises these as follows:
Implication One: Researchers can legitimately offer accounts of events which either differ
from or transcend the understandings of agents themselves.
Implication Two: The research insights will be generated by the processes of projection and
modification. They will reflect a synthesis of the frames of reference of the researcher and the
researched
Implication Three: The interpretive research act is a creative endeavour whose inner
coherence rests upon the starting point and boundaries which are imposed in the course of the
research. Consequently the research findings will take the form of a narrative but this
narrative is not constituted by a succession of episodes but constructs a meaningful totality
from scattered events.
Implication Four- Hermeneutic research is intrinsically critical as, first, understanding must
involve evaluation of actors' self-understanding and, second, actors may appropriate this
evaluation and thereby change is enacted.
Some illustrations of these propositions and implications (along with examples of first and
second order constructs ) in the four empirical papers are given in Appendix 1.
In order to provide a context for the empirical findings on boundary work in the public sector
it is necessary to give some comparative background on the NHS and social services. The
next section covers this material.
Comparing the NHS with Social Services
This section compares the NHS with social services along three dimensions relevant to
boundary work: the extent of professional autonomy; practitioner expertise and public esteem;
and relative internal differentiation.
The extent ofprofessional autonomy
Medicine is the archetypal strong profession (Schon, 1991) enjoying long history. Social
work is a weak and, relatively, new profession (Jones, 1999; Llewellyn, 1998) built on a
fragile base (Langan and Clarke, 1994). The welfare state embeds both bureaucracy and
professionalism within all its organizations, but in the various settings across the public
sector, the balance between the two elements is struck very differently (Newman and Clarke,
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1994). In medicine, professionalism is dominant, in the social services bureaucracy holds
sway. Social work is a state mediated profession (Johnson, 1972). In broad terms, social work
practice is determined by legislation and Department of Health guidance. Moreover, social
services form part of local government and professional practitioners are dependent on local
counsellors working through political committees for resources. In contrast, clinicians operate
autonomously (Harrison, 1999). Although they work to an overall budget set by central
government, decisions on the allocation ofmoney within the budget are purely professionally
driven (Harrison and Pollitt, 1994; Klein, 1995).
The very different levels of autonomy in health and social services can be understood through
the distinction between autonomy over ends and autonomy over means (Bailyn, 1985).
Autonomy over ends (or strategic autonomy) refers to the freedom to set organizational goals;
in the public sector it also entails making decisions over the sorts of problem the service
addresses. Autonomy over means implies the freedom to examine a problem, once it has been
set, through whatever ways are deemed appropriate, given the resource and strategic
constraints on the organization. Managers are more likely to be comfortable in ceding to
professionals autonomy over means than they are autonomy over ends. In health, although
clinicians have not had formal authority over the strategic direction of the NHS, in practice
they have - as strategy for the NHS emerged out of the individual decisions made by senior
clinicians (see above and Llewellyn and Tappin, 2001). For example, there was no explicit
policy decision to de-prioritise the "Cinderella services" of mental health and geriatrics but,
consequence on the relative powerlessness of the clinicians in these areas (and their
associated inability to direct resources to their advantage), historically these specialisms
became underfunded.
In the social services there is some autonomy over means but no autonomy over ends. The
state determines ("ends") through the constructions of the client "needs" that are to be served;
it also mediates in the ("means") in which these needs are met (Llewellyn, 1998a). Baritz
(1960) termed social workers "servants of power", reflecting their function as agents for
governmental decision-making. In particular, social workers perform a control function for
the state. They take children into "care", commit individuals to mental hospitals and advise
elderly persons to enter a "home". These are all decisions that centre on the management of
risk to the individuals concerned but also alleviate threats to the welfare of others (Llewellyn,
1998a). As Wilson (1993) points out, the therapeutic programmes offered in care centres
obscures their other purposes as services that contain "difficult" people and diffuse
discontent. Social workers make decisions that manage individuals who may cause social
problems and, in this respect, social services serve the state.
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These distinctions between autonomy over means and autonomy over ends in health and
social services impact on the extent to which both organizations were rule-governed (and
hence, responded through collective action) or were loosely-coupled collaborative systems
(and, hence responded through individualized action). With limited individualized autonomy,
the social services operates as a strong hierarchy with numerous prescriptive rules that enable
collective action (Wildavsky, 1986, p.23). With a high degree of individual autonomy,
clinicians in the health service have been, largely, free of prescriptive rules over their conduct
and any collective action has been negotiated between individuals.
Practitioner expertise andpublic esteem
In part because of the circumstances discussed above, the professions are in receipt of very
different levels of public esteem. Although, in recent times, there has been some diminution
in the high public status ofmedicine, the general background to this has been one of unlimited
trust (Leverment and Ackers, 2000). The NHS, as an institution, has been, and to a certain
extent still is, sacrosanct- a great British icon symbolizing national pride and unity (Llewellyn,
1997). Social workers, in contrast, have been subject to public vilification (Langan and
Clarke, 1994) and are, at best, generally seen as "brokers in lesser evils"(Stevenson, 1994,
p. 173). The risk management and control aspects to social work (e.g. taking children "into
care" and committing people to psychiatric hospitals) do not tend to enhance the public worth
of the services offered. The intrinsic value of the social services tends to be questioned by the
public and the profession is, at best, tolerated- it is certainly not held in high regard
{Llewellyn, 1998a).
Medicine is a male-dominated profession based on a strong epistemological structure through
its grounding in science. Clinical expertise is fixed in the public mind as the outcome of a
technical process mediated through judgement (Power, 1995). Social work practice is
feminized (Abbott and Wallace, 1990) and, hence its professionalism is conceived in terms of
the "power of nurturance" (Lorentzon, 1990). Nurturance implies "caring" but nor "curing";
on a carer/curer continuum social workers strive to be seen by the public as carers and are
certainly not viewed as curers. Whereas clinicians are firmly positioned as curers and, if
occasionally seen as lacking in sufficient caring qualities, such attributes can be delegated to
the nursing profession (and thus retained within the health arena (Walby et al, 1994).
Practitioners in the social services utilize tacit or experiential knowledge and they work in
poorly defined situations {Llewellyn, 1998a). Social workers apply "know-how". Such
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knowledge does not exist in the abstract ready to be applied to a particular situation (Frankel,
1977, p.51) but must be fashioned at the time to meet the exigencies of the problem.
Outcomes are unpredictable in social work in part because the active co-operation of the
client is required for successful outcomes (Llewellyn, 1998a; Llewellyn and Saunders, 1998).
In contrast, clinicians utilize scientific knowledge and through the skills of diagnosis,
inference and treatment decompose illness into technical specialisms that do not differ much
between patients and, hence can be treated by standardarized remedies, irrespective of the
patient's circumstances and history (Whitley, 1995).
Relative internal differentiation
Health care is characterized by tremendous internal differentiation. There is a remarkable
variety of occupational groups involved in patient care (e.g. radiographers, midwives,
occupational therapists, district nurses, dieticians, health visitors, physiotherapists and
clinicians) each with their own view of the patient and the solution to the patient's problems
(Mackay et al, 1995). Even within the ranks of the doctors there are marked internal divisions
between, for example, junior doctors and consultants and hospital doctors and GPs.
Honigsbaum (1979) commented on the hostile divide between hospital consultants and GPs
(based in differences in workplace, tasks and career structure) that had developed since the
inception of the NHS. Issues of philosophy, training and social attitudes create divisions not
only between GPs and hospital clinicians but also within the hospitals between physicians and
surgeons (Dingwall, 1995; Llewellyn 1997; Llewellyn, 1999).
The different practitioner groups in health care work independently and autonomously
bounded by their own skills, experience and knowledge base (Mackay et al, 1995). Although
the delivery of health care has been dominated by technical rationalism (Klein, 1995) other
health care models are now becoming evident. Beattie (1991, 1993) argues that there are four
competing "practice paradigms" in health care: the biotechnical model; the biographical
model; the ecological model; and the communitarian model. These offer very various
strategies of intervention in order to improve the health of patients (Beattie, 1995). The
biotechnical approach focuses on rectifying health defects through biomedical science. The
biographical model identifies problematic life events and offers coping strategies. The
ecological model is concerned with environmental hazards and seeks social intervention to
reduce risks. The communitarian model mobilizes social movements to share health concerns
and campaign for change. The various occupational groups discussed above do not map
unambiguously on to these models but there are clear linkages. Doctors remain committed to
the biotechnical model but GPs, for example, tend to be more receptive to the biographical
and the communitarian models than their hospital counterparts (see Llewellyn, 1997 and
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Llewellyn and Grant, 1996 for comments from GPs on appropriate health care interventions).
There are considerable professional tensions both within the ranks of clinicians (Llewellyn,
1997) and between the different health care professional groups (Walby et al, 1994).
In contrast to health care, the social services are much more homogenous. The work domain
is structured into predominantly female "front-line workers" (Llewellyn, 1998a) and senior
male management (Jones, 1999). Although there are tensions between these two groups
(Jones, 1999), social work is not characterised by a multiplicity of different (and sometimes
competing) practitioner groups and associated ideologies, as health care is.
These key differences (on autonomy, knowledge base, public esteem and internal
differentiation) between health and social care have both mediated the ways in which
managerialism has penetrated them and impacted on the boundary work between managers
and professionals in the two domains.
Boundary work in the NHS and Social Services
Managerialism has penetrated health care and social work differently. Whilst both domains
have been subject to new forms of financial control through devolved budgets, (see Llewellyn,
1997; Llewellyn, 1998a; Llewellyn 1998b) and a more generally constrained economic
environment through quotas, targets and cash limits, (see Llewellyn, 1997; Llewellyn, 1998a;
Llewellyn 1998b; and Llewellyn, 1999) the way that the reforms have been implemented has
varied. Throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, health care was subject to the quasi-market
and began to embody limited competition, whereas social services remained a monopolistic
provider. In the NHS there has been considerable recruitment of private sector managers into
senior management posts (Llewellyn, 2001a). Private sector staff have introduced a new set of
value commitments and task orientations. But, in the social services, senior managers
continue to be drawn almost exclusively from the social work profession (Lawler and Hearn,
1997). So if new values are to be generated they must come from a re-orientation in existing
mind-sets. In terms of the institutional environment it can be argued that social work has been
less "reformed" than health care. However, it could equally be asserted that, the impact of the
reforms on work practices has been greater in social work then in health (see below). This
section continues by discussing first, how the boundary between professional and managerial
work is changing and second, the impact of boundary budgets in the two empirical areas
under the three subsections introduced in the earlier comparative empirical sections.
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The extent ofprofessional autonomy
As discussed above, professional autonomy is greater in health care than in social work. This
circumstance has impacted on the extent to which individual clinicians and social workers
could evade (or embrace) devolved financial responsibilities. Fundholding, as a scheme, was
optional within general practice (Llewellyn, 1997) Although the introduction of clinical
directorates into health care was obligatory, assuming the boundary role of clinical director
was voluntary (Llewellyn, 2001a). Doctors who became fundholders (or clinical directors13)
did so because, either they had a particular interest in management and/or they anticipated
power gains through devolved budgeting. Moreover, GP fundholders and clinical directors
passed on routine operational management to other groups (generally, business managers and
nurses, Llewellyn 1997; Llewellyn, 2001a). So although many doctor-managers did assume a
"two-way" (Llewellyn, 2001a) orientation, core clinical practice remained insulated from
managerialism. This insulation came about as, first, the majority of clinicians remain
disengaged from management and, second, there were opportunities in health care to delegate
the more mundane administrative component of managerialism. Perhaps even more
significantly, social work was already much more bureaucratized than health care (see above)
and, therefore, constituted a more receptive environment for management discourses. The
impact of managerialism has been much more uniform in the social services than in health
care and work practices have been transformed to a much greater extent.
All front-line social workers have been re-created as "care managers". This change of title has
brought with it a greatly increased administrative component to social work, with a
corresponding decrease in opportunities to engage in therapeutic practice with clients
{Llewellyn, 1998a). Although budgets may only have been devolved as far as team manager
level and, thus, held away from the front line of service delivery {Llewellyn, 1998a; 1998b),
all team managers have budgetary responsibilities. The boundary between managerialism and
social work has become much more blurred than that between managerialism and clinical
work.
Practitioner expertise andpublic esteem
In so far as "real" social work is equated with professional counselling expertise, increasing
managerialism has marginalized this in favour of the control dimension of the social services
(Llewellyn, 1998a; 1998b). There is more evidence, in the social services, of managerial tasks
15
As the role of clinical director was obligatory if there were no consultants with an active interest in management
then the post tended to became filled by the most politically acceptable candidate to the clinical elite.
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and knowledges being forced through to the heart of professional expertise itself
(Scarbrough,1995, p.41). And, in this process, there are more indications in the social services
that the nature of professional work is changing. In social work, financial accountabilities and
an awareness of cost constraints permeate the organization of work to a more uniform extent
than they do in health care, where doctor-managers assume these responsibilities on behalf of
their colleagues. This increasing managerialism in social work is consistent with a workforce
that can no longer harbour, "...illusions about professional autonomy or ideals that service to
the clients is paramount." (Jones, 1999, p.47).
The government proceeded more cautiously in health care in pushing managerialism through
to the heart of professional expertise, in part because of the higher public esteem that health
care enjoys. The strong epistemological structure ofmedicine, through its grounding in
science, also militates against colonization by managers and managerialism. Although
clinicians can take on managerial responsibilities, managers cannot assume clinical tasks
(Llewellyn, 2001a). The scientific expertise of clinicians has proved more of a defence
against integration with management than the "know-how" of social workers. Nevertheless,
the advance ofmanagerialism in both domains has had an effect on public perceptions on the
nature of professional expertise, "This has lost some of its ethical and rhetorical baggage and
has increasingly been marketed as a commodity "(Scarbrough, 1995, p. 12). In the case of the
social work this has resulted in changes at the "threshold" (Llewellyn, 1994) of the
organization as the social services face a loss of work to the private and voluntary sectors
{Llewellyn, 1998a).
Relative internal differentiation
The NHS is a highly internally differentiated organization (see above sections), offering many
and various interstices through which managerialism can enter. This circumstance predicts
that the impact of managerialism will be more varied within health care than in social
services- as the latter is a more homogeneous environment. The evidence from the empirical
research drawn upon for this thesis indicates that this is indeed the case. Within health care
certain groups were enthusiastic about doing boundary work and integrating into a
managerialist framework.
GP fundholders, for example, grasped the purchasing power that budgets conferred. Holding
funds at the practice level allowed GPs to exert financial leverage over their hospital
colleagues in three ways: using contracts to specify (to the advantage ofGPs) processes of
case management at the interface with the hospitals; using contracts to press for specific
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quality standards in clinical practice within the hospitals; and using the financial flexibility of
the devolved budget to "take back" into primary care certain clinical procedures that had been
the sole province of secondary care (Llewellyn, 1997). A latent intra-professional conflict
galvanised fundholding processes and GPs anticipated power gains through holding budgets.
The boundary between general practice and management has always been more blurred than
that between hospital clinical practice and management- as GPs have always run their
surgeries and to this extent, have always engaged with a management agenda. Nevertheless, it
is clear that many GPs seized upon the opportunity of holding budgets in order to achieve a
greater integration between themselves and the hospitals and, in doing so, leveraged their
power position within the NHS (Llewellyn, 1997).
Within the hospitals, doctors have been more cautious about an engagement with a
managerialist agenda (Pollitt et. al., 1988; Preston et.ah, 1992; Harrison and Pollitt, 1994).
However the institution of clinical directorates resulted in some doctors assuming a "two-
way" orientation between medicine and management through budget- holding (Llewellyn,
2001a). In this case their motivation was driven, first, by the realisation that if clinicians did
not assume the responsibility to manage medicine, managers would, and, second, by a
prescience of positioning clinical directors advantageously in the strategic decision-making of
the hospital (Llewellyn, 2001a).
In terms of an engagement with managerialism, the expertise of surgeons is closer to that of
managers than is the expertise of physicians (Llewellyn, 1999). The action orientation of
surgical work is reliant on the cultural values of strength, heroism and boldness to legitimate
its interventionism (Abbott, 1988, p. 188). These attributes mirror the characteristics of
strength, boldness and aggression implied by management and leadership (Mills, 1993). The
bias-for-action mentality of surgeons is reflected in the "super-hero" management literature
(c.f. the work of Drucker, 1968 and Peters and Waterman, 1982). In addition, the nature of
surgical work indicates that it will be more easily penetrated by a managerialist agenda.
Surgery involves an action-sequence, is of an interventionist nature and takes place within a
limited time frame; it has clearer outcomes (than medicine) and is, therefore, more amenable
to counting and measurement (Llewellyn, 1999). The practice of management, in terms of
techniques to promote organizational efficiency, value for money and accountable
performances, is more aligned with the practice of surgery than that of medicine.
Inputs and outputs are not transparent in medicine. Hence technical efficiency (in the sense of
an optimal relationship between inputs and outputs) is not easy either to establish or to
achieve in medicine. Physicians are not as able as their surgeon colleagues to argue for
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resources in the managerial categories of productivity and efficiency. These differences
between surgeons and physicians resulted in a differential take-up of clinical budget-holding,
with many more surgeons than physicians assuming the management role of medical director
{Llewellyn, 1999).
The differentiated nature of the health services results in multiple points of both receptivity
and resistance to managerialism. This heterogeneity within health can be understood as
equating to its many and different intersections of power/knowledge (Foucault, 1972; 1979;
1980; 1986). The relative powerlessness of GPs vis-a-vis the hospital consultants and the
differential nature of the knowledge base in surgery vis-a-vis medicine offer examples of why
managerialism has met with an uneven response in the NHS. GPs saw an opportunity to
increase their power in relation to the consultants (Llewellyn, 1997). Surgeons tend to feel a
greater affinity with managers (than do physicians) as the practices of surgery and
management have some commonalities {Llewellyn, 1999). Scarbrough (1995) identifies
expertise as "...the medium through which knowledge grasps power...(p.28). The field of
health care offers differential opportunities for clinicians to grasp power through the
assumption of budget-holding; hence the uneven response to management across the NHS.
In contrast, managerialism has advanced across more homogeneous terrain in the social
services. As an organization firmly located towards the bureaucracy end of the bureau-
professional spectrum, the social services have been more bound by prescriptive rules that
ensured more uniform responses to events {Llewellyn, 1998b). Moreover, a strong
organizational culture, embodying shared moral values, enables a collective response to
problem-solving. The social services are not characterised by differential sites of
power/knowledge in the way that the NHS is; therefore, the impact of budget-holding has
been less variable - as less opportunities have been around for power re-negotiations.
However, there has been a range of different individual responses to managerialism in social
work. As in health, individuals with a more entrepreneurial mind-set have embraced
management ideologies, resulting in a "patchy" reaction across individuals {Llewellyn, 1998b;
Llewellyn, 2001a). The clearest differentiation in response to managerialism in the social
services is between front-line workers and more senior management. Practising social
workers (now care managers), as front-line workers, have to justify decisions in face-to face
situations with clients {Llewellyn, 1998a). If tight budgets do not stretch to meet clients'
needs, the "emotional labour" (Langan and Clarke, 1994) involved with clients may be
considerable. In contrast, senior management is positioned away from the front line of service
delivery and has the responsibility for ensuring overall financial control. Hence the
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differential enthusiasm between the inner core (of senior management) and the outer
periphery (of front-line workers) in social services for managerialism is not surprising.
There is some comparability in terms of their alignment with a managerialist agenda between
physicians and social workers. The higher uncertainty in diagnosis and treatment in medicine
(than surgery) gives rise to a greater use of, "...experience, trial and error, intuition and
muddling through." (Schon, 1991, p.43). Moreover, physicians (as social workers) tend to
deal with patients/clients with multiple problems with unclear prognoses. Hence, the
trajectory of care in medicine is more complex and open-ended (than in surgery). These issues
make the work of physicians and social workers less easily standardised (than that of
surgeons). Moreover, an "optimal" relationship between inputs and outputs is more difficult
to assert in medicine and social work, than it is in surgery. In these ways, the boundary
between management and surgery is less secure; this can be seen in the greater use of
protocols and guidelines in surgery, in the establishment of twenty-four hour routine surgery
centres and the easier production of surgical costs for benchmarking purposes (Northcott and
Llewellyn, 2001; Northcott and Llewellyn, forthcoming). These circumstances indicate that
the impact ofmanagerialism has had a differential balance of advantage and disadvantage
between medicine (and social work) and surgery. Surgeons are more able to argue for
resources in management terms but their practice is more subject to processes of
rationalization than their medical colleagues. In the social services, work practices are not
transparent in managerial terms but the greater level of bureaucratization in social work (see
above) has, nevertheless, enabled high degree of penetration for management agendas.
CONCLUDING DISCUSSION
The above sections have delineated some of the key differences between the NHS and social
services in terms of the impact of boundary work at the interface between professionalism and
managerialism; this concluding discussion focuses more on some of the similarities.
The logic behind the devolution of budgets throughout the public sector is to ensure that
"..resources flow to the point in the organization where user needs are assessed." (Langan and
Clarke, 1994, p.81). The idea being to couple "caring" and "costing" in a unitary set of tasks
undertaken by an individual. Previously "caring" and "costing" operated as "internally
circular structures" (Luhmann, 1989, p. 15) driven by professional and managerial groups who
had little contact with one another. In order to integrate the tasks of costing and caring
boundary work has been carried out. The empirical papers illustrate some commonalities in
the ways in which the boundaries between professionalism and managerialism have been
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dissolved as professionals decide that some aspects of management can have beneficial
consequences for their practice.
First, professionals occupying boundary roles (care managers, fundholding GPs or clinical
directors) embody, through their work, sets of ideas belonging to professionalism ("caring")
and sets of ideas associated with management ("costing"). This "two-way" orientation leads
to some integration between professionalism and managerialism (Llewellyn, 2001a).
Boundary workers come to perceive that costing may, in some circumstances, enhance caring
(Llewellyn, 1997; 1998a). Some care managers and GP fundholders judged that a greater
degree of cost consciousness could, conceivably, result in savings and, therefore, more money
to spend on caring (Llewellyn, 1997; 1998a). Another way in which professionals think that
budgeting may enable "caring" is when a budget is allocated to what was, previously, a
"Cinderella" area. Care managers commented on how the budget for community care had
resulted in a shift in focus away from child welfare- previously the highest priority client
category (Llewellyn, 1998a). GP fundholders remarked on how they were able to use
allocated resources to introduce community psychiatric services and complementary medicine
(medical hypnosis, aromatherapy and reflexology) (Llewellyn, 1997).
Second, certain professionals perceived that some of their colleagues were exploiting or even
abusing their professional autonomy and, that, more active management would "bring them
into line". Some of the surgeons were aggrieved that a sub-set of their medical colleagues
persistently overspent their budgets (Llewellyn 1999; Llewellyn, 2001a). A few of the care
managers commented that budgeting went some way to preventing individual social workers
overspending to the detriment of other colleagues and other clients (Llewellyn, 1998a).
Clinical directors were keen to curtail colleagues who continued with idiosyncratic practices
(for example, by maintaining longer than average length of stay with no appropriate clinical
indications) (Llewellyn, 2001a).
Third, professionals perceived that there were areas where the greater degree of formalization
associated with management was beneficial to "caring". For example, social workers judged
that contracting with care home owners could sometimes prevent abuses of client rights
(Llewellyn, 1998a). GP fundholders related instances where consultants were now more
careful about care management issues (e.g. patient discharge letters and communication of
information relating to changes in clinical practices in the hospitals). Clinicians in the
hospitals perceived that more management expertise was required on the risk management
aspects of clinical practice in the more litigious contemporary environment (Llewellyn,
2001a).
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Fourth, in all areas of the public sector there have always been professionals who have some
sympathy with management agendas and ideologies. The preceding section has analysed in
some detail the more managerialist mind-set of surgeons (than physicians) and the greater
compatibility of surgical work (than medical) to the management categories of efficiency and
productivity. But, aside from these group alignments, there are also individuals who are more
management oriented. There are clinicians who enjoy the tasks of organizing, budgeting and
ensuring organizational accountability (Llewellyn, 1999). Some GP fundholders relished
negotiation and bargaining with the hospital consultants (Llewellyn, 1997). A few social
workers got "a gleam on their eye" at the opportunity to act in an entrepreneurial, even
combative, way (Llewellyn, 1998a). Some professionals were liberated by the more
managerial climate in public services!
Managing expert labour
Expertise and money are the fundamental resources in public sector organizations. Practising
professionals can use their exclusive claims to the control of expertise in the public sector to
circumvent change. They have also, traditionally, mobilised their knowledge-power-expertise
to make the individual decisions that have driven the allocation ofmoney in the public sector.
Increasingly, however, rather than money being held centrally (with global budgets as the
norm) managerial professionals are using their power to devolve budgets to enhance their
control of public sector activities. Money is being utilised both as a means of achieving some
integration between managerial and professional work and as a way of controlling the
professionals. Hence, the allocation ofmoney is a potentially powerful way of managing
expert labour. The empirical papers in this thesis illustrate some of the various consequences
of using money as a mode of control in public services.
When money conveyed purchasing power on GPs, the channels of communication between
primary and secondary care were re-opened16 (Llewellyn, 1997). Previously the separately
secured funding of the hospitals and the higher status of clinicians in secondary care
combined to isolate GPs from the medical schools and to silence their voices in negotiating
clinical developments. The power of budgets to dictate "what's do-able" in professional
practice was clearly evident in both health and social care (Llewellyn ,1998a and Llewellyn,
1999). Albeit that, in the social services, tight financial constraints dictated that collective
responses were made to management's attempts to devolve financial responsibilities to
16
This "re-opening" may have taken the form of an additional renewal of communications if there had been
significant private referrals between the GPs and the local consultants.
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particular individuals (Llewellyn, 1998b). There were also indications of a more managerial
work orientation (consequent on delegated budgeting) in both health and social care, albeit
that some areas (for example, surgery) had a greater initial receptivity to key management
categories. Moreover, there were differential possibilities for professionals to enhance their
power-base through assumption of management responsibilities. In health care there were
examples of professional advance through budget-holding (e.g. GPs (Llewellyn, 1997) and
clinical directors (Llewellyn, 2001a) whereas in social services the result of delegated budgets
was solely to increase the control of senior management (Llewellyn, 1998b). In the hospitals
there was evidence of a new area of expertise emerging- that of "medical management". This
emergent domain looks to be professionally dominated (Llewellyn, 2001a). The implications
of using money as a control tool in the public sector are, on the evidence of the work in this
thesis, highly domain specific.
Several pressing issues indicate a requirement for greater integration between managerial and
professional knowledges in the public sector. Determining the strategic direction of public
services, instituting an aggregate approach to service delivery, dealing with technological
advance (in the context of resource constraints), implementing risk management, negotiating
rising consumer expectations and utilising public-private partnerships all require a
"knowledge in the world" approach. Creating expertise that overlaps professional and
managerial work, through integrating "caring" and "costing", is a key challenge for public
sector management. This thesis has sought to make a contribution in this area.
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APPENDIX 1
Illustrations of the hermeneutic methodology in the empiricalpapers
Proposition One that the sense content of action must be drawn out is evident in the narrative
accounts of all four papers. For example, the proposal in Llewellyn 1999 that the orientation
of surgeons is closer to a management perspective than that of physicians was deduced from
comparing the actions and attitudes of surgeons against the actions and attitudes of managers
(first order constructs). Not all surgeons were consciously aware of a closer alignment with a
management agenda, but an analysis of their actions indicated that this was the case. This
closer alignment fosters different terms of engagement with managerialism for surgery than
medicine. Thus the penetration of the clinical realm by managerialism (a second order
construct (or social product)) differed between surgery and medicine.
Proposition Two on the possibility of institutionalization was demonstrated, for example, in
Llewellyn, 1998b. Social workers were diffusing budget responsibilities in order to avoid
painful "emotional labour" with clients when budgets did not stretch to meet needs (a first
order construct). However, these individual responses were rapidly becoming institutionalized
as social products as the "normal" reaction to budget pressures.
Proposition Three on actions developing meanings in other social contexts is seen, for
example, in Llewellyn, 1997 where the latent conflict between the GPs and hospital
consultants (first order constructs) took on a new dimension under fundholding. GPs were
able to launch a professional challenge (a social product) against the consultants under the
auspices of fundholding as a political initiative.
Proposition Four on the "open" nature of interpretation is again evident in all the papers. One
example is the understanding of the doctor-manager role (Llewellyn, 1997, 1999, 2001a). The
example of GPs who were "early-takers" in fundholding indicated an enhanced power
position for them in the NHS (first order constructs). But the evidence on clinical directors
has been more ambiguous. There are indications that some of these doctor-managers are
becoming new "clinical bosses", on the other hand it could be argued that they are acting as
subordinates to NHS general managers. The story of the power-positioning of doctor-
managers (a social product) is an on-going one.
Implication One is again demonstrated in the narratives of all four papers in the sense that
these narrative accounts are "metastories". Metastories interweave quotes from the
interviewees with theoretical understandings that will not usually be available to them. One
52
example is the analogy in Llewellyn, 1999 of surgeons as counters and physicians as
philosophers. This builds on but also extends the self-understandings of the clinicians
involved in the study.
Implication Two -that processes of projection and modification generate the research insights-
was shown, for example, in Llewellyn 1998a where the "boundary work" thesis was taken
back at the second stage of this research for comment and amendment from the interviewees.
Implication Three is also seen in all the papers. For example, the narrative in Llewellyn 1997
begins at the inception of the fundholding scheme and is focussed on key players. These
boundary definitions produce a very different account of the impact of fundholding than
would be obtained from the later "takers" or, indeed, from non-fundholding GPs.
Implication four on the intrinsically critical nature of hermeneutic research is again apparent
in all the papers. One example is that the strategies identified in Llewellyn 1998b to diffuse
budget responsibilities (first order constructs) may be appropriated and extended by other care
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Working in hermeneutic circles in
management accounting research: some
implications and applications
Sue Llewellyn*
Ways of thinking about accounting have changed. Management accounting, in
particular, has escaped from being encompassed by a set of calculative procedures. It is
now accepted that accounting has organizational and social significance simultaneously
reflecting and shaping both structures and ideas. Consequently there has been
increasing research interest into the meaning and roles attributed to accounting,
processual change in accounting, and accounting histories. Such extensive definitional
and boundary changes inevitably brought into focus an issue which was previously
unproblematically peripheral to the concerns of accounting researchers—that of
methodology. There has been some realization that what is researched and how it is
researched are interlinked—that new research methodologies will reveal new research
agenda. However, this heightened awareness of the importance of methodology has not
been matched by a consideration of its implications for empirical accounting research.
This paper seeks to redress this imbalance by, first, identifying a nexus of ideas from
hermeneutics—ideas which understand action as a text analogue—and, second,
drawing out some substantive conclusions on what the adoption of such a methodology
would mean for empirical, interpretative accounting research.
Key words: hermeneutics; methodology; interpretive; empirical; case study methods.
1. Introduction
For a time in management accounting research two prescriptive arguments existed side
by side; then they began to converge. First there were calls for the correction of a
perceived imbalance between normative theorizing (when abstracted from any real-life
context) and empirical research; less of the former and more of the latter was
prescribed (Tomkins and Groves, 1983; Kaplan, 1986; Scapens, 1990). The usefulness
of normative theory, when founded on the assumption that introspection and deduction
could improve accounting without reference to its practical functioning within
organizations, was challenged by researchers such as Kaplan who cited the need for a
science of management accounting to be built upon empirical research using the tools
of observation, classification and measurement. However, this advocacy of empirical
work remained implicitly positivist. Its aim was the faithful representation of practice
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in order that systems could be designed to enhance the 'relevance' of accounting to
modern organizations (Johnson and Kaplan, 1987, Johnson, 1992). Meanwhile, a
parallel development was occurring—the theoretical claims of traditional mainstream
positivist research to portray 'mirror-like' representations of an objective reality were
increasingly being questioned by an emerging interpretive research agenda. Hines
(1989) has termed this agenda 'the sociopolitical paradigm'.1 From such a perspective
'. . .researchers aim to understand the meanings which are given to accounting in
particular settings.' and researchers are aware that '. . . order is as much constructed as
it is revealed by accounting means.' (Hopwood, 1983, p. 288, p. 294). As the
interrelationship of these prescriptive arguments became more apparent a new area of
inquiry opened up for accounting researchers and this new research agenda suggested a
fruitful convergence between the interpretive and the empirical traditions.
The developments outlined above allowed the crystallization of certain key clusters of
new interpretive research questions. These were, first, an understanding of the
meanings and roles atrributed to accounting (Burchell et al., 1980; Hopwood, 1983;
Meyer, 1986; Lavoie, 1987; Richardson, 1987; Miller and O'Learv, 1990), second, a
critical assessment of the accounting endeavour and the potential for radical accounting
change (Cooper, 1983; Laughlin, 1987), and third, inquiry into the situated nature of
accounting tracing its spacial and temporal trajectories (Hopwood, 1987; Loft, 1986;
Miller et al. 1991). That the boundaries of management accounting research have
shifted in this way is of interest in itself. Edwards and Emmanuel (1990) conclude that,
'. . .management accounting is a discipline in transition.' (p. 61). But despite the
widening domain of interpretive accounting research and within this extended domain
the identification of specific research themes, there has not been a proliferation of
qualitative empirical studies. That this has not happened may be due, in part, to the
exigencies and imperatives of academic life which inveigh against time-consuming
qualitative work (Willmott, 1983) but there are other underlying issues.
Before exploring these issues, the structure of the paper is explained. Eollowing this
introduction the paper falls into two parts: first, there is a discussion of hermeneutics as
a methodology, identifying some basic propositions and implications for empirical
research and, second, there is an analysis of the potential impact of hermeneutics by
reference to two completed case studies from the management accounting literature.
These studies are Dent's (1991) analysis of change at the railways, 'Accounting and
organizational cultures: a field study of the emergence of a new organizational reality.'
and Innes and Mitchell's (1990) paper on the electronics industry, 'The process of
change in management accounting: some field study evidence.'
Some issues in the development of interpretive work
This paper introduces hermeneutics as an interpretive methodology, in doing so it
argues, first, that the methodology adopted will shape the research process and the
research findings to a far greater extent than will the research methods. The following
distinction between methodology and methods is proposed—that methodology reflects
the ontological and epistemological assumptions of the researcher (particularly those
concerning the relationship between subject and object) whereas methods are
secondary concerns around the techniques used for data collection. There is still a lack
'Mines used this phrase to describe theoretical developments which encompassed financial accounting. This
paper concentrates on management accounting, however, the phrase is still descriptive of the shift away from
positivist research whether applied to management accounting or financial accounting.
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of clarity on this distinction (see, for example, Spicer, 1992). One of the central themes
of this paper is that interpretive empirical work should be explicitly grounded in a
methodology rather than a method (Llewellyn, 1992).
Where subject and object are thought to be independent, as in positivist research,
the subject conceptualizes the research as the observation and recording of information
about the object. However, in social science the object of the research will be a social
one. 'Social' objects, as compared with natural objects, have features which complicate
the research process. Social objects will be 'intrinsically meaningful' (Sayer, 1992) or
'concept-dependent' (Bhasker, 1979). Thus in, for example, the Dent study on the
process of change at the railways, rail travel with its associated cultural and material
practices was already constituted as meaningful both for railway employees and for the
researcher. Thus when an interpretive researcher seeks to understand what the railways
mean to those who work there, this understanding will, in part, be informed by the
researcher's own pre-understanding. In addition, in any social setting, systems of
meaning will be 'reciprocally confirming' (Williams, quoted in Sayer, 1992) with work
practices. Changes in work practices will, therefore, be accompanied by changes in
their meaning. Thus the meanings attributed to work practices are not just in the
minds of those engaged in them, what social phenomena '. . .are depends on what they
mean in society to its members.' (Sayer, 1992, p. 30, emphasis in the original).
The major difference between interpretive and positivist research is that interpretive
research will attempt, in some way, to address these connections between subject and
object and between meanings and practices. The proposition that methodology, not
methods, has primacy in the research process is explored further in the third section of
the paper where it is shown that the knowledge generated in the Dent and the Innes
and Mitchell studies was quite different (although both projects were case study based
and used semi-structured interview techniques) thus demonstrating the crucial role of
methodology in the production of knowledge. Therefore, although interpretive
accounting researchers frequently employ case study methods (along with other tools
such as archival research, verbal analysis or participant observation) such procedures
remain data collection techniques as they cannot and will not be sufficient to provide a
methodological framework for interpretive management accounting research.
Second, although there has been an increasing interest in methodology stemming
from a recognition that the research methodology and the object of the investigation are
linked (as was outlined above, new research questions around accounting change, roles
and histories cannot be disentangled from empirical and interpretive means of enquiry)
there has been a lack of clarity and precision to the term 'interpretive' as a
methodology.2 That interpretive methodologies have been rather nebulous in content
is, in part, a consequence of the confusion between methods and methodologies (as
discussed above). Sometimes the terms 'method' and 'methodology' have been taken to
be interchangeable. On other occasions methodology has been equated with the way
that interpretive accounting researchers deal with the criticisms (around validity,
reliability and generalization) of case study methods put forward by the positivists
(Spicer, 1992). Where an interpretive methodology has been explicitly adopted it has
2The (1990) Covaleski and Dirsmith paper is an exception to this in its explication of double reflexivity and
dialectic tension in interpretive work. However, the earlier 'methodology' papers (Tomkins and Groves,
1983; Hopper and Powell, 1985; Morgan, 1988; Chua, 1988) concentrated on the classification of a range of
ontological and/or epistemological assumptions to the neglect of a consideration of how such assumptions
would shape the research act.
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tended to limit the research findings to an explication of the subjective realms of agents'
experiences (this propensity is examined more closely later in this paper with reference
to the Dent study).
Third, scant attention has been paid to tracing the implications of an interpretive
methodology for empirical research. Where a prior theoretical framework has been
adopted by interpretive management accounting researchers, such a framework, rather
than constituting a methodological stance, has tended to form the explanatory medium
through which the research findings are interpreted.3 The work of Habermas, Giddens
and Foucault has been used in this way (see Laughlin, 1987; Macintosh and Scapens,
1990; Stewart, 1992). The purpose of this paper is not to deny the potential of such
approaches but to argue that research can proceed from a less encompassing initial
position and still be methodologically informed. Such an approach should more readily
generate new theoretical insights [cf. the classic grounded theory tradition of Glaser
and Strauss (1967)] than will the use of extant social theories. The adoption of a
hermeneutic approach to interpretive research will, first, show how assumptions on
subject-object relations shape the research process and, second, reveal some specific
implications for empirics.
2. Hermeneutics: what it is
Before turning to the detail of an hermeneutic approach, this section starts by relating
'hermeneutics' to interpretive, qualitative and naturalistic—terms which are already
familiar from the accounting research literature. 'Qualitative' and 'naturalistic' have
both been used as descriptive of both methods and methodology. When used to
indicate method 'qualitative' has been '. . .an umbrella term applied to a number of
interpretive techniques directed at . . . inferring the meanings of events or phenomena
occurring in the social world' (Covaleski and Dirsmith, 1990). As a methodology
'qualitative' has referred to processes of understanding, rather than explanation,
particularly contextual understanding. Tomkins and Groves (1983) consider that the
essence of 'naturalistic' methods lies in their study of human behaviour 'in its natural
setting' (p. 364). As a methodology they link 'naturalistic' with idealist ontological
assumptions. In order to locate hermeneutics within the 'interpretive' school in
accounting research the following comments are made: hermeneutics denies the
objective-subjective dualism which is set up in some interpretive approaches (for
example, Burrell and Morgan, 1979). Therefore hermeneutics is not solely concerned
with the explication of subjective meanings. Indeed, in the Ricoeurian version which is
used here, hermeneutics focuses on social action (or practice) as an active relation
between the realm of ideas and the realm of real, material objects (Sayer, 1992, p. 205).
A Ricoeurian version of hermeneutics would also reject the notion that explanations are
inappropriate in the social sciences. The presence of unarticulated structural conditions
(or stable relations) invoke the need for explanation as well as subjective understand¬
ing. This is expressed by Thompson (1981),
'For example, there are relations of production and distribution, hierarchies of power
and processes of legitimation, all of which may remain wholly or partly opaque to the
actors which they enmesh' (p. 157).
'it is recognised that there can be no clear-cut distinction between a 'methodological stance' and the adoption
of a fully-developed social theory as a theoretical framework (both involve the articulation of values),
nevertheless it is argued that the latter position willl be more directive and tend to substantiate the initial
theory rather than producing new knowledge.
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Hermeneutics can be described as the theory of interpretation. As a theory it draws
parallels first, ontologically, between certain aspects of social action and certain features
of a text and, second, methodologically between the understanding of social action and
the interpretation of a text (Ricoeur, 1981, p. 197).
The origin of the word 'hermeneutics' lies in its use as a means of describing the
process of recovery of meaning. Hermeneutic was the word applied to a quest which
was concerned to recover the authenticity of certain ancient, usually biblical, texts,
where original meaning had been lost through successive translations (Ricoeur, 1974,
p. 64). Hence, historically, the meaning of hermeneutics encompassed the notion of a
search: the search for authentic knowledge. Gradually, however, the sense of the word
began to change—usage as 'recovery of meaning' giving way to the more modern use as
'interpretation of meaning' (Bauman, 1978, p. 10). This shifting emphasis enabled a
parallel development: the application of the ideas which are encapsulated in the word to
some of the methodological problems in the social sciences as research seeks to
interpret the '. . . situated practices of individual social actors.' (Scapens, 1992).
What follows is selective in its sources for a hermeneutic way of thinking4 in
interpretive research. Ideas are drawn predominately from Ricoeur. The main aim
being to identify themes which can ground interpretive empirical work in management
accounting, clarifying and sharpening claims to 'interpretive methodologies'.5 A first
step is to take a theme from the (1981) work of Ricouer: that the understanding of
social action can be considered analogous to the reading of a text. Unless this
connection is established the links between hermeneutics and interpretive methodolo¬
gies remain tenuous. Ricoeur's argument is that, in so far as the analogy holds, the
problems of understanding human actions will mirror the difficulties of textual
interpretations (p. 197). To elucidate this problematic and develop the analogy
between the interpretation of texts and that of human action Ricoeur points to
four ways in which the meaning of an action becomes detached from the event of the
action, thereby becoming objectified and thus an appropriate focus for the act of
interpretation.
First, human action and written text can be analysed for their sense-content (p. 205).
This 'sense-content' is not fully encompassed by the intentions and motivations of the
actor or writer, although grasping the inner deliberations of the actor/writer will
usually be a first step. The purpose of analysing the sense-content of action is not to
restrict analysis to only those actions which are rational or which avoid contradiction
■The work of Heidegger, Dilthey, Gadamar and Ricoeur and, subsequently, Giddens and Taylor progressed
and advanced the concept of hermeneutics. Dilthey established a dichotomy between understanding in the
social sciences and explanation in the natural sciences by positing that human action must be understood by
grasping the subjective consciousness of the agent whereas the natural world must be causally explained from
the outside. Gadamar, however, held a version of verstehen which emphasized not the inner experience of
agents but the authority of history as underlining meaning. This paper in no way attempts to portray the
subtle distinctions which lead these thinkers to occupy various positions within the hermeneutic tradition nor
does it address the various critiques of hermeneutics. For a recent discussion of the idea of action as a text see
Thompson (1993).
^There have been previous papers in the accounting literature which explored aspects of the hermeneutic
tradition. These include Willmott's (1983) discussion of what he terms the 'historical-hermeneutic sciences'
and their contribution towards a paradigm for accounting research, Lavoie's (1987) advocacy of hermeneutics
as underpinning an understanding of accounting as the language of business, and Boland's (1989) paper
which attempts to synthesize the 'objective' and 'subjective' traditions in accounting research through a
hermeneutic turn of thought which rejects the objective-subjective dichotomy.
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but to find,
. a coherence between the actions of the agent and the meaning of the situation for
him .... the meaning of the situation may be full of confusion and contradiction; but
the adequate depiction of this contradiction makes sense of it' (Taylor, 1979, p. 35).
These ideas can be summarized as:
Proposition One: The 'sense-content' of action and text must be drawn out; com¬
prehension cannot be immediate or unmediated.
The way in which this is accomplished (through projection and modification) is
discussed in the section which sets out the implications of these propositions for
empirical research.
Second, action and text are capable of becoming detached from the person who
performed or wrote them and can acquire a social dimension (p. 206). This implies that
an action can be understood not only as a personal endeavour but also as a social
product. The social nature of individual action has two facets: its antecedents and its
consequences. Any action has antecedents which are not fully encompassed by the
personal motives of the agent. 'Behaviour' cannot be understood in isolation from that
set of social 'rules' by which it is regulated and from which it derives its meaning. Such
'rules' are known to the agent but some of the conditions for social action are unknown.
Hierarchies of power, processes of legitimation, and relations of production
(Thompson, 1981) are all social structures which may be opaque to the agents
concerned. Thus both the 'rules' which define the socially-given content of individual
action and the social structures which constrain the scope and power of individual
endeavour present as objectifications which negate the equating of the antecedents of
action with the personal motives, reasons and intentions of the agent. Once done, as
Ricoeur remarks,'. . . our deeds escape us and have effects we did not intend', (p. 206).
It is through this 'sedimentation in social time' (p. 207) that institutions, such as
accounting, become objectified and present as a social reality which simultaneously
enables and constrains individual action. It is this process which generates the links
between systems of meaning and material practices so that what practices are is, in
part, dependent on what they mean in society. Thus,
Proposition Two: The text or the action has both personal and social significance—its
social dimension implying the possibility of institutionalization.
Third, the relevance and importance of an action can transcend its circumvention
within any initial situation. Ricoeur refers to this property of action as the opening up
of 'non-ostensive references',
'An important action develops meanings which can be actualized or fulfilled in
situations other than the one in which this action occurred the meaning of an
important event exceeds, overcomes, transcends, the social conditions of its production
and may be re-enacted in new social contexts. Its importance is its durable relevance
and, in some cases, its omni-temporal relevance.' (p208).
In other words action, as a text, can become a 'referent'. By 'leaving a mark' (p. 206)
an event can contribute to the emergence of patterned action or institutionalization.
Actions or events may thus escape their initial definitions and circumstances and
become focal points for individuals or for whole communities. The symbolic meaning
of such events will be pervasive and enduring. Hence,
Hermeneutic Circles 237
Proposition Three: The text or the action may transcend its encompassment within its
initial circumstances and develop meanings in other social contexts.
Finally, human action, as is a text, is an 'open work'. It is 'open' in two senses.
First, it is 'open' to anyone who can read (p. 208). Thus the 'interpretation' of action is
not the specialized province of the researcher but is a universal, integral and necessary
condition for the continuity of social life. As action may be interpreted by an infinite
number of readers its meaning is essentially 'in suspense' (p. 208) and fresh significance
can always be placed on an event by invoking a new and different frame of reference.
Thus human action is 'open' in a second sense—there are no compelling certainties
attached to any particular interpretation. This insight is reflected in Willmott's
(1983, p. 399) view of hermeneutics as acknowledging the historically bounded nature of
understanding. The transient nature of any interpretation has dual consequences. No
interpretation can claim to be definitive but any action can receive fresh relevance and
interest by being viewed from a new perspective. If the essentially transient nature of
interpretation is accepted then it can be seen that the conceptual innovation that this
implies in turn alters human perceptions of reality. This casts the possibility of
prediction in the human sciences in a new light. For if, 'the very terms in which the
future will have to be characterized .... are not available to us at present' (Taylor,
1979, p. 69), then prediction is, at least imperilled, or, at most negated, as the linguistic
categories of the future are not yet available. The past may be re-conceptualized with
the ideas of the present but the future cannot be captured if its terms of reference are
not yet available. Introspection reveals that such a dilemma is often reflected in our
experience of change.
'Often one has the sense of impending change but is powerless to make clear
what it will consist in: one lacks the vocabulary' (Taylor, 1979, p. 70).
This interdependence between our grasp on social reality and the language available
to conceptualize it has been described by Bhasker (1979, p. 28) as the concept-
dependence of social reality.6 It is the concept-dependence of social reality along with
the potential for conceptual innovation which renders our understanding of social
action inescapably contestable and transient. lience,
Proposition Four: Textual interpretation and social understanding are both essentially
'open' in nature.
To re-cap, four reasons can be offered for the understanding of social action as a
text-analogue. These reasons refer to the four areas of congruence between verstehen
in the social sciences and textual interpretation and are shown in Table 1. That these
propositions are basic to the hermeneutic endeavour can be seen by locating them
within Giddens' notion of the 'double hermeneutic' (1976, p. 162; 1982, p. 11;
1984, p. 284). The researcher encounters a realm in the social world which is already
meaningful to the agents involved. Agents' interpretations have been accomplished by
reference to their own values and beliefs and by what they perceive as the
'contextuality' of their action. 'Contextuality' is here equated with the 'setting' of the
action and defines the agents' awareness of the processes and structures which they use
to orient and make sense of their action (Giddens, 1987, p. 215). Thus Proposition One
6Bhasker does not, however, accept that the nature of social reality is exhausted by its intrinsic
'concept-dependence'. His view is that social reality has a material aspect and cannot, therefore, be reduced




Proposition One: The 'sense-content' of action and text must be drawn out;
comprehension cannot be immediate or unmediated.
Proposition Two: The text or the action has both personal and social significance, its
social dimension implying the possibility of institutionalization.
Proposition Three: The text or the action may transcend its encompassment within its
initial circumstances and develop meanings in other social contexts.
Proposition Four: Textual interpretation and social understanding are both essentially
'open' in nature.
implies that the 'sense-content' of social action must be explicated through these
first-order constructs (Giddens, 1984, p. 284) but is not restricted to such constructs.
That the 'sense-content' of action is not confined to agents' own reasons, motives and
values lies in its nature as a social product. Consequently researchers can construct
'second-order constructs' using their own 'technical' language which re-interpret the
action, events and experience of the researched (Proposition Two). However, as human
action is essentially an 'open work' (Proposition Four) the researched may choose to
appropriate the 'second order constructs' of the researchers. Hence these 'second-order
constructs' may re-emerge as 'first-order constructs' presenting as fresh research
material and so on. Therefore,
'The concepts, theories and findings generated by sociology 'spiral in and out' of social
life, they do not form an ever-growing corpus of knowledge' (Giddens, 1987, p. 32).
The implications of hermeneutics for empirics
Thus it is argued that hermeneutics can offer a methodology which transcends those
interpretive perspectives which limit research to the understanding of the subjective
realm of experience. The subjective-objective duality7 posed, in part, to emphasize the
inadequacies of positivism as a methodology restricts the development of interpretivism
if such research cannot go beyond grasping the significance of action from the actors'
point of view. However, the adoption of Proposition Two leads to a rejection of this
boundary.8 Proposition One finds the 'sense-content' of action in its coherence with the
meaning of the situation for the agent but Proposition Two contends that interpretive
work can go beyond this. That the antecedents and consequences of action are often
opaque to the agent implies that the interpretation of action can have a power of
disclosure which transcends the limited horizons of the existential situation of the agent
(Rabinow and Sullivan, 1979, p. 12) Thus the notion of human action as a social
product is closely associated with the post-structuralist notion of the 'decentring of the
subject' (Giddens, 1987, p. 86) and argues that research can transcend agents'
7Dow's (1990) paper 'Beyond Dualism' provides a useful analysis of the conflicts which have arisen in
economics through the inherently uncertain nature of economic 'realities' being portrayed through
predominately dualistic methodologies and theories. Much of her argument could be applied to accounting
research when attempts arc made to capture the 'endemically uncertain' (p. 146) in the form of duals instead
of recognising that opposing categories (e.g., the subjective-objective) obtain their meaning partly from each
other (p. 144). Such categories are better regarded as mutually informing rather than mutually exclusive.
"Boland's (1989) paper takes Morgan's Images of Organization as an exemplar of a hermeneutic work in its
rejection of the subjectivisl-objectivist dual for the presentation of eight different metaphors which construct
our understanding of the nature of organizations.
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interpretations; it can go beyond what Thompson (1981, p. 38) has termed 'experiential
empathy'. This can be summarized as,
Implication One: Researchers can legitimately offer accounts of events which either
differ from or transcend the understandings of agents themselves.
Proposition Four outlines the nature of human action as an 'open work' and points to
the second implication of hermeneutics for empirical research: the inevitability of the
'hermeneutic circle' of understanding and explanation. The concept of the hermeneutic
circle is the most widely recognized defining idea in the hermeneutic tradition but it
has two rather different sets of associations. First, the hermeneutic circle describes the
processes through which the subject and the object of the research become more aware
of the concepts and ideas which guide their thinking and of their inherent
emancipatory and/or constraining qualities. To any 'reading' of an event in the social
world the researcher always brings interpretive skills and some kind of pre-
understanding of what the event is about. The pre-understanding of both researcher
and researched is constituted by their belonging '. . . to a history, to a class, to a nation,
to a culture, to one or several traditions.' (Ricoeur, 1981, p. 243). A heightened
awareness of such pre-understandings can lead both researchers and researched to
strive to attain more adequate conceptualizations through, first, critical reflection and,
second, an engagement of their disparate frames of reference. Subject and object are
thus 'mutually implicated' (Ricoeur, 1981, p. 57) in a commitment which, for Ricoeur,
embodied an ethic. From this comes the first meaning of the hermeneutic circle—the
research findings will reflect a tacking backwards and forwards between the pre-
understandings of the researcher and the 'first-order constructs' of the researched.
That these have commonalities makes the research possible; that they have divergencies
should make the research fruitful. The commitment of the researchers and the
researched 'energizes' the hermeneutic circle and ensures that the 'circle' does not
become a 'vicious circle'. (Ricoeur, 1981, p. 221). Rickman (1976) describes the process
and its influence:
'This circularity—or perhaps one might call it a spiral approximation towards greater
accuracy and knowledge—pervades our whole intellectual life.'
From this first notion of the hermeneutic circle (or spiral) comes the second implication
for empirics:
Implication Two: The research insights will be generated by the processes of projection
and modification. They will reflect a synthesis of the frames of reference of the
researcher and the researched.
Projection and modification supplants Popper's (1959) model of conjecture and
falsification (through testing) because hermeneutics is concerned to produce knowledge
of relationships in open systems. The possibility of 'emergent powers' (Sayer, 1992,
p. 122) in open systems means that regularities cannot be assumed to continue
indefinitely (cf. Propositions Two and Three). Hence falsified prediction does not
necessarily imply that the theory being 'tested' is defective. Hermeneutics is, therefore,
particularly appropriate in conditions of processual change where emergent powers are
transforming social relationships and thus negating the possibility of prediction.
The second set of ideas implicit in the hermeneutic circle encompasses the inevitably
holistic nature of interpretive research. For interpretive empirical work there is no
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obvious starting point (Rickman, 1976) nor are there obvious boundaries to the
research problem, field or agenda. What this means is that the research 'whole' is
constituted by the fixing of its parts and, in turn, how the research 'whole' is defined
will constrain what its parts can consist of. Once these boundaries are set the research
'whole', as problem, field or agenda, is understood by reference to its 'parts' and the
parts only make sense through their contribution to the 'whole'. Consequently the
research findings will take the form of a narrative but this narrative is not constituted
by a succession of episodes but constructs 'a meaningful totality from scattered events'
(Ricoeur, 1981, p. 278) The holistic associations of the hermeneutic circle coalesce to
the third implication of empirical work,
Implication Three: The interpretive research act is a creative endeavour whose inner
coherence rests upon the starting point and boundaries which are imposed in the
course of the research.
Proposition Two posits human action as concept-dependent and Proposition Four
argues for the essentially 'open' and contestable status of the research insights. Taken
together these imply that research 'findings' can be appropriated by 'lay' actors. Such
'appropriation' involves the incorporation of research findings into the thinking of
actors and, as action is concept-dependent, the conduct of actors is thereby changed.
Laughlin (1991)9 discusses this in his analysis of'second order' change or 'colonization'
of a cultural milieu. Such a position recognizes that research has an intrinsic critical
dimension, as all research has the potential to effect change and development. As
Giddens (1984) has expressed it, 'the formulation of critical theory is not an option'
(p. xxv; emphasis in the original). Therefore,
Implication Four: Hermeneutic research is intrinsically critical as, first, understanding
must involve evaluation of actors' self-understanding and, second, actors may
appropriate this evaluation and thereby change is enacted.
These four founding propositions and the implications derived from them are
suggested here as a basis for the further development of hermeneutics in accounting
research. The hermeneutic implications are shown in Table 2.
The following section continues by outlining how hermeneutics would impact upon
research into the processes of change in management accounting.
How would the adoption of an hermeneutic methodology change the conduct and focus of
current management accounting research ?
This question is illustrated by reference to the ways in which two published empirical
research studies—'The process of change in management accounting: some field study
evidence' (Innes and Mitchell, 1990) and 'Accounting and organizational cultures: a
field study of the emergence of a new organizational reality' (Dent, 1991) embody or
deny the hermeneutic propositions and implications outlined above.
These two papers were chosen primarily because they were concerned with
organizational change. Hermeneutics is particularly appropriate for the analysis of
change as transitional periods reveal the mutually confirming relationship between
systems of meaning and material practices. Under the circumstances of change what
Bourdieu (1988) has termed the 'on-going struggle' for meaning intensifies and
becomes more visible. Thus, in addition to the analysis of action for its sense-content
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and social significance, organizational change brings the nature of action as an 'open
work' into sharp focus. The struggle for meaning also involves the establishment of
referents as certain events are interpreted as key turning points in the production of
new meanings and practices.
The Innes and Mitchell paper (1990) explores changes in costing practices observed
in the competitive environment of the electronics industry. It makes no claims for an
interpretive methodology but aims for a '. . . descriptive analysis of the process by which
practical management accounting change has occurred at the level of the firm within a
real world setting' (p. 4, emphasis added). The paper was chosen in order to illustrate
the type of knowledge generated when processes of change are analysed through the
following 'non-hermeneutic' assumptions: first, when independence is assumed
between subject and object and, second, when it is thought appropriate to analyse
changes in work practices in isolation from the changes in the meanings attributed to
them. The assumption of subject-object independence is illustrated when the authors
comment on the potential limitations of their reliance on the views of the management
accountants (as interested parties) to the changes involved.
'Their views of management accounting changes , of the origins of the
techniques , and of their consequences may reflect self interest as well as
reality [emphasis added]. Alternative research designs perhaps involving more direct
observation will help to ascertain whether the factors involved in management
accounting change ... are in accordance with the above analysis.' (p. 15)
Thus indicating the authors' assumption that access to an objective reality is dependent
upon the use of correct methods. The notion that research must involve an evaluation of
an actor's self-understanding (Implication Four) is by-passed by the assumption that
'more direct observation' will reveal whether or not the views of the management
accountants were correct. Implication Two—that the research insights will reflect a
synthesis of the frames of reference of the researcher and the researched is negated by
the presupposition of an objective reality.
That the authors analyse processual change in work practices without reference to
concurrent changes in meaning is demonstrated by their focus on the factors which are
necessary and sufficient for change to occur.
'The first set of factors comprised conditions conducive to management accounting
change which were necessary but not sufficient, in themselves, for the change to occur.
Examples included the availability of adequate accounting staff and computing
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resources. . . . These we have termed facilitators. The second set of factors. . . . included
the competitiveness of the market, production technology and the product cost
structure. These we have termed motivators. The third set of factors. . . . included the
loss of market share, the arrival of a new accountant or a deterioration in profitability.
These we have termed catalysts. Management accounting change occurred through the
interaction of these three types of factor.' (p. 13, emphasis in the original)
Changes in meaning were seen as consequent upon change occurring. For example,
the authors note that the organizational role and status of management accounting
altered following the development of new management accounting practices (p. 13).
Thus the hermeneutic assumption that change will always involve a 'struggle for
meaning' is clearly not incorporated in the Innes and Mitchell analysis.
The theory underlying the paper is close to that of contingency analyses in its
proposed identification of factors which have influenced management accounting
change. Flowever, the authors note some of the limitations of such work,
'. . . contingency theory provides only a static analysis of management accounting
systems. . .although. . .it. . .contributes to the identification of some of the factors
which may drive change. ... it does not explain the manner in which this happens. . .'
(p. 4; emphasis added).
Thus the authors are aware of the inadequacy of contingency theory as an explanatory
framework for the processes of change. However, the explanation which they advance
does not remedy these deficiencies because their analysis continues to split change into
component parts (or factors) rather than showing how change is accomplished through
human agency.
This paper is firmly rooted in the tradition of seeing accounting as a practical
organizational resource. The authors identify the core areas of management accounting
as, '. . . the timeliness and accuracy of costing information, the adequacy of financial
performance measures and the practicality of operating a conventional control system'
and consequently changes are anticipated in . .these fundamental areas. . .' as
managerial accounting change is '. . .designed to overcome the limitations of traditional
practice' (p. 5). Such an account is congruent with what Hopwood (1987) has termed
'. . .accounting change as a process of technical elaboration and, almost invariably,
improvement' (p. 208). In methodological terms this research, although it is somewhat
critical of contingency theory, adopts a stimulus-response model of how change is
accomplished (p. 12) and different forms of accounting are seen as emerging as
adaptations to changes in environmental circumstances (p. 9, 10, 11). Such a theoretical
perspective has been characterized by Hopwood (1987) as depicting accounting change
'. . .as a reflective rather than a constructive organizational endeavour' (p. 212).
Therefore although semi-structured interviews were conducted with the management
accountants the paper gives little feel for organizational change as a lived experience
of sense-making for the actors concerned (Proposition One). Consequently the process
of accounting change as a social accomplishment through human agency remains
unexplained;10 there is little insight into '. . .how and by whom change is formulated
and managed.' (Pettigrew et al., 1992).
There is no discussion of how cultural and linguistic change accompanies and
enables shifts in material practices and no pinpointing of those key events which actors
"'A glimpse of such processes is given when reference is made to a firm where the engineers had dominated
management decisions and a quote from one of the management accountants recounts the rising ascendancy
of accounting and accountants in the battle for information and resources (p. 15).
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used to confer meaning on the unfolding story of change (Propositions Two and
Three). What the paper does is give an account of those external (competitive market
and economic recession) and internal (organizational restructuring, new product
technology, incompatibility between cost systems and product cost structures, and
managerial complaints about accounting complexities) motivating events which were
cited by the accountants as constituting the origins of change. Thus there is knowledge
of why accounting change occurred (in terms of the pre-conditions for change) but
there is little insight into how change was achieved. Although the authors expand upon
the factors cited above to include, for example, loss of market share as a catalyst for
change and the existence of adequate accounting computing resources as a facilitator of
change, no extension of this list of contingent 'variables' can ever ensure change as a
necessary consequence of their existence as the authors imply (see quote from p. 13
above). The argument advanced here is that any research that hopes to fully illuminate
the process" of management accounting change must work through an interpretive, if
not a hermeneutic, methodology in order to demonstrate how change is accomplished
through human agency.
The Dent (1991) paper traces the impact of new accounting practices on the
organizational culture within the railways. This study explicitly adopts an interpretive
methodology (p. 710) but such an approach is equated with the anthropological mission.
Dent describes the aims of his research with a quote from Malinowski, 'to grasp the
native's point of view, his relation to life, to realize his vision of the world' (p. 711).
This perspective narrows the focus of Dent's research, effectively limiting his work to
what has been described in this paper as Proposition One—the explication of the
'sense-content' of social action from the point of view of the actor/s concerned. Thus
Dent's methodology, cannot encompass individual action as a social product both in its
antecedents and its consequences (Proposition Two). The adoption of an hermeneutic
approach here would have allowed Dent to expand his analysis to include the
socio/political origins of the processes he observed. These may have been somewhat
opaque to both the agents and the recipients of the organizational changes at the
railways but such opacity does not necessarily exclude socio-political events from
constituting the wider explanatory context for the material and cultural transformations
at the railways.
Central to Dent's paper is a story: the story of the advent of a new breed of executive
at the railways—the business managers. The business managers bring with them a new
'business' culture, a profit-oriented culture which is to challenge and overthrow the
prevailing culture characterized by a preoccupation with engineering and logistics
(p. 715). The 'old' culture—concerned with the railways as a social service is carried
and reproduced by the 'old' guardians of the railways—the general managers.
Dent recounts the unfolding series of events at the railways through a narrative
(Implication Three). His account of sense-making is congruent with Proposition
One—that the 'sense-content' of action must be drawn out. 'Opinions, sentiments,
interpretations, confusions. . .' (p. 712) were present in the interview data but these
were made sense of by reference to the meaning of the situation to the interviewee.
However, in contrast to hermeneutics, Dent equates meanings for interviewees with
their role or function, their level in the hierarchy and the time of their interview
"It is recognized that the Innes and Mitchell paper had an understanding of 'process' as the cumulative
pressure for change engendered by moves from motivators to catalysts to facilitators but this paper would
define these as the structural elements of change.
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(p. 712). In his view, these three factors will determine the construction which
interviewees place upon subsequent events. Hence, for Dent 'meanings' were identified
with situational conditions at the railways. Such a position has been described by Dawe
(1970) as '. . .postulating social norms as being constitutive rather than merely regulative,
of the self (p. 209, emphasis in the original). As is argued later, Dent implicitly argues,
through his reference to the motives and intentions of the business managers, for a
purely psychological theory of how change is enacted at the railways.
Proposition Three is evident in Dent's identification of referents, 'Some key turning
points were obvious in the data' (p. 712). Dent identifies three key 'referential' decision
points: the wider relocation of high speed passenger trains, the timing of the
installation of new signalling equipment and whether train scheduling should be set to
maximize operational or passenger convenience. The triumph of the judgements of the
business managers in these decisions '. . .came to have a significance beyond the
decisions themselves' (p. 721). These events escaped their initial circumstances to
become focal points—in hermeneutic terms they took on non-ostensive references and,
hence, became institutionalized within the railway culture.
'They were widely celebrated in the organization. . .and are recalled in explanations of
the emergence of the business rationale for railway management. . .People used them to
attribute a new meaning to their everyday activities' (p. 721).
Dent's research also gives an illuminating account of the interdependence of
linguistic/cultural categories and material practices. Such an analysis both implies the
possibility of institutionalization and points to Proposition Four—that social un¬
derstanding is essentially open in nature.
'Prior to the study, the dominant culture .... centred on engineering and production
concerns . . During the course of the study, a new culture emerged. The previously
dominant culture was displaced by a new preoccupation with economic and accounting
concerns . . . Gradually, through action and interaction, they were coupled to organiza¬
tional activities to reconstitute interpretations of organizational endeavour' (p. 708).
Such an institutionalization process has been described by Berger and Luckmann
(1967) as the accumulation of 'linguistic objectifications' (p. 56). These meaningfully
order all the routine events encountered in everyday life. Dent's study shows how the
objectifications of the language of engineering and logistics were supplanted by those of
accounting and economics. Such a change is a very powerful one, for as Berger and
Luckmann point out '. .everyday life is dominated by the pragmatic motive' (p. 56) and
once everyday reality at the railways is defined in terms of accounting and economics
the previous reality constituted by engineering and logistics fades into the background
and is 'forgotten' as events are made meaningful within the world of a business reality.
The story of the coming of the business managers gives an account which portrays
these agents of change as determined in intent but, at first, unsure as to how change
can be achieved.
'The story is one of evolving interpretations, meanings and perceived possibilities. No
one in the organization foresaw the outcome at the start, not even the business
managers' (p. 715).
Such an approach is hermeneutic in its understanding of change as historical,
developing and concept-dependent (Propositions Three and Four, and Implication
Four)
What Dent's research lacks is any understanding of the motives and actions of the
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business managers as social constructions (Berger and Luckmann, 1967; Neimark and
Tinker, 1986; Hopper et al., 1987). The business management initiative itself is
dissociated from wider socio-political developments.
'But such evidence as is available supports the view that the initiative was developed
largely independently of political ideas, its private sector leanings owing more to the
advice of a few business consultants than to any political agenda. Certainly it was not
government-inspired; indeed government was initially sceptical, only later endorsing
the ideas (and applying them to its own ends' (p. 728)).
If the events recounted at the railways were disengaged from the broader socio-political
context then a gap appears—how can the actions of the business managers be
understood?
In response, it seems that Dent's research must rely on a psychological theory of how
change was enacted at the railways.
'Equally important are the personalities and backgrounds of the business
managers .... these men became evangelists, hungry people with a mission. They
developed a zeal to convert the railway from a social service to a business enterprise.'
(p. 716).
If, initially, the business managers were fired with ardent evangelical intent, later their
'hunger' took a more tangible form as the metaphor of the hunt enters Dent's analysis.
'These Regional Business Managers, once appointed, carried the economic perspective
deep into the regional organizations, carving underneath the regional General Managers
and giving Business Managers a direct line of influence to operational activities. One
commented: "People in the regions are used to doing things without asking. They find
themselves subject to our scrutiny. I can take things up in a big way, if necessary, and
howl for their blood".' (p. 720).
The point here is not to challenge the authenticity of the self-understanding of the
Business Managers as predatory agents of change. Other research confirms that
metaphors of seduction, of the chase and of the hunt are common as actors attempt to
reconstruct and explain to themselves (and others) the course of what they see as
crucial and dramatic events (see Bryman, 1989). Nor is it denied that the drive and
energy of the business managers was necessary for change to be enacted. Is it sufficient,
however, for Dent to uncritically accept these subjective interpretations as encompass¬
ing understandings and conclude that the changes at the railways were driven purely by
the cumulative dynamic of the inner drives of the Business Managers?
The argument here is that, in this, Dent is restricted by his chosen methodology. His
understanding of the interpretive endeavour is that it, 'Necessarily, . . . precludes the
imposition of exteriorized accounts and radical critique.' (p. 710). But as Levi-Strauss
(1969) indicated it is important to show, '. . .not how men think in myths, but how
myths operate in men's minds without their being aware of this fact. . .' (p. 12).
'Exteriorized accounts' must form a part of the analysis of the antecedents of action as
some antecedents are opaque to agents. Otherwise interpretive research will be reduced
to what Garfinkel (1967) terms 'accounts of accounts'.
As others [see Boland (1989) for a discussion of how hermeneutics can close the
subjective-objective gap] have pointed out, an interpretive hermeneutic approach to
research can integrate subjective understandings with an analysis of the objective
conditions for social action which simultaneously enable and constrain individual
endeavour (Proposition Two and Implications One and Four). When the interpretive
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task is limited to the explication of subjective understandings then critique is
marginalized but this is contingent upon a limiting definition of interpretivism as a
methodology. As Willmott (1983) and Hopper et al. (1987) show, interpretivism can be
extended from its micro-processual focus to encompass a critical dimension. In short,
Dent's paper provides an instructive and illuminating account of how change was
brought about at the railways, but its analysis of why organizational change occurred
remains at the level of individual psychology.
The contrasts afforded by these two papers show that the type of knowledge
generated by research is not primarily linked to methods (as both were case-study
based and used semi-structured interviews12) but flows from the research methodology.
The scenarios investigated were not dissimilar. Both studies were concerned with the
process of change in organizations. Both organizations faced turbulent environments.
In the Dent study 'The railway was under acute threat. The competence of
public-sector management was openly under challenge.' (p. 715). In the Innes and
Mitchell study the electronics industry faced extremely keen international competition
(p. 4). Both organizations were characterized by internal power struggles—between the
business managers and the general managers (Dent, 1991) and between the engineers
and the accountants (Innes and Mitchell, 1990). Yet the knowledge produced by the
studies was strikingly different in content being dependent upon that 'rock-bottom
antinomy'—namely the opposition between subjectivism and objectivism. This paper
would argue that the limitations of both these papers could be transcended by
integrating '. . . the analysis of the experience of social agents and the analysis of the
objective structures that make this experience possible.' (Bourdieu, 1988, p. 780, p. 782)
As argued earlier, hermeneutics offers some methodological answers to the subjective-
objective dualism through its emphasis on action as a social product—Proposition Two
[see also Boland and Pondy (1983) and Boland (1989)]. Thus overcoming the
limitations introduced when action is seen either as the outcome of consciously pursued
goals (cf. Dent) or the result of mechanical determination by external causes (cf.
Innes and Mitchell).
3. Conclusion
This paper has sought to re-establish a convergence between the empirical and the
interpretive traditions in management accounting research. As reflection upon the two
papers cited above illustrates, accounting research needs a strong on-going programme
of empirical work in order that theory is constantly generated, challenged and
re-worked through exposure to processual change. To assert that theory construction
and empirical work need to proceed together in order to address a research agenda
which acknowledges and encompasses change does not deny that theory and empirics
are conjoined—such conjunction stemming from the inevitably context-bound nature
of understanding. This is eloquently stated by Bauman (1978):
'Any intellect, however powerful, sets about its work loaded with its own past; this past
is simultaneously its liability and its asset. Thanks to its past, the intellect is able to see;
because of it, is is bound to remain partially blind.' (p. 225)
l2The ways in which the two studies extended their research were, however, different. The Dent study was
an in-depth longitudinal analysis whereas the Innes and Mitchell paper was cross-sectional in its look at
seven different sites. The time span of the two studies was, however, similar—being around 2 years.
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Hermeneutics has a 'way of seeing' (constituted by its methodology), and through its
integration of the subjective and objective realms of experince it can focus what to 'look
at' but it cannot resolve the dilemma that any research picture will be a partial
one—such a conclusion is inescapable given the premises of interpretive work. The
only circumstances which would allow the emergence of complete understanding—the
existence of a closed system—would not require interpretation or understanding but
would only call for explanation (Bauman, 1978). The partiality of any interpretation
will reflect three facets of hermeneutics. First, the unique engagement of the frames of
reference of the researcher and the researched—what Gadamer has termed a 'fusion of
horizons'. This fusion allows 'the world of the text' (Ricoeur, 1981, p. Ill) to be
opened up. What is disclosed is not the world 'behind the text'—the hidden intention
of the author—but the world 'in front of the text'—all those things which the author
could have been aware of but, by design or default, was not (Bauman, 1978, p. 229).
Second, the starting point and boundaries imposed on the interpretation (enabling a
meaningful totality to be constructed from a series of scattered events) will be unique to
the researcher. Third, the historical context which forms the setting for the
interpretation, and, in relation to which it makes sense, renders any account an artifact
of its time and hence intrinsically transitory.
The fact that meanings will change with the 'world' of the researcher does not imply
that interpretations are never consensual. For any fixation of the context ensures that
meanings are not usually contested (Fish, 1979). Being in a situation means that a
particular context will be assumed. As Dent's study showed, when the context for the
operation of the railways was constructed around engineering and logistics, there was
consensus on meanings. Only the advent of the business managers introduced an
alternative context—that of accounting and economics—and only with an alternative
context did meanings become disputed (opening the way for changes in practice). The
existence of the dominant 'pragmatic motive' (Berger and Luckmann, 1966) in
everyday life ensures that whilst a context, culture or 'way of thinking' allows agents to
'go on' (Giddens, 1984) in their work it is likely to continue. Alternative contexts,
cultures or 'ways of thinking' have to be construed as more successful, in terms of their
practical interventions in the world, in order to supplant the current orthodoxy.
Research is no different, in this respect, from any other realm of work. Hence although
positivist orthodoxy presenting the researcher as someone with a '. . .very polished,
non-distorting mirror for a mind' (Madison, 1990) has been eroded, interpretive
accounting research has, so far, lacked a conception of how the values and beliefs of the
researcher shape the research process. This paper has sought to remedy this.
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Introduction
Organization is a form of social life, yet it is a particular form which is, in many
ways, clearly differentiated from wider society. The concept of the
organizational "boundary" captures the nature of this differentiation (or
separation) first, by defining, through processes of inclusion/exclusion, the
limits of the organization as it "meets" its environment and, second, by
maintaining the the organization as a unified entity. Thus the notion of the
organizational boundary contains a contradiction. The boundary marks a
separation but, paradoxically, such a separation "...creates the perception of
something that is also whole or unitary" (Cooper, 1989, p. 488). The article will
expand on the dual nature of the organizational boundary by considering
boundaries as "thresholds" and as "binding structures". This distinction also
relates to the ways in which accounting is implicated in boundary maintenance,
for the article will argue that financial accounting is, in the main, concerned
with establishing "thresholds" while management accounting is, primarily,
involved in the reproduction of "binding structures". One catalyst for change in
organizations, and in their accounting practices, occurs when tensions are
engendered through the simultaneous pursuit of separation and integration.
The disruption and reconstitution of boundaries in such transitions are
considered with reference to case studies of accounting change.
Boundaries can be defined in a number of different spheres of organizational
activity. The physical/productive, financial, psychological, legal and temporal
realms are all areas where boundaries are represented. The boundaries of the
organization in physical/spacial terms are co-terminous with its buildings (in
their geographical layout), with its employees and with those departments
(such as sales and marketing or research and development) which interface
most directly with the environment. In the productive sphere boundaries are
represented by the extent of equipment, labour power and physical output or
product. In psychological terms the limits of the organization are defined as all
those elements (role, culture, symbol and ritual) which demarcate the distinctive
nature of organizational life. The boundary between the organization and
va,UntinK Audits & society being experienced most directly by individuals as the division between
Accountability Journal. Vol. 7 their public and private lives. Temporal boundaries are achieved by dividing
University PiLs,0951-357-1 time into ordered sequences in order both to structure working practices
and to provide for formal/informal periods. Highly pertinent to the formal Managing the
organization are those agencies and artefacts which document the limits of the Boundary
organization in legal and financial terms. This article has a primary emphasis
on the financial boundaries of the organization and explores the ways in which
accounting is implicated in forming and managing these boundaries.
Despite the potential contribution of boundary maintenance ideas it is only
recently that organizational theory has begun to formulate the concept of ^
boundary management as an essential organizational activity. Within this way
of thinking the identities of the organization and its environment are established
and maintained through a process - a crucial element in any achieved
organizational identity being the perception of it as an ordered, rational place
(Cooper, 1990). Thus, the article begins by looking at how the idea of boundary
maintenance as an achieved phenomenon was by-passed by the notion of the
universal, rational, ordered organizational form. It continues by examining
empirical evidence of the changing organizational context of accounting,
changes which resulted in more organizational "surface" being exposed to the
external environment. The notion of boundary maintenance emerged then as
the "closed system" perspective in organizational theory and gave way to ideas
on "open systems". Having introduced the concept, a discussion follows on how
accounting is implicated in maintaining boundaries, first, as thresholds and,
second, as binding structures. The article concludes by assessing the
consequences of boundary maintenance ideas for the relationship between
organizational and social theories and for the role of accounting.
The Assumption of the Rational Ordered Organizational State
Defining the distinctive nature of organizational life has been a dominant theme
in organizational theory since the work of Max Weber. Weber predicted that the
inevitable rationalization and disenchantment of the modern world would
crystallize in universal bureaucratic forms. Furthermore the technical
superiority of these forms would ensure that they became constituted as
defining organizational characteristics. Such forms would endure "...because it
is only through the purposefulness and goal directedness of organization that
the uncertainties of disenchanted modernity could be coped with" (Clegg, 1990,
p. 33). Hence the expectation was that, in a disenchanted world, the reassurance
derived from "calculability" would replace the sanctity of ultimate values, as
forces for rationalization created organizations as "ordered places".
Weber as the theorist ofmodernity (Reed, 1993) had articulated themes which
proved to be extremely influential. Organizations were seen as:
Islands of rationality in a sea of human irrationality: their triumph over the surrounding
environment assured by their vastly superior technical capacity for co-ordinating and
controlling the individual actions of millions of human beings (Reed, 1985, p. 5).
This view dominated organizational theory up to the 1970s. Writers as diverse
as Habermas, Foucault[l] and Perrow were, nevertheless, united in a common
AAAJ assumption of the universal logic, and, hence, self-sustaining nature, of the
7 4 bureaucratic organizational form. Habermas conceived of organizations as self-
regulating technical mechanisms co-ordinated around the goals of money or
power. Such systems tend to colonize and erode the cultural "life-world" which
gives meaning to life and work - thus yielding supremacy to rational-technical
configurations. Foucault continued the theme of the pervasive nature of the
_ bureaucratic form by exploring how the time-space dimensions of modern
bureaucracies allowed the surveillance and control of even the mostmundane of
working practices. Perrow expressed the uniformity inherent in bureaucratic
hierarchies as a moral principle. The morality of bureaucracies lying in the
guarantee of equal treatment for all organizational members of the same status
regardless of their social, racial, sexual or religious identities. But the
inevitability of the bureaucratic form (as an expression of human rationality)
was the underlying theme of all these analyses. In bureaucracies division of
labour and hierarchical control structures are spelt out in formal rules and
cultural rationalization is monopolized by the organization - hence
bureaucracies control their own definitions of reality (Meyer, 1986). Thus, given
this rational-legal-technical organizational form, active processes to
continuously achieve organization as an unambiguous state were unnecessary.
Yet although formal organization is a defining feature of the present
world, real bureaucratization, as envisaged by Weber,, has made but a "weak
advance" (Meyer, 1986). Hence the expectation that organizations can self-
evidently be differentiated from society by their universal conformity to
rational-bureaucratic models has not been realized.
The development of natural systems theory (Scott, 1981a) was one response
to evidence that the iron-cage of bureaucracy did not encompass all
organizational forms. Natural systems, through a focus on the individual within
the organization, made visible all aspects of organizational life where no clear
distinctions existed between organizational and socio-political processes.
A fundamental assumption of such theory was that "people, social life,
language, interactions and interpretations are just as human inside
organizations as they are outside" (Turner, 1990). From such a perspective the
concept of a unified system designed for goal congruence is negated by the
existence of interest groups or informal coalitions in pursuit of disparate aims.
Corporate culture and interpersonal relationships prefigure problem
construction, and decision making is more closely aligned to political processes
of interaction and adjustment than it is based on cause-effect or cost-benefit
calculations (Boland and Pondy, 1983). If the rational perspective tends to
disconnect the organization from society the natural perspective presents the
organization as a microcosm of society. One way of avoiding this dichotomy is
through the use of Thompson's (1967) conception of organizations as systems,
which by reducing or absorbing uncertainty achieve rationality - albeit of a
limited kind.
On a theoretical level a conception of the organization as a system which Managing the
reduces or absorbs uncertainty opens the way for a focus on the means whereby Boundary
uncertainty is managed. Thus, Thompson's concept of the organization was a
natural precursor of boundary maintenance theory as boundary activity is
primarily directed towards reducing uncertainty. On an empirical level the
organizational context of accounting was also changing as vertical integration
through hierarchies gave way to the problems engendered by managing more
diversified organizational forms.
The Changing Organizational Context of Accounting
The nature of the organizational context of accounting is in transition as
modern gives way to post-modern organizational forms. The key theme of post¬
modern organizational theory being what Power (1990) has termed as an
"assault on unity". New alliances such as private-public partnerships, joint
ventures and mergers are challenging the notion of the organization as a
"systematically bounded" entity functioning as a "single centre of calculation
and classification" (Clegg, 1990, p. 19). Evidence is accumulating on new inter-
organizational linkages and on new intraorganizational forms[2]:
(1) The post-modern organizational structure has a flatter hierarchy, is more
fragmented and decentralized, and less formal and less bureaucratic
than its modernist predecessor (Graham, 1989).
(2) Post-modern organizations are more responsive to Mintzberg's (1983)
"external coalition" or "cast of players" (owners, suppliers, clients,
partners, competitors, unions, professional societies, newspaper editors,
governments and special interest groups) who "frame" the organization.
(3) Production in a post-modern organization tends to be flexible, FMS
enabling organizations to go for market niches rather than (or as well as)
mass forms. Production is organized around technological choices rather
than driven by technological determinism, and functions through multi-
skilled rather than de-skilled jobs (Clegg, 1990, p. 181).
(4) As more flexible network-based configurations replace hierarchies with
a "... resulting 'shrinkage' of the middle layers..." (Thompson, 1993, p.
185), management processes take place "horizontally" across
organizational sub-units rather than "vertically" through a well-defined
chain of command - mechanisms such as profit centres, subcontracting
and quality circles contributing to the decentralization of production
decisions (Thompson, 1993, p. 190).
(5) Shifting patterns in the ownership of managerial control systems are
also apparent as post-modern organizational forms, more sensitive to
consumption rather than production issues, emerge. Once production
began to be successfully routinized, managerial power passed from
production to sales and marketing as "... extending market penetration
AAA] and developing innovation through product-related strategies" (Clegg,
7 4 1990, p. 97) began to be conceptualized as the key issue for
organizational success.
(6) Information, computerization and knowledge assume primacy as the
driving forces for innovation in post-modern organizations - thus
g implying highly developed organizational search and scan capabilities.
■————— For these reasons post-modern organizations have more "surface" exposed to
the external environment (Graham, 1989). There are, therefore, both theoretical
(see the previous section) and empirical imperatives which direct post-modern
organizations and post-modern organizational theorists actively to address the
issue of boundary maintenance.
Conceptualizing Organizational Boundaries
This section considers how the concept of the organizational boundary changes
with shifts in organizational theory. It examines:
® closed systems theory;
© open systems theory; and
• active boundary maintenance.
The Boundaries of Closed Systems
Classical management theory conceptualized organizations as "closed" systems
whose "goals" were achieved through principles of internal design which
minimized uncertainties arising from the interdependence of component parts
(Hayes, 1980). Scientific management and administrative theory produced
universal prescriptions for organizational design. Thus, Taylorism was geared
towards minimizing uncertainties arising from the "general purpose" nature
of people by transforming them into "specific purpose" employees (March and
Simon, 1958, p. 13). In turn, general management theory addressed
administrative problems of co-ordination and control flowing from the
uncertain nature of intraorganizational interactions (Fayol, 1949). Such systems
were portrayed as relatively impermeable to their surrounding environments
and therefore became theorized as self-sustaining entities which are
"conceptually detached" (Cooper, 1990) from their backgrounds.
The machine constituted the overarching organizational metaphor for these
closed systems (Morgan, 1986) and the mechanized bureaucracies most closely
conformed to organizational models designed and operated as machines.
Attention is focused on the assumed unity of the system and hence the ongoing
processes through which that unity is maintained remain unexamined.
Conceptually the boundary of the system is marginalized and remains "at the
margin" as a "... kind of container which holds the system parts together and
thus prevents their dispersal" (Cooper, 1990).
The Boundaries ofOpen Systems Managing the
In contrast "open systems" theory recognizes the importance of interactions Boundary
between the organization and society (by seeing organizational boundaries as
permeable) and introduces the idea that the survival of the system implies an
appropriate relationship with its environment (Morgan, 1986, p. 45). However,
this relationship takes the form of adaptive responses to the threats and
opportunities which arise in the environment (Gouldner, 1959). Hence the idea
of active boundary maintenance as an essential feature of organizational life is
still relatively neglected. In contingency theory, for example, the outer
organizational context is acknowledged but it is "... conceptualized as an
environment comprising a variety of factors that must be registered and
controlled if strategic adjustments are to be successfully achieved" (Willmott,
1990, p. 45). Central to contingency analysis is the pursuit of equilibrium, as
"adjustments" harmonize structural and contextual "variables". The analysis
presents a static picture of organizations, change being enacted through
processes which are seen as essentially aberrant in nature and as ceasing once
stability is regained. Thus, equilibrium is privileged over boundary activity
rather than being conditional upon boundary maintenance. As contingency
analyses assume that functional imperatives determine organizational
restructuring, they cannot encompass the active accomplishment through
agency of the organization as an embedded, but differentiated, part of wider
society. The organization as an organic entity evolves "... on the basis of an
independent social logic which ... can ... be internalized by its members" (Reed,
1985, p. 27, emphasis added). However, from the open systems perspective, the
organizational boundary is more than an outer shell of containment, its
essential feature being the permeability which allows input-output flows as
materials, energy and information are exchanged between the organization and
its environment. But inside-outside distinctions remain a priori - certain
characteristics are "... inexorably naturalised as being inside the organization,
such as 'size' and 'technology' ... "whereas" ... those factors outside, such as
the 'environment' have a precarious contingent relation to these interior forces"
(Clegg, 1990, p. 19, emphasis in the original).
Boundary Maintenance as an Essential Organizational Activity
Fundamental to boundary maintenance theory is the idea that "we are no longer
looking at something that an organization 'has', but at the processes that make
it possible for an organization to exist at all" (Turner, 1990, p. 87). Organization
becomes an appropriation of order from disorder and, in this appropriation, the
boundaries or "surfaces" of a system constitute those areas of greatest potential
instability (Power, 1990). Thus, boundary management constitutes the achieved
relations of "relative autonomy" and "relative dependence" which exist between
organizations and their environments (Clegg, 1990, p. 7). From this perspective
boundary maintenance is an organizational problem and specific individuals or
agencies will pursue strategies to achieve it. Boundary management, as an
organizational task, is, most usually, accomplished by people in either liaison or
leadership roles:
By monitoring and controlling boundary transactions people are able to build up considerable
power. For example, it becomes possible to monitor changes occurring outside one's group,
department, or organization and initiate timely responses... Or one gains access to critical
information that places one in a particularly powerful position to interpret what is happening
in the outside world, and thus help define the organizational reality that will guide action
(Morgan, 1986, p. 169).
But while agency is central to this account of boundary activity, such agency is
not only accomplished through the reasoned intentions and capabilities of
purposeful individuals:
Agency wreaks its action on the world through the attempted accomplishment of projects
which make sense in terms of the forms of calculation which agents have available to them
(Clegg, 1990, p. 7, emphasis added).
Through such "forms of calculation" all organizations have built into them a
"mobilization of bias" (Giddens, 1984, p. 15) which means that power does not
reside purely with the capabilities of individuals[3]. Thus, what agents know is
"...not purely idiosyncratic but is institutionally framed" (Clegg, 1990, p. 13).
Hence the role of institutionally generated information, such as accounting, is
crucial to the task of boundary management.
To summarize, boundary maintenance theory describes organizational
boundaries as achieved by individuals (or collective agencies) as they filter
and process information to maintain an organizational identity in both
physical and conceptual terms. In comparison to the "closed" and "open"
system approaches more organizational surface is assumed and consequently
more organizational/societal interdependencies are recognized. Such inter-
dependencies are conceived not as objectively established "threats and
opportunities" but as reflecting the dependence of any environmental under¬
standing on the organization's self-understanding. Thus, organizational
boundaries constitute those areas where the process of organizing occurs. Such
processes involve inclusion and exclusion as an organizational identity is
maintained and the organization enacts its environment.
Figure 1 captures the differences between closed systems, open systems and
active boundary maintenance theories for the concept of the organizational
boundary.
How Accounting Information Is Implicated in Boundary
Maintenance
One of the arguments of this article is that, at a fundamental level, organization
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The role of information is to mediate between form and matter, order and disorder;
information is a process (and not a state) in which form is made out of non-form (Cooper, 1990,
Institutionally generated information, such as accounting, is pivotal for both
productive activities and communicative interaction. However, accounting
information also absorbs uncertainty, shapes expectations, and makes
some organizational activities more visible than others. But accounting is only
one of a number of information flows in organizations. Under what
circumstances, therefore, does accounting begin to predominate over other
information systems in the process of managing boundaries?
The next three sections address this question by first, presenting financial
accounting as a "threshold" device which manages the boundary between the
organization and its environment, second, by linking management accounting
with the "binding structures" which preserve organizational unity[4], and,
third, by considering how boundary tensions engender processes of change.
Boundaries as Thresholds
Financial reporting charts the physical/spatial and financial limits of the
organization through the quantification of assets and liabilities. Therefore, it
defines, through processes of inclusion and exclusion, the boundaries of the
organization as a physical, legal and financial entity. Various uncertainties,
other than those of a technical nature, are posed by this exercise. The
inclusion/exclusion of intangibles, such as goodwill, involves the management
of conceptual and measurement uncertainties. The drawing of financial and
p. 172).
AAAJ legal boundaries also has considerable ethical implications. Decisions on the
7 4 inclusion/exclusion of environmental pollution or the consumption of natural
resources and infrastructure (such as water and roads) have moral dimensions
(Francis, 1990). Such financial accounts define the limits of both modern and
post-modern organizations in physical, legal and financial terms and would be
acknowledged by closed and open systems theory - such accounts fulfilling the
12 core "institutionalised expectations" (Zald, 1986, p. 330) which have arisen
-—— »-•
arouncj accounting. But post-modern organizations are characterized by the
".. .relative shift from commodity production to service delivery and intellectual
technologies ..." (Heydebrand, 1989)[5] and within the service industries (and
the reduced manufacturing sections) functionally flexible organizational forms
with dispersed centres of power and heightened reliance on information for
control. The argument here is that under these conditions of greater
differentiation and increased organizational/societal interpenetration reliance
on traditional accountings will no longer be sufficient to maintain thresholds in
post-modern organizations.
Classic organizational theorists anticipated the expansion of accounting in
line with increased differentiation (Blau and Schoenherr, 1971; Perrow, 1979;
Scott, 1981b). Meyer (1986) comments on this and goes on to tie the requirement
for more accounting with an enhanced need for co-ordination and control as
organizations become characterized by increased technical activity. However,
within this way of thinking, the crucial determinants of accounting activity lie
within the organization. More germane to the idea of "thresholds", however, is
Meyer's proposition that demands for accounting can also arise in the
environment - that accounting also increases in response to pressures from
outside the organization. Meyer considers two possibilities:
(1) That the environment presents problems or opportunities with which
the organization must contend. Hence the environment makes demands
on the organization (here he cites the expansion of capital markets as a
major determinant in creating more financial reporting).
(2) That the environment supplies cultural materials or resources, such as
accounting, for organizations. Organizations that utilize these "culturally
sanctioned" resources are thereby legitimized both internally and
externally. This second argument is highly pertinent to ideas about
boundary maintenance for here accounting is central to the management
of meaning between the organization and society - accounting acting as
a legitimating institution (Richardson, 1987) for organizations.
Predictions about the prevalence and visibility of accounting and accountants
can, therefore, proceed from evidence of increased rationalization of particular
institutional sectors of society. Meyer (1986, p. 348) cites the example of health
care where, at the macrosocietal level, increased rationalization has resulted in
heightened legitimacy for those medical organizations where there has been a
significant expansion in accounting work.
The present scenario in the UK provides an illustration of this. For many Managing the
years in the National Health Service financial reporting practices in the NHS Boundary
were aimed at demonstrating compliance with statutory directives - for
example, the prescriptive guidance on accounting from the Department of
Health for cash expended by the health authorities (Lapsley, 1992). Statements
of income and expenditure had the primary aim of determining whether health
authorities had met their financial objectives (i.e. had spent no more than their 1 ^
yearly allocations). Thus, "thresholds" were maintained primarily through
legalistic means, and traditional accountings sufficed to establish boundaries
between the NHS and its main regulator - central government.
However, social, technological and political changes converged to undermine
the organizational legitimacy of the NHS. Such pressures disrupted reliance on
the limited nature of accounting as practised for most of the life of the
organization. An unparalleled expansion in expensive medical technology, a
focus on scarcity rather than resource allocation, and some erosion of the
autonomy of clinicians combined to place the value of health care, as a product,
in dispute (Llewellyn, 1993). Once health care becomes commodified in this way
accounting tends to expand. It provides the monetary values (i.e. costs and
prices) which by spanning organizational and societal cultures can be used to
restore legitimacy when greater organizational/societal interpenetration has
occurred. Thus, when medical organizations become more open to societal
scrutiny more accounting can restore thresholds which reclaim rationality and
order for the organization. Those organizations, such as the NHS, facing
uncertain goals (perhaps with long time horizons for goal accomplishment) or
having indeterminate input/output transformations are particularly vulnerable
to societal pressures for increased legitimacy (Dirsmith, 1986, p. 360). Such
organizations will tend, therefore, to be more reliant on accounting for
boundary maintenance.
Such a boundary maintenance strategy will, however, entail a high degree of
risk. Traditionally, health organizations have been legitimized by the processes
they incorporate rather than the products they supply - the worth of such
institutions being arrived at by reference to internal definitions. Thus, patients
have been referred to particular hospitals because they offer a credentialled or
medically regulated service - referrals have not been dependent on judgements
on outcomes for patients. Historically, in health organizations, criteria for the
evaluation of products or outcomes, as distinct from the processes of delivery,
are lacking. Consequently, the process itself becomes identified with the product
(Heydebrand, 1989). But for accounting to legitimize medical care a product
must be defined. In health care the "treated case", as a product, although not
allowing for any evaluation of outcome, permits the attachment of a monetary
value (cost or price) to a distinct health commodity. Exchange values then
facilitate comparisons on costs (or prices) between different institutions. Such
cross-institutional comparisons will, however, create a potential "winners and
AAA] losers" scenario. Hospitals are not only required to offer a professionally
7 4 recognized and regulated service, but to demonstrate cost efficiency vis-a-vis
peer institutions. Thus legitimacy, via accounting as exchange value, is
inherently more precarious than legitimacy conferred through formal rules for
process. Nevertheless once legitimacy via internal rule structures becomes
challenged, organizations will draw on accounting as a legitimizing artefact
14 which is congruent with the values of a society where health care has become
commodified. An expansion in accounting (which in the case of the NHS
involved a more commercial format for financial accounting and a greater
emphasis on management accounting for the pricing of services) will then
restore a rational, ordered identity and the organization can again achieve a
form of closure in relation to the society in which it is embedded.
Boundaries as Binding Structures
Boundaries not only function as thresholds; they also, by acting as binding
structures, produce and reproduce the internal unity of the organization.
Internally the boundaries of an organization bind organizational time and space
or create "time-space zones" (Giddens, 1987, p. 148). Such zoning enables
mastery over the diverse productive, social and political processes which
organization embodies. The attention-directing, performance-monitoring and
information coding functions of management accounting contribute to time-
space zoning by reducing, absorbing or denying the uncertainty which is
endemic to organizational life. Central to these accounting functions is writing
as "... the process by which human agents inscribe organization and order on
their environments" (Cooper, 1989). Accounting embodies and has capitalized
on two critical features of writing: first, that information is available "at a
glance" and, second, that it appears in a "depersonalized" form - such features
acting so as to promote perceptions of accounting as free from "contamination
by undecidability" (Cooper, 1989, p. 500). Accounting thus reduces indeter¬
minacy through the organization of time/space and within these processes both
"accounting as history" and systems of accountability are pivotal.
The "backwards-looking" aspect of accounting is critical in forming the
authoritative organizational history which can be used to shape the future.
Accounting rules constituting legitimized guidelines for"... the construction of
a representation (pattern, picture, model) ... of the world" (Mackay, 1969,
quoted by Cooper, 1992). The processes within accounting directed towards
ensuring factual, authentic and true reports lend considerable credence to the
use of accounting as history, for system monitoring and for the guidance of
future conduct (Chambers, 1989). A framework for accountability provides both
for the monitoring of system reproduction and for the definition of the limits of
the application of the system:
Accounting involves the binding of organizational space in the very real sense in which one of
the most important boundaries of an organization is defined by the boundaries of its system
of accountability. To be part of an organization is to be subject to that organization's system of
accountability: a customer is not accountable to someone within the organization, in the same
way that an employee is accountable. Within these boundaries the physical organization of
space in terms of hierarchical, functional and divisional patterns are not just reflected in, but
are also reproduced through the operation of systems of accountability (Roberts and Scapens,
1985, p. 448).
An example of boundary changes to systems of accountability is provided by
Tai (1990) in a case study of the "new managerial ideas" as expressed by the
Industrial Structure Council of theMinistry of International Trade and Industry
(MITI) in Japan, and adopted by the giant Japanese electrical equipment
conglomerate Matsushita Electric. The "new managerial ideas" culminated in a
plan to establish a "corporate civil society". Such a plan involved the extensive
rethinking of the boundaries between Matsushita and society, as the following
description of the "corporate civil society" demonstrates:
A system in which the people work together toward attainment of public targets and values
shared on such different social levels as within each enterprise, between enterprises, between
enterprises and society, and between enterprises and consumers, instead of leaving the
behaviors of the enterprises up to the private market mechanism (p. 54).
One facet of the proposed reconstitution of organizational boundaries was a
recasting of the relationship between Matsushita and the subcontractors who
supply a very high number of the essential component parts for electrical
equipment. Matsushita wished to reduce their dependence on these subcontract
firms and the intent inherent within the statement of the "corporate civil
society" provided a rationale for doing so. A focus on the mutual benefits of
shared values allowed Matsushita to take "an increasingly stern attitude" (p. 61)
towards those firms which continued to operate as independent units. In order
to bring these recalcitrant subcontractors into closer collaboration with the
Matsushita division the standard time allowances within Matsushita's standard
costing system were also applied to the independent subcontract firms. Thus,
the boundaries of the systems of accountability were successfully extended to
reduce the autonomy of independent units and such firms are now "bound" by
accounting numbers in a managerial relationship of much tighter surveillance
and control.
Systems of accountability also permit the co-ordination and control of intra-
organizational superior-subordinate relations where people are physically at a
remove from one another. The potential for the assertion of subordinate power
is reduced when accounting rules delineate expected procedures and results.
Thus accounting, through "action at a distance" (Hopwood, 1990; Robson, 1992),
can enable the integration of organizational sub-units and the long-distance
control of subordinates. Systems of accountability reproduce an organization
which is, physically and psychologically, more cohesive and coherent. Also, by
creating reciprocal rights and responsibilities, they bind organizational
members together and go some way towards banishing the potential disruptive




Systems of accountability also embody a moral order: a complex system of reciprocal rights
and responsibilities. The practice of accountability institutionalises the notion of
accountability; it institutionalises the rights of some people to hold others to account for their
actions (Roberts and Scapens, 1985, p. 448).
Thus, the boundary of the organization also marks out a space within which
particular rules establish contractual relationships - the boundary symbolizing
the moral unity of the organization where an assumed common purpose
absorbs social tensions by binding together the separate goals of all
organizational members.
Closely associated with spatial zoning is the ordering of time as agents
organize the "setting" of their action. Accounting is presented as one of the
ways in which time can assume limits and be standardized:
Accounting structures organizational time by dividing the flow of organizational life into
"accounting" periods and generating regular reports, budgets and appraisals with all their
related practices (Roberts and Scapens, 1985, p. 448).
It provides "rites of passage" such as the year end when particular attention is
paid to the relations between the past and the present and the risks associated
with the future. Future uncertainty can be reduced by the attachment of rates of
return to future projects as "chunks" of future time are then accounted for.
Accounting also enables the commodification of time as monetary costs are
attached to both labour and machine time. Although the commodification of
time, as a practice, is still uneven, the period during the 1980s saw an extension
of the costing of time from productive and service industries to the social
services as, for example, teaching and medical care became much more
commodified (Clark, 1990).
Thus, accounting constructs particular forms through which information
can be represented (Cooper, 1992). The "particular forms" of organizational
histories, systems of accountability, moral codes and temporal ordering which
accounting produces facilitate the binding of organizational space/time and,
thus, maintain the organization as an entity.
Shifting Boundaries and Boundary Tensions
The preceding sections have expanded on the metaphors of "thresholds" and
"binding structures" in boundary maintenance. Financial accounting has been
portrayed as a "threshold" device which manages uncertainty on the boundary
between the organization and society. Management accounting has been seen
as implicated in the reduction of internal uncertainties and, hence, in the
reproduction of the organization as an entity.
The simultaneous absorption of both internal and external uncertainties is
often problematic. This section explores how boundary management is tied up
in processes of change in organizations. In particular it examines a situation in
which there is an organizational focus on one source of uncertainty to the
neglect of another. The 1985 Berry et al. study of the National Coal Board (NCB)
provides a useful example of such a scenario. During the period of time that this Managing the
study took place control mechanisms at the NCB were loosely coupled. Such Boundary
loose coupling effectively insulated one part of the organization from
disturbances that were occurring in another (p. 4). Thus, rather than
management accounting being used to "bind" organizational parts together,
boundaries had been placed around the organizational functions of production jy
and finance. Such a situation was not, however, altogether "dysfunctional" as
such boundaries acted so as to "seal" the problems of one area from another -
specifically, pessimistic financial information did not filter through to disrupt
productive activities. Thus, "Fluctuations in markets or financing do not get
reflected in the assessments of colliery viability" (p. 17). This scenario had
another implication for boundaries: the productive boundaries of the NCB were
emphasized to the neglect of the financial ones, "... Area and Colliery levels
have ... been regarded as 'Production Centres' ...by concentrating on
production (that is maximising output, manpower and machinery utilisation)
the financial results ... will automatically meet requirements" (p. 9).
However, such a situation was engendering a conflict between the
management of internal tensions and the maintenance of the external
organizational/societal boundary. During the time of the study the socio¬
economic environment was becoming less benign (p. 15). Consequently
-there was increasing pressure on the NCB to demonstrate rationality and
legitimacy to external regulators (such as the government and the media) by
being seen to manage financial uncertainties. However, the boundary
strategy of sealing off production from finance, allied with a culture which
defined organizational purposes in productive rather than financial terms, was
exacerbating the difficulties of effective external boundary maintenance.
Internal boundaries were being managed so as to shield the technical core but
uncertainties were building up on the organizational/societal boundary.
Subsequently "thresholds" at the NCB were to break down resulting in the
organization being overwhelmed by the cumulative pressures of decreased
demand, economic recession, governmental distrust of the nationalized
industries and a market-oriented policy for fuel.
As the above study demonstrates, processes of change are often enacted
through the challenging of dominant boundary definitions and through shifting
patterns of boundary activity. A research focus on the role of agency in
reconstituting boundaries reveals that a change in the "gatekeepers" (or those
who manage the external boundaries of the organization) always brings
potential changes in the power structures and systems of meaning within the
organization. Dent (1991), in a case study of change at a state railway, shows
how when "gatekeeper" roles are assumed by profit-oriented "Business
Managers" (thus excluding the "general managers" who were preoccupied with
engineering and logistics), the definition of the organization through productive
AAA] boundaries is challenged and the management of external uncertainty takes
7 4 place through accounting, rather than productive, information.
Thus "to organize" involves the management of internal and external
uncertainties. When change is seen as engendered by the tensions between
internal and external boundary management a research agenda on
organizational transitions is revealed.
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Some Consequences of a Neglect of Boundary Maintenance Ideas
for Organizational/Social Theories
As boundaries mark the differentiation of the organization from society a study
of boundary maintenance ideas should clarify the relationship between
organizational and social theories and, hence, assist in the analysis of situated
accounting practices.
A neglect of boundary maintenance theory has had the consequence of
creating a rift both historically (Reed, 1985, p. 61) and analytically between
organizational theory and social theory. Historically, some theorists have seen
such a division as beneficial. Albrow (1968), for example, prescribed a clear
distinction between the "sociology of organizations" as an intellectual domain
where social theory could address the sociopolitical agenda within
organizations and "organizational theory" as an technocratic concern
"... pervaded by the managerial interests of improved organizational efficiency
and effectiveness" (Reed, 1985, p. 108). Donaldson (1985) defended the
intellectual terrain of organizational theory against an oncoming tide of social
theory - denying that organizational theory could ever be engulfed by social
theory. A separation of the two domains was recognized, but not prescribed, in
Covaleski and Aiken's (1986) analysis of the development of organizational
theory as an "applied" analysis, in contrast to which social theory is "detached"
from any managerial prescriptive bias. But such a schism has had a number of
consequences. First, the assumption that organizations are intrinsically ordered
places, rather than produced as such, neglects the extent to which rational-
instrumental behaviour is subject to social or interactional forces (Boland and
Pondy, 1983; Cooper, 1990; Gouldner, 1959). A focus on individual behaviour
results in organizational theory only incorporating such psychological concepts
as functional fixation and agency theory as it recognizes the problems created
by bounded rationality (Simon, 1947) and opportunism (Williamson, 1970). A
neglect of social theory also produces an organizational theory which is
dominated by "... a grey collection of managerialist typologies" (Parker, 1992,
p. 1) as power, culture and symbolism are conceptually excluded from the
organizational arena. Second, if the organization is seen as inherently unitary
rather than continuously reproduced as such, then the organization and its
environment become disconnected and tendencies to see the organization as a
self-sustaining entity are preserved. Such a disconnection not only ignores
boundary activity, it denies any possibility of organizations joining "... with
their surrounding cultures for purposes of mutual empowerment..." (Gergen, Managing the
1992). Third, the system metaphor, central to managerial organizational theory, Boundary
implies a structural-functionalist methodology and therefore excludes any
analysis of social relations within organizations (Silverman, 1970).
This separation of the domains of social and organizational theory has had a
powerful impact on the analysis of accounting practices. Sociologists, while
writing extensively on power and authority, have largely neglected the concrete
embodiment of these concepts in accounting systems of co-ordination and
control (Johnston, 1986). Why this has happened is uncertain but Zald (1986)
suggests that it results from the sociologists' view of accounting as "fixed"
and "... part of a technical cultural process which need not be analysed"
(p. 328). That sociologists think in this way is not unconnected from the
"capture" of the concepts of control and co-ordination by the managerial
concerns of organizational theorists. Consequently, sociologists have not
analysed "the fundamental tendency of all bureaucratic thought ... in turning
... all problems of politics into problems of administration" (Mannheim, 1936,
quoted in Cooper, 1989; italics indicate author's insert). Boundary maintenance
theory aids the understanding of how the disconnection between social and
organization theory has occurred and also points to the ways in which social
and organizational theories could be reconnected through the nesting of the
manifest processes of co-ordination and control in the rather more abstract
social theorizing around power and authority.
Conclusions and Implications for Research
Traditional organizational theory assumes that:
By gaining knowledge, we acquire power over organizations; we can design them and be
experts on them ... The aim of this expertise follows the grand narrative of progress which is
manifested within organizations as a concern for "efficiency", "minimization of conflict" and
"profitability" (Parker, 1992, p. 5).
From this perspective accounting comes in as a technical artefact, in a reflective
rather than a constitutive role, and carrying the assumption that it can produce
prescriptions tor improvements in internal organizational design. In contrast
this article has sought to locate accounting within "... the production of the
organization rather than the organization of production" (Cooper and Burrell,
1988, p. 106). Hence, it has identified the ways in which accounting is implicated
in boundary maintenance. Implicit in this approach is the notion of agency.
To be an agent"... is to have the capability of 'making a difference'" (Giddens,
1982, p. 212). This article sees accounting as a resource, drawn on by agents, not
only to "make a difference" within organizations but to "create a difference"
between the organization and society. Such a difference is achieved by
maintaining boundaries as "thresholds" and managing boundaries as "binding
structures". This involves seeing "organization" "... as a process verb that
needs disorganization in order to exist" (Parker, 1992, p. 6). The process of
AAAJ organizing happens at organizational boundaries, as agents or "gatekeepers"
7 4 manage the exigencies of inclusion and exclusion in the production and
reproduction of organizational realities.
Therefore "to organize" involves a negotiated understanding of organ¬
izational realities and an interpretation of these in relation to environmental
realities. Organizations must, therefore, "... achieve a form of self-referential
closure in relation to their environments, enacting their environments as
projections of their own identity or self image" (Morgan, 1986, p. 240).
In this process of enactment, the internal information collecting and processing
systems of the organization have profound effects on what signals are
received from the environment and on how these signals are received (Scott,
1981b, p. 173). Thus organizational scan, search and information processing
facilities enact the environment as a significant representational context by
transforming it from being merely"... 'everything else' - that is everything that
is not system" (Scott, 1981b, p. 165). Thus, accounting information is implicated
in the construction of environmental realities in order to aid organizational
understanding of both what to attend to and how to interpret it.
This role of accounting is clearly brought out in the Berry et al. (1985) case
study on organizational change. Where, as in the Berry et al study, accounting
information is disconnected from productive activities, internal boundaries
protected the technical core of the organization, but the concomitant neglect of
the external societal boundary resulted in the eventual breakdown of the
organizational/environmental threshold. Such a study suggests that boundary
management ideas can usefully be applied both in the understanding of how
organizations achieve a negotiated equilibrium and how such stability can be
undermined by boundary tensions and shifting boundary emphases. Thus,
boundary management ideas have both theoretical implications for the
understanding of the organizational/social context of accounting (as the
preceding section outlines) and empirical significance for rich accounting case
studies (of particular interest may be the catalyst role of boundary tensions in
engendering organizational transitions).
The paradox of the organization as an embedded, yet differentiated, form of
social life can, therefore, be viewed as reflecting the interdependencies between
the organization and its environment. The organization is embedded in society
in its use of environmental information for self-understanding but, at the same
time, the organization is differentiated from society by managing boundaries to
maintain its own internal identity. Such an approach challenges a traditional
static and structure-biased organizational theory and presents an
understanding of organization as process. In consequence the role of accounting
in the processes which achieve organization is revealed.
Notes
1. Although Foucault is usually seen as making a contribution to the post-modern debate his
work is difficult to categorize and he himself rejected the post-modern label. He is referred
to here to highlight one facet of his work, i.e. that facet which stresses the pervasive,
ubiquitous nature of discipline within organizations. In contrast to this view of the self-
sustaining nature of organizational power this article develops ideas of organizational
processes as achieved by boundary maintenance.
Heydebrand (1989) provides an analysis of how intraorganizational forms are related to
certain structural dimensions of labour.
Clegg's view may be taken to imply that agency is not always accomplished through
individuals. This article, however, adopts a formulation which sees agents necessarily as
people but, such a position does not imply that agency always equates with the intentions
of purposeful individuals. The "forms of calculation" (including accounting) through which
agency is expressed are institutionally constructed. Such "forms of calculation" can be
compared with Giddens's notion of the "resources" or structured properties of social
systems which are drawn on by agents in the course of their interaction.
These linkages (i.e. between "thresholds" and financial accounting and between
management accounting and "binding structures") are not always complete. Clearly
budgeting, for example, can serve to maintain "thresholds" by convincing external
regulators that efficient planning systems are in place (the use of management accounting
to supplement reliance on financial accounting is documented in the history of the NHS).
Nevertheless it is argued that, although blurred, these distinctions are useful.
Intellectual technologies encompass both information processing and decision making





Albrow, M. (1968), "The Study of Organizations - Objectivity or Bias?", in Salaman G. and
Thompson K. (Eds), People and Organizations, Longman, London.
Berry, A.J., Capps, T., Cooper, D., Ferguson, p. , Hopper, T. and Lowe, E.A. (1985), "Management
Control in an Area of the NCB: Rationales of Accounting Practices in a Public Enterprise",
Accounting, Organizations and Society, Vol. 10 No. 1, pp. 3-28.
Blau, p. M. and Schoenherr, R.A., (1971), The Structure ofOrganizations, Basic Books, New York,
NY.
Boland, R.J. and Pondy, L.R. (1983), "Accounting in Organizations: A Union of Natural and
Rational Perspectives", Accounting Organizations and Society, Vol. 8 Nos. 2/3, pp. 223-34.
Chambers, R.J. (1989), "Time in Accounting", Abacus, Vol. 25 No. 1, pp. 7-21.
Clark, p. (1990), "Chronological Codes and Organizational Analysis" in Hassard, J. and Pym, D.
(Eds), The Theory and Philosophy of Organizations, Routledge, London.
Clegg, S. (1990), Modern Organizations: Organization Studies in the Postmodern World, Sage,
London.
Cooper, R. (1989), "Modernism, Post Modernism and Organizational Analysis 3: The Contribution
of Jacques Derrida", Organizational Studies, Vol. 10 No. 4, pp. 479-502.
Cooper, R. (1990), "Organization/Disorganization", in Hassard, J. and Pym, D. (Eds), The Theory
and Philosophy ofOrganizations, Routledge, London.
Cooper, R. (1992), "Formal Organization and Representation: Remote Control, Displacement and
Abbreviation", in Reed, M. and Hughes, M. (Eds), Rethinking Organizations New Directions in
Organizational Theory and Analysis, Sage, London.
Cooper, R. and Burrell, G. (1988), "Modernism, Post Modernism and Organizational Analysis: An
Introduction", Organization Studies, No. 19 No. 1, pp. 91-112.
Covaleski, M. and Aiken, M. (1986), "Accounting and Theories of Organizations: Some
Preliminary Considerations", Accounting, Organizations and Society, Vol. 11 Nos 4/5,
pp. 297-319.
Dent, J.F. (1991), "Accounting and Organizational Cultures: A Field Study of the Emergence of a
New Organizational Reality", Accounting, Organizations and Society, Vol. 16 No. 8, pp. 705-32.
Dirsmith, M.W. (1986), "Discussion of Social Environments and Organizational Accounting",
Accounting, Organizations and Society, Vol. 11 Nos 4/5, pp. 357-67.
Donaldson, L. (1985), In Defence of Organizational Theory: A Reply to the Critics, Cambridge
University Press, London.
Fayol, H. (1949), General and IndustrialManagement, Pitman, London.
Francis, J.R. (1990), "After Virtue? Accounting as a Moral and Discursive Practice", Accounting,
Auditing & Accountability Journal, Vol. 3 No. 3, pp. 5-17.
Gergen, K.J. (1992), "Organization Theory in the Postmodern Era", in Reed, M. and Hughes, M.
(Eds), Rethinking Organizations New Directions in Organizational Theory and Analysis, Sage,
London.
Giddens, A. (1982), "Power, the Dialectic of Control and Class Structuration", Profiles and
Critiques in Social Theory, University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA.
Giddens, A. (1984), The Constitution ofSociety, Polity Press, Cambridge.
Giddens, A. (1987), "Time and Social Organization", Social Theory and Modem Sociology, Polity
Press, Cambridge.
Gouldner, A.W. (1959), "Organizational Analysis", in Merton, R.K., Broom, L. and Cottrell, C.
(Eds), Sociology Today, Basic Books, New York, NY.
Graham, A. (1989), "Management Development in the Public Sector", Public Money and
Management, Vol. 9 No. 3, pp. 25-9.
Hayes, D.C. (1980), "An Organizational Perspective on Psycho-technical System Perspective",
Accounting, Organizations and Society, Vol. 5 No. 1, pp. 43-7.
Heydebrand, W.V. (1989), "New Organization Forms", Work and Occupations, Vol. 16 No. 3,
pp. 323-57.
Hopwood, A.G. (1990), "Accounting and Organization Change", Accounting, Auditing &
AccountabilityJournal, Vol. 3 No. 1, pp. 7-17.
Johnston, H.T. (1986), "Accounting, Organizations and Rules: Towards a Sociology of Price -
A Comment on Zald", Accounting, Organizations and Society, Vol. 11 Nos. 4/5, pp. 341-3.
Lapsley, I. (1992), "User Needs and Financial Reporting: A Comparative Study of Local
Authorities and the National Health Service", Financial Accountability & Management, Vol. 8
No. 4, pp. 281-98.
Llewellyn, S. (1993), "Linking Costs with Quality in Health and Social Care: New Challenges for
Management Accounting", Financial Accountability & Management, Vol. 9 No. 3, pp. 177-94.
Mackay, D.M. (1969), Information, Mechanism and Meaning, MIT Press, Cambridge.
Mannheim, K. (1936), Ideology and Utopia, Harcourt Brace, New York, NY.
March, J.G. and Simon, H.A. (1958), Organizations, Wiley & Sons, New York, NY.
Meyer, J.W. (1986), "Social Environments and Organizational Accounting", Accounting,
Organizations and Society, Vol. 11 Nos 4/5, pp. 345-56.
Mintzberg, H. (1983), Power in and around Organizations, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ.
Morgan, G. (1986), Images ofOrganizations, Sage, London.
Parker, M. (1992), "Postmodern Organizations or Postmodern Organization Theory?",
Organization Studies, Vol. 13 No. 1, pp. 1-17.
Perrow, C. (1979), Complex Organizations: A Critical Essay, 2nd ed., Scott Foresman, Glenview, IL.
Power, M. (1990), "Modernism, Post-modernism and Organization", in Hassard, J. and Pym, D.
(Eds), The Theory and Philosophy ofOrganizations, Routledge, London.
Reed, M. (1985), Redirections in Organizational Analysis, Tavistock, London.
Reed, M. (1993), "Organizations and Modernity: Continuity and Discontinuity in Organizations
Theory", in Hassard, J. and Parker, M. (Eds), Postmodernism and Organizations, Sage,
London.
Richardson, A.J. (1987), "Accounting as a Legitimating Institution", Accounting, Organizations
and Society, Vol. 12 No. 4, pp. 341-55.
Roberts, J. and Scapens, R. (1985), "Accounting Systems and Systems of Accountability -
Understanding Accounting Practices in Their Organizational Contexts", Accounting,
Organization and Society, Vol. 10 No. 4, pp. 443-56.
Robson, K. (1992), "Accounting Numbers as 'Inscription': Action at a Distance and the
Development of Accounting", Accounting, Organizations & Society, Vol. 17 No. 7, pp. 685-708.
Scott, W.R. (1981a), "Developments in Organizational Theory 1960-1980", American Behavioural
Scientist, pp. 407-22.
Scott, W.R. (1981b), Organizations: Rational, Natural and Open Systems, Prentice-Hall,
Englewood Cliffs, NJ.
Silverman, D. (1970), The Theory ofOrganizations, Heinemann, London.
Simon, H.A. (1947), Administrative Behaviour, Macmillan, New York, NY.
Tai, S. (1990), "Managerial Accounting and the 'New Managerial Ideas' - A Case Study of the
Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. Ltd", Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, Vol. 3
No. 2, pp. 52-65.
Thompson J.D. (1967), Organizations in Action, McGraw-Hill, New York, NY.
Thompson, p. (1993), "Postmodernism: Fatal Distraction", in Hassard, J. and Parker, M. (Eds),
Postmodernism and Organizations, Sage, London.
Turner, B., (1990), "The Rise of Organizational Symbolism", in Hassard, J. and Pym, D. (Eds), The
Theory and Philosophy ofOrganizations, Routledge, London.
Williamson, O.E. (1970), Corporate Control and Business Behaviour, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs,
Nf.
Willmott, H. (1990), "Beyond Paradigmatic Closure in Organization Enquiry", in Hassard, J. and
Pym, D. (Eds), The Theory and Philosophy ofOrganizations, Routledge, London.
Zald, M.N. (1986), "The Sociology of Enterprise, Accounting and Budget Rules: Implications for







The University ofEdinburgh, Edinburgh, UK
Introduction
The inception of fundholding - the opportunity to hold a budget at practice
level - for general practitioners (CPs) has constituted a critical, formative
moment for intra-professional relations in British medicine. Fundholding
conferred purchasing power on GPs; this paper argues that they are using this
financial leverage to enhance their influence within the British National Health
Service (NHS). The mechanisms of fundholding have enabled GPs to
accommodate their "latent desire" (Glennester et al., 1993, p. 74) to shift the
balance of power between themselves and the hospital consultants. This desire
had remained latent as any overt intraprofessional challenge would have
threatened public perceptions of all medical experts as exemplars of rationality,
impartiality and civility (Dezalay, 1995; Ezzamel and Willmott, 1993). Societies
rationalize socially significant but unclear (or uncertain) domains, such as
medicine, by professionalizing them and handing over decisions to licensed
practitioners (Meyer, 1994, p. 222). Any conflicts signalling irrationality will,
therefore, undermine claims to professionalism. Fundholding presented GPs
with an opportunity to engage in "turf battles" (Dezalay, 1995) and renegotiate
their relationships with the consultants without risking damaging the overall
reputation of the medical profession as fundholding was a political initiative
rather than a professional challenge. While successive governments have set
overall funding levels for the NHS, they (prior to the health service reforms)
accepted the autonomy of the medical profession to allocate resources within
the NHS. This concordat ensured that awkward decisions about "who gets
what" remained within the realm of expert professional judgement and did not
become politicized - and, hence, seen as the responsibility of government
(Klein, 1995, p. 96). The opportunity presented to GPs through fundholding
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AAAJ professional medical renegotiations were conducted through an overtly
10 j politicized medium.
The reorganization of health care by the State through the inception of the
NHS in 1948 had intensified the divisions which already existed between GPs
and consultants by removing the financial ties which linked them. From 1948
onwards consultants were paid largely by the state and GPs, as a source of
32 private work, through referring patients to the hospitals, declined in
'
importance; concomitantly, after 1948, GPs' capitation fees were paid by the
state regardless of the number of patients they referred to consultants
(Honigsbaum, 1979, pp. 302, 308). The severing of these monetary bonds
widened the professional divide within British medicine. "The plain fact is ...
that a hostility exists between two sections of the profession. The conception of
the colleague...is dying, if it is not already dead...This is a tragedy for the
profession; it is a tragedy for the public; it is a tragedy for the National Health
Service..." (Creditor, 1971 quoted in Honigsbaum, 1979, p. 299).
Fundholding re-opened communications between GPs and consultants as it
re-established the financial ties between them. This paper delineates three
domains within which GPs are working with budgets to renegotiate medical
agendas through exerting financial leverage: first, the use of contracts to
specify (to the advantage of GPs) processes of case management at the interface
with the hospitals; second, the use of contracts to press for particular quality-
standards in the clinical practice of hospital consultants; and, third, the use of
the increased financial flexibility conferred by the budget to "take back" certain
surgical procedures from secondary care to primary care. These are all domains
where GPs perceive that consultants have exercised control without
accountability to GPs or to patients. As one GP in the empirical study (referred
to in detail below) remarked,
They [the consultants] thought that when they were given a consultants' job they were deified
on the same day.
The paper begins by examining the dominance structures which exist between
consultants and GPs, the research design is then explained - followed by the
accounts of the GPs interviewed. These accounts explore four areas where
fundholding impacts on GP - consultant relations: the hospital interface; the
expansion of primary care; GPs' managerialism; and, finally, the interwoven
agendas of money and medicine. The accounts capture a very unique moment
in the development of fundholding, being focused on the initial stage of the
scheme. They are based on evidence from GPs who have been particularly
instrumental in establishing fundholding and in articulating its aims and
objectives (see the further discussion below on research design). This approach
does not deny that many GPs are opposed to fundholding, even though they
may acknowledge that the scheme has elicited a greater responsiveness from
the Trust hospitals (for a discussion of some of the issues which divide
fundholding and non-fundholding GPs see Llewellyn and Grant, 1996). The
principal aims of this paper are, first, to present evidence on why GPs who are
enthusiasts for the scheme embraced it so readily and, second, to discuss (again Purchasing
through reference to the arguments of GPs themselves) their unfolding projects power and
as fundholding develops. The paper examines GPs' use of budget holding as a professionalism
control device to achieve changes in the process of the provision of health care -
particularly in terms of GPs attempting to redress the balance of control of
health care provision between themselves and the consultants.
The paper does not discuss the government's ongoing commitment to 33
enhancing the control of the medical profession as a whole (for accounts of this —->
process, see for example, Lapsley, 1994 and Laughlin et al., 1992). In its focus on
the three-way contractual and managerial relationships between GPs,
consultants and managers (in the Trust hospitals and the health boards) the
paper also sidesteps the issue of the increased managerial control which is now
exercised over GPs by the Family Health Service Authorities]!] (for a detailed
discussion of this enhanced accountability see Laughlin et al., 1994). Following
the accounts from GPs the paper concludes with comments on the present and
possible future direction of fundholding within the British NHS. Table I gives
some explanatory detail on the relative positions of GPs and consultants in
British medicine and on the reformed UK health service.
Infra-professional power relations in medicine
This paper uses the work of Abbott (1988, pp!18 ff) to theorize internal
differentiation and relations of dominance within the medical profession.
Abbott uses the central concept of jurisdiction to understand professional work,
jurisdiction implies control of knowledge and its application which, in turn,
involves the exclusion or domination of outsiders who attack that control;
GPs General practitioners (GPs) are doctors who have undertaken the same
initial medical training as their colleagues in the hospitals but who, on
registration, transfer out of the hospitals into the community to practise as
generalists rather than specialists.
Consultants Consultants are medical specialists who work within hospitals. They may
be either physicians or surgeons and they hold the highest appointment
within their particular branch of medicine or surgery (termed a specialism).
They do not offer holistic care of the whole body (apart from those
specializing in paediatrics or geriatrics) but diagnosis and treat a part of the
body (e.g. cardiologist is concerned with the heart and its diseases).
Trust hospitals Trusts are semi-autonomous self-governing hospitals. They are able to set
their own levels of remuneration for their workforce but are subject to
external financing limits which limit total borrowing for capital projects.
They are also required to earn a 6 per cent return on assets in use. They are
directly accountable to the Secretary of State for Health.
Health Boards Health Boards (District Health Authorities in England) are bureaucratic
bodies which had previously (prior to the purchaser/provider split) run the
hospitals; now the role of Health Board managers lies in purchasing (for
non-fundholders and for those services not covered by fundholders' budgets





hence, professional activity always involves competition. Within this analysis
professional development is not essentially a process of professionalization -
involving association, licensure and the formation of ethical codes - but is a
history of jurisdictional disputes (pp. 2ff). Such disputes are about who controls
what, when and how. Sequences of jurisdictional control are played out as
jurisdictional boundaries come under attack. Abbott writes on both
interprofessional and intraprofessional disputes; it is the latter which is
considered in this paper - in the context of the GPs' struggle for greater control
over medical practice through a challenge to the jurisdictional dominance of the
consultants. Along with Abbott, the paper uses principally the work of
Honigsbaum (1979, pp. 2ff) to understand the historical dimensions of intra¬
professional medical conflict and it is the historical dimension which is
considered here first.
Historically, issues of philosophy, training and social attitudes created
divisions in British medicine and provided a rich field for territorial disputes
(Dingwall, 1995, p. 227). At the beginning of the nineteenth century there were
three distinct categories of medical personnel - physicians, surgeons and
apothecaries - and it was from the latter that the modern GP role emerged.
These origins stigmatized the early GPs - as apothecaries had combined their
dispensing duties with the sale of groceries and, hence, they carried negative
"tradesmen" associations (Honigsbaum, 1979, p. 2). Trading introduced a
financial rationality into the developing professional milieux of medicine and
hence the early GPs were not as successful as the physicians and surgeons at
distancing themselves from the logic of the market (Dezalay, 1995). As the
nineteenth century progressed doctors were assisted by the appearance of
microscopes and stethoscopes for clinical examination in the process of
excluding patients and amateurs from participation in medical practice
(Dingwall, 1995, p. 239). In 1858 doctors, still struggling with one another over
territory and with the government over their social standing, succeeded in
getting the Medical Act passed (Reader, 1966, p. 66). This act created the
General Medical Council, a body with two main duties, to ensure that unfit
practitioners do not get on to the medical register and to expel unworthy
members from the profession (Carr-Saunders and Wilson, 1933). The Council,
imbued with the prestige and authority of the state, formalized the principles of,
first, proper professional education (tested by examination and awarded by
licence), second, professional self-discipline (through registration and striking
off) and, third, statutory recognition of the rights of the qualified practitioner
(with sanctions against the unregistered); these principles instituted that most
prized attribute of professionalism "...the closed shop with an Act of
Parliament to lock the door." (Reader, 1966, p. 68).
Medical science advanced throughout the nineteenth century and, as the
"centre of gravity" for the generation of medical knowledge moved from the
bedside to the hospital (Scale and Pattison, 1994), hospitals spread rapidly.
Access to these hospitals provided physicians and surgeons with the
opportunity to specialize. By the end of the nineteenth century the development
of anaesthesia and antiseptic techniques had made surgery respectable;
previously its status had been threatened by the "messy, painful and
hazardous" nature of surgical practice (Honigsbaum, 1979, p. 3). At this time
GPs were performing a variety of surgical procedures and the surgeons had
retaliated by usurping aftercare from the GPs (Honigsbaum, 1979, p. 14). Thus
prior to state intervention, access to the hospitals in order to practise specialized
medicine was an issue which created tensions between GPs and consultants
and a medical occupational hierarchy had been established based on class
origins and techniques. However, these tensions were suppressed through the
privatized nature of medicine. An uneasy concord was maintained as
consultants were dependent on GPs for income through the referral system. All
referrals to the hospitals came through the GPs, but once patients were
hospitalized the consultants took charge. Although this referral system
regulated competition within the medical profession, it was identical to those
systems which controlled forms of inter-professional rivalry, being
"... essentially a demarcation agreement between two crafts, of exactly the
same kind that developed between different crafts in shipbuilding and other
British industries." (Klein, 1995, p. 79).
Extension of coverage, (with its promise of a better life for all), rather than
cost containment, was the focus of the health care debate in the aftermath of the
First World War as the government took steps to allay a public outcry at the
loss of life involved (Honigsbaum, 1979, p. 53). This directed attention on the
hospitals as the centres for technological progress in health care and, hence, as
the determinants of the future health of the nation. State perceptions on the
significance of the role of GPs declined as they did not contribute towards the
advancement of medical knowledge. But in the 1980s, as health care discourses
reverted to cost containment the importance of the general practitioner as a
controller of the consumption of health care resources has again been
highlighted (Klein, 1995, p. 164). Nevertheless the potential role of fundholding
within the wider reforms of the NHS was understated. GP fundholding
constituted a mere "sideshow" (Glennester et al, 1994, p. 74) to the creation of
the Trust hospitals with their semi-autonomous status (see Working for
Patients (SSH, 1989) for further information on the UK health reforms).
That the impact of fundholding was unexpected is attributable to the public
"invisibility" of the intra-professional conflict between GPs and consultants
(Abbott, 1988, p. 121); but this conflict was to galvanize fundholding processes.
Such an analysis explains why GPs have taken voluntarily to fundholding
(fundholding now covers one third of the UK population and, in some places,
coverage is over 70 per cent (NHS Executive, 1995)) whereas the tale of
persuading hospital clinicians to hold budgets has been tortuous (Lapsley,
1995). As the study described below demonstrates, GPs anticipated power
gains through holding budgets; hospital clinicians did not. Hence, this paper
delineates the "differential appeal" (Humphrey et al., 1993, p. 18) of fundholding




in control of the reforms but the consultants saw them as threatening. One GP
from the empirical study (described in detail below) expressed this as follows:
They [the consultants] see the NHS being GP-led rather than consultant-led - that's the source
of the threat they feel.
Internal differentials give rise to the problem of power and, hence, create intra-
professional tensions. Abbott defines four areas of internal differentiation:
intra-professional status; client differentiation; organization of work; and career
pattern. Along all these dimensions GPs and consultants are polarized - with
GPs occupying lower status roles and performing lower status tasks. Yet, prior
to fundholding as a political initiative, GPs had failed to launch any
professional challenge to the consultants' dominance over medical terrain. That
they had not done so may be attributed, first, to their reluctance to expose intra-
professional tensions to the public gaze and, second, to the lack of a mechanism
which would facilitate such a challenge. Fundholding was a politicized
initiative instigated by the state, it constituted a disturbance to the balance of
power between the GPs and the consultants but it was a disruptingmechanism
which was introduced into (rather than lay within) the medical terrain. Abbott
has been criticised for neglecting the significance of external challenges (or
mechanisms) which give rise to professional renegotiation of territory (Dezalay,
1995; Sikka and Willmott, 1995). In the case of intra-professional (as opposed to
inter-professional) disputes "externality" is particularly important, as an
external mechanism can be converted into an internal challenge without
damaging the credibility of the profession as a whole. Fundholding as a state-
sponsored financial mechanism allowed a covert intra-professional challenge to
be launched by those GPs who sought to raise their status vis-a-vis their
hospital colleagues.
Professional regression
Intraprofessional status differentiation allows for "professional regression"
where, in the medical sphere, consultants see only patients who are referred by
other professionals (in the British context GPs). This referral system fosters an
environment where GPs must mediate in the patient world by seeing patients as
people. People often have a complexity of medical, social and financial need.
Front-line GPs, in their referral role, strip patients of their extraneous non¬
medical needs (Abbott, 1988, p. 41), enabling the consultant to review a
"preprofessionalized" case - presenting with only medical signs and symptoms.
Moreover consultants work in specialisms dealing solely with parts of the body
- only in the case of the very young (paediatrics) or the old (geriatrics) will
hospital doctors treat the whole person. This task differentiation allows
consultants to regress to a "higher ground". "In the varied topography of
professional practice, there is a high, hard ground where practitioners can make
effective use of research-based theory and technique, and there is a swampy
lowland where situations are confusing 'messes' incapable of technical
solution." (Schon, 1988, p. 67). This problem is solved in the British medical
profession by locating GPs in the swamp. In this swampy zone GPs must work Purchasing
through experience, often employing trial and error, as they cope with patients power and
as "confusing messes" presenting with signs and symptoms of organic, nrofpcQinnnli<?m
psychological or social origin (Armstrong, 1980, p. 74). On the hard, high
ground consultants can satisfy their hunger for technical rigour and buttress
the public view of clinical practice as one of solid clinical competence (Schon,
1988, p. 68). Consequent on consultants' higher involvement with the medical 37
knowledge base and the GPs' "dirty work" with non-medical client problems,
consultant vis-a-vis GP status is much enhanced. Hospital surgeons and
physicians are "professionals' professionals" (Abbott, 1988, p. 118) who are
enabled by the GP referral system to regress from front-line tasks and who,
consequently, enjoy high peer esteem and high incomes.
Client differentiation
Client differentiation occurs when superordinate-subordinate sectors of a
profession serve different client groups. The higher status professional deals
with the higher status client and vice-versa; this client differentiation reinforces
the task differentiation (referred to above) as a professional. .who serves high
status clients receives some reflected glory, just as one who serves charity cases
receives some reflected opprobrium." (Abbott, 1988, p. 122). Currently in the
medical profession only hospital consultants see private patients - receiving the
payments from clients which are the publicly visible signs of the value of their
specialist expertise; since the inception of the NHS the public have not perceived
any benefits in paying GPs for private treatment. Aside from client status,
consultants and GPs also favour different types of client. GP fundholding has
been criticized on the grounds that it builds in an incentive to "cream skim" (i.e.
to exclude from the practice list those patients whose medical conditions
necessitate costly treatments) (Glennester et al., 1993). In contrast, consultants,
as medical technocrats (Klein, 1995, pp. 25ff), will prefer patients with unusual,
complex or serious and, hence, costly conditions. These patients will require
highly technical medical interventions and, hence, such patients will justify the
deployment of expensive technology. Clients with complex medical conditions
will frequently be referred between specialists; they will, therefore, be agents
for cross-fertilization of ideas between specialties. Consultants can also seek to
advance their careers by publishing papers which interrogate unusual
afflictions through the pursuit of the "...purely professional activity of
research." (Abbott, 1988, p. 123). Clients with esoteric conditions are more
interesting as they fully engage the specialist knowledge base of the
professional; GPs must always refer such patients on to specialist treatment
centres, they are not "fit" to serve them. GPs work with the trivial, the
superficial and the most boringly familiar of medical cases; in consequence, the
GPs' public image is somewhat staid if not dull. Patients with serious, unusual
or complex conditions will, ceteris paribus, be more costly. Therefore
fundholding GPs and consultants are also distinguished by "client cost
incentive". Consultant "client cost incentive" militated against non-emergency
cases, minor elective surgery and out-patients; these were precisely the
categories which were targeted within the fundholding scheme and, hence,
included in GPs' budgets.
Differentiation ofworkplace
Linked to professional regression is the differentiation of workplace for the
consultant and the GP. High status consultants work in the highly regarded
"teaching" hospitals which are centres for medical research and the
advancement of medical knowledge. Within these teaching hospitals
consultants have been able to develop the "firms" which further concretize and
advance their power. Consultants need subordinates to undertake the more
routine "scut" work such as giving injections, clearing sores, taking histories
and even conducting minor surgery (Abbott, 1988, p. 126). GPs are suitable
candidates for this delegated work. In the "cottage" hospitals which flourished
before the Second World War[2], GPs did perform these tasks (Honigsbaum,
1979, pp. 10-11). However, there was consultant anxiety over the impact of non-
specialist GPs on the quality of clinical practice - one leading surgeon in 1946
claimed that "more people are killed than cured in cottage hospitals" - and the
GP came to be regarded as a menace in the hospital world (Honigsbaum, 1979,
p. 306). During the 1950s cottage hospitals began to close down. Both to deny
GPs access to hospitals and to allow for the accommodation of private practice
the "firm" concept was developed from the inception of the NHS. Consultants
began to supervise as many as six "assistants" - a senior registrar, two
registrars, a senior house officer and two house officers (Honigsbaum, 1979,
p. 294). So a division of labour evolved within the health sendee where routine,
"degraded" work was given over to junior doctors and GPs were pushed back
into the community.
Differentiation in career progression
Differentiation of workplace dictates sharply divided career paths for the
"hospital" doctor and the GP. Although both share the protection that
professionalism provides against the instabilities of capitalist employment
(Abbott, 1988, p. 132), GPs have a stable, comfortable, if essentially static, career
pattern. In contrast hospital doctors, owing to the pyramidic structure of the
"firm", face a riskier progression through a career hierarchy and, owing to the
relative infrequency of vacant consultant posts, may be forced to seek
employment in a lesser status institution or leave Britain for abroad. Essentially
GPs take on a lower status front-line peripheral role away from the main centres
of medical power in exchange for some freedom from the rigidity and
supervision inherent in the "firms". In doing so, however, they sacrifice the
possibility of career development and risk their clinical practice degenerating
into repetitive routine.
Collegial status is also denied by the "gatekeeper" role which GPs perform
on patient access to the specialist expertise obtained in the hospitals (Bevan,
1989). In the USA and other European countries, patients may go straight to a
specialist opinion and as a result health care costs are higher[3] (Klein, 1995, Purchasing
p. 163). This "gatekeeper" role acts so as to filter out those non-serious power and
conditions which do not require specialist attention. "Gatekeepers" also limit professionalism
access to those expensive treatments which are rationed. For example, older
patients are not referred by GPs for dialysis as GPs are aware that consultants
ration this treatment by age (Schwartz and Aaron, 1988). This convention
spares the consultants from having to deny treatment and avoids a painful 39
rejection for the patient. The front-line "gatekeeper" role which GPs provide —~
simultaneously serves the state by limiting costs[4] and facilitates the decisions
which consultants make on health care rationing.
Internal differentiation within a profession generates intra-professional
tensions which can escalate into hostility if not publicly visible conflict (Abbott,
1988, p. 117). Consequently, such tensions may be a source of professional
development. The argument of this paper is that fundholding provided an
appropriate medium for renegotiations between medical professionals through
safely channelling intra-professional tensions through an accounting-based
initiative.
The research design
The paper draws on data from an empirical study conducted in the three
regions which have been most closely associated with the development of
fundholding in Scotland (Grampian, Lothian and Tayside). The methodology
which underlines this study is to trace the early dynamics of fundholding
through, first, identifying the key players who are driving the processes of
fundholding and, second, analysing the critical structures which define and
constrain these processes of agency. This approach also differentiates between
key players by focusing on how they seek to impact on these critical structural
conditions. This methodology combines Giddens'(1984) analysis of structure
and agency with Sayer's (1992) understanding of structures with "emergent
powers".
All but one of the key players interviewed during the research were lead
fundholding GPs within their practices. Two lead Landholders were also
chairmen of their regional fundholding associations and, therefore, headed up
the regional negotiations on contracts with hospital Trusts. All were to some
degree involved with increasing the range of medical services within their
practices but one GP had been particularly prominent in this respect. This
practitioner ran what was generally recognized to be the most innovative
surgery within Scotland; this practice had its own ambulance, owned a
number of diagnostic facilities and offered on-site minor surgical procedures.
It equated to the old "cottage" hospital and publicized its activities through its
resident part-time journalist. The one interviewee who was not a lead
Landholder was a GP surgeon and performed a one-day weekly surgical list.
This surgeon competed with the local hospitals for minor surgical procedures
not requiring general anaesthesia. In the sections which follow, these "key
players" are referred to as TD1, LD2, GD3 and so on where T, I, or G indicates
AAAJ the Scottish region (Tayside, Lothian and Grampian) within which the
]_0 ] practice was situated and Dl, 2 or 3 relates to the chronological order in which
the doctors were interviewed. Seven fundholding GPs in all were interviewed,
two in each of Tayside and Lothian and three in Grampian - where the third
interviewee was the aforementioned GP surgeon. Practice or fund managers
were present at these interviews but this paper does not make reference to
40 their views as the paper concentrates on the impact of fundholding on the
relationship between the GPs and the consultants and the GPs dominated the
discussion on these issues. As a part of the study, three non-fundholding GPs
were also interviewed but this paper makes reference to the comments of only
two of these - where the comments were germane to the territorial battles
between GPs and consultants. These non-fundholders are identified as NF1
and NF2.
The interviews conducted with these key players sought to identify agents'
reflexive monitoring and rationalization of their action; these accounts of
agency were then interrogated to discern the overall plans, programmes or
projects of the agents concerned and how these were constitutive of the
development of fundholding. This approach follows Giddens' distinction
between reasons and motives where reasons refer to the grounds of action and
motives refer to the wants which prompt them. Motives only usually having a
direct purchase on action where circumstances break with routine (Giddens,
1984, p. 6). The inception of fundholding fractured the routines of general
practice and hence supplied opportunities for agents to realize projects which
had previously been suppressed. One GP expressed this as follows:
Both the Chairman of the Health Board and the BMA were opposed at that time [at the
beginning of 1991], there was very little on paper, we asked naively "Is there a manual?" but
soon we realized that we had the opportunity to write the manual ... We shared information
among ourselves and any GP who was interested. (GDI)
Fundholding enhances the abilities of GPs to "make a difference" (Giddens,
1984, p. 14) to the course of events through the exercise of purchasing power.
Power, in this sense, equates to transformative capacity (Giddens, 1984, p. 15).
However, although fundholding has released the transformative capacities of
GPs as agents, fundholding carries certain structural properties which define
and constrain GPs' processes of agency. Structural constraints dictate how the
initial budget is set, the scope of services included within the budget and the
ways in which any "savings" can be used. Potential fundholding practices are
also screened for size and managerial capabilities. Historic expenditure
patterns[5] continue to form the basis of the budgets set but it is the
government's intent to continue to move towards weighted capitation (i.e. where
budgets are set on the basis of number of patients weighted by indicators of
need such as age and sex and, possibly, social deprivation, see, for example,
Sheldon et al., 1994 for a discussion of possible capitation formulae). In terms of
scope, initially budgets covered only hospital out-patient services, elective in
patient and day cases, diagnostic tests, drugs (prescribed and dispensed),
practice staff costs and certain accommodation costs. Latterly, however, this
"standard" fundholding option has been supplemented by community Purchasing
fundholding (which excludes acute hospital services) and total fundholding power and
(which covers all services). Fundholding now comes in these three variants in professionalism
terms of scope. Expenditures may be shifted between budget heads and overall
underspends, once audited, may be used in improving practices and offering
better services to patients (as judged by the GPs concerned). Initially
fundholding was open only to GPs with a minimum list size of 11,000; practices
also had to demonstrate that they were technically (in terms of information ~
technology) and managerially capable of handling the changes involved. The
minimum list size has been progressively reduced; it now stands at 4,000. For
further details on the structure of fundholding see the series of government
directives from NHS Review Paper 3, (SSH, 1990) to NHS Management
Executive (1995). The paper now turns to examine the accounts of GPs, first, on
why they chose to embark on fundholding and, second, on the projects they are
now trying to realize.
GP fundholders and infra-professional power relations
The following accounts from fundholding GPs on their reasons for going
fundholding and on their developing projects cover four areas: first,
communications with the Trust hospitals; second, the expansion of primary
care; third, how contracting between GPs and consultants has marginalized
managers in the Trust hospitals and the Health Boards; and, fourth, an
exploration of the diversity in terms of what GPs are attempting to realize
through fundholding. As stated in the earlier section on research design the GPs
quoted below are all enthusiasts and "early-takers" - key players in the
development of fundholding in Scotland. As one stated:
Some fundholders end up just exchanging paper with providers; we wanted to change things
drastically. (TD1).
Hence these accounts cannot evaluate the general impact to date of fundholding
throughout Scotland. As Day and Klein (1991) argue, fundholding has long-
term implications which are difficult to predict, being dependent on the future
uptake of the scheme and it will be a long time before there can be any
evaluation of the scheme in terms of its impact on patient care. Moreover, as the
above quote indicates, all fundholders do not pursue change through the
scheme with the same degree of commitment; the Audit Commission (1996)
reported that only around 10 per cent of fundholders were responsible for the
significant impact of the initiative. This research sought to access the views of
this crucial 10 per cent.
What the accounts do show are the "conditions of possibility" (Latour, 1987)
for fundholding or its emergent powers (Sayer, 1992, p. 118). These conditions of
possibility or emergent powers may or may not be fully realized being
dependent on how future processes of agency track through all the institutions
concerned.
AAAJ CPs use fundholding to regain ground lost to the consultants at the hospital
101 interface
Fundholding constitutes a potential disturbance to the balance of power
between the GPs and the consultants - as doctors who have jurisdiction over
money also have some jurisdiction over medicine. The following comments
from fundholding GPs illustrate this perception. First, from the perspective of
42 the historic advantages of the consultants, who, through professional
regressjon! control the medical knowledge base (Abbott, 1988, p. 118) and,
hence, have a privileged access to resources:
There's a lot of historic baggage, the medical schools always got all the resources you know
how it is, I don't need to tell you - it's the people who bring the money in, they get all the
resources...The Scottish health service is dominated by the medical schools, we wanted to
break their monopolies. (TD1)
The acute sector always dictated priorities - all the high-tech things - any money left over
went to GPs. (NF1)
and, second, on the emerging power of the GPs through the use of budgetary
control,
Ifwe've got the money that's what the Trusts will respond to, if we withhold the money they'll
have to respond. (GDI)
If you've got control over finances you've got more clout. (TD2)
If there's no funding behind it, very little happens - you're shouting from the trees, you're
toothless. (LD2)
One GP recalled his frustrating experiences of "shouting from the trees" when
he sat on joint consultative committees with consultants in his pre-fundholding
days,
We [the GPs] always brought up the same issues - quality, waiting times [for patients],
delayed or no reports back - there were always the same excuses, the same processes
produced no change, it [the hospital] remained a great black hole. (GDI)
The local consultants' response to GPs' newly acquired resources in the early
days of fundholding was confrontational:
You know what they [the consultants] said? They said, "You've got our money - give it
back".. .that's what they said at first - they actually said that. (TD1)
The contracting process makes consultants accountable and accountability
(even to other doctors) has been an alien concept to hospital clinicians (Hunter,
1992, p. 561). Documented forms of surveillance have been unheard of for
consultants who, in practice, have been accountable to no one, except the
General Medical Council and then only for the most exceptional cases of abuse
or error (Walby and Greenwell, 1994a). Consultants have been free to make a
whole range of decisions over the tasks they perform: how many patients to
admit and which diagnostic and therapeutic procedures to carry out; how to
schedule out-patient appointments; how to utilize their allocation of beds (in
terms of turnover); how to manage junior doctors; and how to pursue clinical
interests (Schulz and Harrison, 1990, p. 346). Although the government has
attempted to introduce greater external accountability for hospital clinicians,
particularly through medical audit, research done on the implementation of
audit concludes that it is functioning so far as a tool of medical self-
management, particularly vis-a-vis the education of more junior colleagues by
consultants, and medical accountability to external agencies has not been
enhanced (Kerrison et ai, 1993). Similarly Laughlin et al. (1992, p.137) note
"...this [medical audit] does seem to be an area where the initiative has been
taken back into the professions' hands."
In England Glennester et al. (1993) found that contracting was slow to get
under way as providers did not take GP fundholding seriously; most
participating practices had to make repeated attempts merely to locate someone
within the hospitals who was prepared to talk to them; the idea that practices
may want to negotiate improvements in services was treated "with incredulity"
(p. 92). Not surprisingly consultants in Scotland also at first resisted contractual
forms of accountability:
We [the GPs] thought we would be kind and gentle at the beginning, we wanted to get into a
dialogue with them [the consultants] but we found out that we needed to move a few patients
to have an impact - but it only needs to be at the margins... They're [the consultants] so
reactive to any change, there's this dreadful built-in conservatism... Relationships [with the
consultants] aren't always very good, in fact I'm sure my name's mud. The younger ones see
the need to engage in a dialogue but the older ones think it's appalling that GPs are even
studying these questions [standards of service], (GDI)
All GPs in this study used their purchasing power to influence processes of care
management at the hospital interface - improving communications from the
hospital to the GP surgery, cutting back on waiting times and ensuring that
patients saw a consultant rather than a junior member of the "firm" whenever
GPs felt that their condition warranted a consultant opinion. The following
comments illustrate the impact of GPs' purchasing power on these care
management processes:
A number of things have improved - discharge letters - sometimes we just didn't get them or
it would take six weeks, now it's supposed to be seven days and they manage ten days. Drugs
on discharge is another - they [the consultants] used to just throw them [the patients] out and
if we were closed - if it was a holiday or a weekend, then they couldn't get their drugs, now
they give them seven days' worth. (TD2)
The most noticeable improvements are communication between hospital doctors and GPs
there are regular'meetings now - they keep us posted about new services, new consultants, tell
us about new ideas - in the past they'd do things like stop ECGs without even telling us -
they'd never do that to us now. (LD2)
But other GPs wished to go beyond having an input into decisions on care
management processes to actually influencing the consultants' decisions on
clinical practice, (see also the later discussion on the parties to the agreement of
medical guidelines in the section on "Money and medicine"):
...For instance we've built the use of certain anti-coagulants before certain operations into
contracts - it means far less chance of thrombosis - which can be life-threatening if it reaches





consultants were actually doing it...They thought when they were given a consultant's job
they were deified on the same day. (GDI)
Quality in contracting, that's what GPs are in fundholding for but consultants aren't very good
at regress [providing less treatment when more may not be beneficial]. For example, for lung
cancer all the research shows that on radiotherapy three doses is all that's required - any more
than that just doesn't do any good but people [the consultants] are still using seven to eight
doses, so money's being wasted. (GDI)
Some GPs suspected that the hospital Trusts were responding to GPs' increased
financial leverage by increasing the number of cross-referrals between
specialisms, in order to generate income:
There's a triumvirate of orthopaedics, neurosurgery and the pain clinic. They make referrals
between themselves and there's nothing we can do about it when we get billed...The other way
they've got of making money is combined clinics - we send a detailed letter and they pick
something out of it.. .There's no doubt that the Trusts are looking to make money and they're
using various means of doing it... .We send a patient in for a surgical procedure - a day case
- and then someone comes and sits at the end of the bed - that's an out-patient appointment
and we get charged for both - they say an out-patient appointment has taken place. (TD2)
These accounts of the restructuring of professional relations in the NHS have
indicated how GPs with jurisdiction over money have used this leverage to
improve, from their perspective, the processes of case management at the
interface with the hospitals. Such perceptions reflect the findings of Dixon
(1993) and Glennester (1994). These improvements encompassed the re-
establishment of communicative links between hospitals and surgeries: face-to-
face meetings between GPs and consultants where medical agendas are
discussed; discharge letters which gave accurate information about in-patient
episodes; and reduced waiting times for consultant diagnosis of patients'
conditions. In addition some GPs have gone beyond this in an attempt to
influence consultants' clinical practice.
There were signs of reactions to the enhanced power of GPs as the "empire
strikes back" (Glennester et al, 1994, p. 106). When "money follows patients"
through cost and volume or cost per case contracts, there are incentives, first, to
treat rather than to wait and see and, second, to cross-refer (to increase the
number of items which can be billed). The experience of the USA has been that
when fee-for-service is the norm the importance of peer review bodies is
heightened in order to assess the appropriateness of medical interventions and
to bring pressure to bear on those who seem to be overly interventionist. In the
current British context, although individual consultants are salaried, the quasi-
market imperatives of hospital Trust status create financial incentives to
intervene and also to fragment treatments between different specialties. Some
fundholders had attempted to curb this practice by refusing to pay for tertiary
referrals when the GP concerned had not been informed in advance that such
referrals were clinically indicated. However, as it is unknown for GPs to
question a consultant's judgement over such referrals, registering with the GP
merely allows tertiary referrals to be monitored - it does not prevent them
occurring. The issue of tertiary referrals illustrates that GPs still lack control
over medical processes once their patients are admitted into the hospitals. But Purchasing
fundholding offers opportunities to cut down on the referral rate and retain power and
patients within primary care. GPs can use the financial flexibility conferred professionalism
through fundholding, first, to challenge the dominance of hospital-based
treatments by providing more holistic and/or preventive care and, second, to
take back some of the more minor surgical procedures by providing them in-
house. Both of these strategies, but particularly the second, can reduce the ^
referral rate to the hospitals - lessening the dependence of GPs on consultants,
enhancing the profile of GPs in British medicine and ensuring that more
resources remain within primary care. The next section discusses these issues.
GPs use fundholding to expand the services provided through primary care and
"take back" procedures from the hospital consultants
The flexibility that fundholding provides has allowed GPs to develop their
professional practice. Many fundholding GPs now provide a much wider range
of medical services within their surgeries than was previously the case - from
physiotherapy, chiropody and various forms of behavioural or cognitive
therapy to a range of services from complementary medicine:
There's a lot of physio needed in this area and, as we've spent less on drugs, we've been able
to transfer the savings to physio. (TD2)
We've got cognitive/behavioural therapy, there's a group of patients - say depressive or phobic
... you couldn't crack that in seven minutes or you spent an hour and it came off another
patient's time ... now we've got the CPNs [community psychiatric nurses] they've got the time
... there's a lot of unmet need ... there's a whole lot of patients who you wouldn't necessarily
refer on but they need time, it's meant the quality of service has improved tremendously - now
they don't have to wait. (TD1)
We have a community care co-ordinator - we wanted to make social work really work. Our
teenage health clinic covers everything from spots to sex. (TDl)
The patients get a better deal, we've got more in-house services ....and we've introduced
complementary medicine - a medical hypnotist, aromatherapy and massage, and reflexology
- we've always had an interest in it. (TD2)
Within this expansion of primary care the most significant professional
development has been the re-emergence of the GP surgeon as this may
challenge the consultants' monopoly over surgery as a work task (Abbott, 1988,
p. 118). All three of the regions in Scotland in which the research took place had
access to the services of a GP surgeon and in one of these regions both the
surgeon and the lead fundholding GP in the practice were interviewed. The lead
GP emphasized that the service must be credible in the eyes of the local
consultants:
Well if you've [the hospital Trusts] got a service which can't cope and we're offering a true blue
accredited service, what can they say? But you've got to be careful about secondary care in
primary care - if it's at a hobby level then you're doomed - you've got to be credible at the
consultant level. (GD2)
Initially credibility was low, as judged from the reactions of the surgeons at one
local Trust:
Do you know what they said? They said "Do you want to send your patients to a failed
surgeon?", they [the consultants] actually said that - the arrogance of that. (GDI)
In the event the GP surgeon interviewed dissipated the initial adverse reactions
of local consultants by "going to them for protocols". A protocol of care
establishes a predetermined schedule though which the treatment of a medical
condition can be organized; therefore it allows delegation to a more junior
clinician or to a nurse (Marsh, 1991, p. 42). That this GP surgeon went to the
local consultants for "protocols" implicitly acknowledged the continuing power
of these consultants to oversee her surgical list. Even though the work had been
transferred out of the hospitals, the consultants' control over this minor surgery
was not completely curtailed:
I'd anticipated problems with the consultants but 1 went to them for protocols and ideas and
there hasn't really been a problem; mind you, I've been very careful, I was aware that our
heads were on the chopping block - that some people would be very pleased to see it all go
wrong. (GD3)
This approach to the consultants by the GP surgeon put her in the position of a
junior member of the consultants' firm and ensured that her clinical practice did
not conflict with their established procedures - thus consultants continue to
maintain jurisdiction by maintaining influence over lesser colleagues from their
heartland in the hospitals (Abbott, 1988, p. 119). One GP argued that the
emergence of the GP surgeon did not undermine the consultants' control over
surgery:
They're [the consultants] not threatened clinically, these minor ops are done by housemen or
SHOs [senior house officers], anyway, they're not done by consultants. But if it takes money
out, they don't like it, if they see their financial empires shrinking - that worries them, I think.
(LD2)
The possible financial implications of a reduction in income for the hospital
Trusts were highlighted by the demand for the services of the GP surgeon
exceeding expectations:
It was slightly frightening and I'd only anticipated a couple of hours a week - but I do a full
day -1 could do two days if I wanted to. (GD3)
The GPs at this practice had recently attended a fundholding meeting which
had considered the merging of primary and secondary care in a single building
- such a scheme had been recently established in England:
There's a unit in England where the GPs bought the hospital - the ground floor's primary care
and the first floor is secondary. The GPs bought in expertise from a Trust at a distance the
local one wouldn't do it the GPs provide the post-operative care. We could use the
community hospitals in this way - it fits the Patients' Charter the one near here is run by the
local Health Care Trust, but they don't own them, they have a franchise to operate from them.
(GD2)
The preceding two sections have outlined how fundholding GPs have sought to
reduce the power and status differentials between themselves and the
consultants, first, by increasing the communications between the hospitals and
GPs' surgeries, second, by expanding the range of services offered within
primary care, and third, by "taking back" procedures from the consultants in
the hospitals. Task and workplace differentiations (Abbott, 1988) are diffused
through these means. The merging of primary and secondary care in one
building would consolidate these processes as GPs and consultants would no
longer be aligned with separate work sites and the old "cottage" hospital would
have re-emerged in a new form. Nevertheless consultant status remains
something to be aspired to rather than attained and GPs remain in the shadow
of their more powerful colleagues. This is demonstrated by GPs importing the
medical conventions of the hospitals into general practice in an attempt to align
the two workplaces. GPs speak now of having "specialisms" (TD1) in "general"
practice through their expanded range of services and of new GPs being
"registrars" (NF1) whom the longer established GP partners train. GPs also
acknowledged the continuing relations of dominance in medicine by asking the
consultants for "protocols" for minor surgery and ensuring that they were
"credible" (GD2) as GP surgeons in the eyes of the consultants at the local
hospitals. But because fundholding constitutes a facet of the quasi-market in
health care, it forces both GPs and consultants to engage with managerialism in
medicine and, as potential managers, GPs have some advantages over the
consultants as the following section demonstrates.
GPs as doctor-managers use fundholding to marginalize "lay" managers in the
hospitals and the Health Boards
There has been a shift in government policy from the attempts in the 1980s to
strengthen management in health care (as operationalized in management
budgeting) and thereby control health professionals (Packwood et al, 1991;
Pollitt et al., 1.988; Preston et al., 1992) to a strategy of creating managers out of
these professionals (Hunter, 1992, p. 565). This change in emphasis saw
Tayloristic strategies of management budgeting give way to the "new wave"
ideas of resource management within the hospitals (Walby and Greenwell,
1994b). The dominant position of clinicians within the NHS sets a context where
moves to make doctors into managers will be successful only where doctors can
see professional benefits accruing through the process. Lead fundholding GPs
are becoming managerialized because fundholding is conferring real
professional rewards (status, power and perceptions of improved quality of
patient care) on participating GPs. Where the management or administrative
tasks of fundholding are operational or comparatively routine in nature, GPs
have delegated these tasks to predominantly female practice (or fund)
managers, echoing the findings of Laughlin et al. (1994) where unwanted
mundane clinical tasks associated with the GP contract were passed on to
practice nurses. Thus the managerialization of the GP practice through
fundholding has not involved a threat to the continuance of GPs' core
professional practice with patients (see the discussion in Llewellyn and Grant,
1996 on the impact of fundholding on the clinical dimensions - consultations,
prescribing and referrals - of primary health care). Moreover practice (or fund)
managers occupy a clearly subservient role to GPs and do not challenge their
dominant professional position. But this is not the case for consultants, as
"management" within the hospitals has been a domain occupied by a separate
professional cadre and this group have posed a threat to consultants' clinical
freedom (Hunter, 1992). These differences in the managerial context within
general practice and the hospitals impacted on the initial round of contracting
in this study. In the beginning the consultants stood back from the contract
negotiations with the GPs - leaving the process to hospital managers. This
resulted in managers agreeing unrealistic targets and standards from the
clinicians' point of view. One GP commented on their first round of contracting
with their local Trust:
We agreed standards with the managers but they hadn't even shown them to the clinical
directors. They were so keen to get the money. Later I saw one of the clinical directors in the
corridor and I said to him," This is what you've signed up to." He said,"We can't do that -
that's impossible". I said "Well I know that but your managers agreed it". They were in breach
of contract for six months but we didn't press it. There's a lack of communication between the
managers and the clinical directors, so now we only go to meetings when the clinicians are
present. (LD1)
Managers aren't the point -OK the consultants don't always agree and that's the real problem.
But having managers in the middle just makes things worse. (GDI)
Moreover, as managerialism is generic in its terms of reference, GPs believe that
managers (particularly if they have been imported from outside the NHS) fail to
understand the particular nature of the British NHS, specifically, managers do
not grasp that change within the NHS has to be slow:
They [management in the Trusts] get in these contracting guys - they're straight out of
Japanese computer firms - they don't understand - it's [the NHS] not like business, it's a huge
dinosaur. (LD1)
Pre-1982 change was slow within the NHS as, during that period, change in the
NHS was incremental (Harrison and Pollitt, 1994, p. 36). Incremental change, in
turn, reflected the dominance of consultants, as providers, in shaping the NHS
and ensured the continuance of the provider values of paternalism, planning,
need, trust and stability (Klein, 1995, p. 248). Post-1982 incremental change in
the NHS was disrupted, first, by the attempts to control clinicians, through
strengthening management and imposing budgets, and, subsequently by the
strategies to create managers out of doctors through offering them budgets
(Hunter, 1992, p. 557). GP fundholders, who have become managerialized,
clearly believe that doctors rather than managers should decide priorities and
make resource management decisions. GPs think that managers lack insight
into the nature of clinical practice (they sign up to "impossible" clinical
standards) and are driven by purely financial criteria ("They were so keen to get
the money"). This leads to strategies to marginalize managers ("They aren't the
point") by only going to meetings when fellow clinicians are present. This
understanding underpins the seemingly paradoxical position of the GP who, Purchasing
while emphasizing the changes wrought by GPs at the interface with the power and
hospitals, still maintains that the NHS is a "huge dinosaur". An understanding nrofessionalism
that GPs and consultants both have a stake in maintaining provider values
explains the perception of this GP that the NHS is a "huge dinosaur" which
managers "don't understand". Fundholding GPs wish to instigate change in the
NHS but they want change to be negotiated within the medical profession 49
rather than allowing extraneous management criteria to drive agendas.
Fundholding has enhanced communications between GPs, as purchasers,
and consultants, as providers, and has therefore been a vehicle for
marginalizing the role of hospital managers in contracting. But the
marginalizing potential of fundholding is even greater with respect to the
managers in Health Boards as the reforms introduced GPs and Health Boards
as budget holders with overlapping purchasing roles. Prior to the health service
reforms, Health Boards had held sole responsibility for the co-ordination and
delivery of health care but post-reform Health Boards now have a much more
limited purchasing and planning role. These overlapping purchasing roles
immediately created an open question as to who would emerge as primus inter
pares in contracting (Culyer et al., 1990). In the three-way relationship between
the Trusts, fundholders and the Health Boards, GPs were divided in their
opinions on the future role of the Health Boards. Although all GPs felt that
fundholding has marginalized Health Board functions to some extent, some
thought that the Health Boards had a future in strategy and monitoring
whereas others were of the view that the Health Boards were likely to become
defunct. The following comments illustrate the view of a GP who was, broadly
speaking, supportive of the Health Boards:
We have a visionary Board but some Boards don't want to let go. Our Health Board no longer
goes for everything, they set the strategy but the GPs do the purchasing. There are now 32
fundholding practices in this region. There are three members of staff employed by
fundholders who are situated in the Health Board. With an executivemanager this could form
an agency. Such an agency could do the purchasing for the fundholders and the non-
fundholders. (GDI)
But others were dismissive over the negotiating skills within the Health Boards
as this remark shows:
We negotiated with the Trust and got our contract. Then the Health Board went in and got less
- so then the Trust turned round and said we can't agree what we'd negotiated - they [the
Health Board] were dragging us down. (LP1)
Furthermore some GPs felt that the future viability of the Health Boards was
severely in doubt:
Well the logical conclusion [of fundholding] is that there won't be a Health Board. (TD2)
The Health Boards concede that GPs are purchasing but they say that they are quality,
strategy and public health but they are punk at strategy.What's strategy without purchasing?
Strategy independent of purchasing is a nonsense...but they [the Health Boards] are fighting
back - they are relying on two things - one waiting for an election and, two, reining the
fundholders in .. [but, presently]... The Scottish Office [central government] wants Health
Boards out of purchasing. (TD1)
The enhanced communication between hospital doctors and GPs wrought by
fundholding has defused the management threat (in the Health Boards and the
Trusts) to doctors' jurisdiction over the planning and control of medical
agendas by "squeezing" the role of management in negotiation. Fundholding
GPs are being managerialized as they believe that the processes of holding
budgets and managing resources are genuinely helping them to become better
doctors. This message has been difficult to communicate in the hospitals where
there has been a split between professional and management cultures (Hunter,
1992) but, within general practice, where GPs have always functioned as
"independent entrepreneurs" (Stacey, 1988, p. 124) of healing, processes of
creating doctor-managers have been much more successful.
If doctor-managers become a dominant group, then this will have profound
implications for "lay" managers,"... in particular will they return to the days of
being the handmaidens to powerful clinical "bosses' but under a new guise?"
(Hunter, 1992, p. 559). A focus on "better" ways of allocating resources enhanced
the role ofmanagers as potential co-ordinators and planners of health care. This
created an opportunity for managers to invade the territory of professional
medicine through their claims to more effective means of rationing and
distributing health care. But the purchaser/provider split (of which fundholding
formed a part) handed over "planning" activities to the logic of the quasi-
market. Within this market GPs have occupied a more autonomous role than
their consultant colleagues. Hence, so far, GPs have been better able than the
consultants to defend medical agendas from a managerialism which has
threatened to break out of its administrative framework to challenge the
medical dominance of decision making over resource management in health
care.
However, GPs' enthusiasm for resource management may diminish if and
when overall resource constraints begin to bite and there is some evidence of
this beginning to happen. A "cash crisis" for fundholders was recently
reported in one of the regions involved in this study. For the first time
fundholders in this region refused en masse to accept the budgets allocated by
the local Health Board claiming that, "... the proposed funds are insufficient to
meet 'massive' price rises by two of the city's Trusts..the finance director at
the Health Board retaliated by stating that "Clearly the issue of prices being
charged by individual Trusts is a matter between the Trusts and the
fundholders." (Scotland on Sunday, 12 May 1996). This incident highlights the
power of the Health Boards to pass questions on the overall adequacy of
resource funding back to the logic of the quasi-market, to be solved through
negotiations between GPs and the Trusts. Moreover GPs' new-found role in
resource management is not unidimensional - it is dependent on the projects
which GPs are seeking to realize. It is this source of uncertainty which the next
section discusses.
Money and medicine: interwoven agendas Purchasing
The preceding sections have explored three areas where there is a dynamic power and
relationship between GPs and consultants consequent on the fundholding professionalism
initiative. This section now moves to focus more closely on the diversity of
approach to the development of fundholding taken by GPs themselves who,
although they may have been motivated to "go fundholding" in the first
instance by a common desire to redress the balance of power between 51
themselves and the consultants, now seek to realize different projects. That =
there is space within the fundholding initiative for various projects to be
pursued is linked to the ambiguity which surrounded the initiation of the
scheme.
The intended policy impact of fundholding was ill-defined and,
consequently, the structural mechanisms of fundholding are not yet finalized.
As one GP remarked:
No one thought through what it meant or what it was intended to achieve, basically it was
dreamed up by a GP on drugs who sold it to Margaret Thatcher [the then prime minister] at a
dinner party. (NF2)
Mrs Thatcher seized on the idea of GP budgets with some enthusiasm at a point
in time when there were fears of the government "losing their way" on the
health reforms. (Klein, 1995, p. 190). Thatcherism had constituted these reforms
"... as a continually unfolding project, with policies being dropped, adapted or
invented to suit the circumstances." (Humphrey et al., 1993, p. 11). Fundholding
was an ingredient in this "reform cocktail" (Klein, 1995, p. 191) whose likely
effects were unpredicted and somewhat unpredictable. This ambiguity created
"conditions of possibility" (Latour, 1987) within fundholding for differing
projects to be pursued which, in turn, implies differential responses to the
accounting mechanisms inherent in fundholding. This section explores GPs'
responses to budget setting, to the use of audited "savings" and to the medical
audit of general practice. On the initial setting of the budget, where GPs
favoured using budgets to enhance equity within the NHS they pressed for
capitation-based budgets. In contrast, where they were more concerned with
extending primary care services they emphasized the incentives provided
through the use of historic spending patterns. GPs concerned with the issue of
equity in resource distribution in the NHS commented:
It's [budget setting] not an exact science, well that's the understatement of the year - there are
winners and losers - we came out about the middle but we had good quality or honest data -
until there's an agreed capitation formula, equity will be noticeable by its absence. (GD2)
I'm opposed to the way funds are made up. It should be weighted capitation rather than the
historic basis. We're always complaining about spendthrift practices - under this system they
keep getting more and more money - maybe they've referred excessively to the hospitals. I
want to use this system to restore some of the inequities in the Scottish Health Service...For
instance, there's two practices I know, they both get £190 per patient - one's in a deprived area,
so you can understand that, but the other is in a very prosperous area but they say, "We've got
a lot of professional people here and they like second opinions".. .1 ask you was that why the
health service was set up - to provide second opinions?... It's a nonsense. (GDI)
must be seen to be linked to efficiency gains through purchasing in order to
have a chance of political approval. The notion of "efficiency" rewards invokes
the possibility of performance evaluation for clinicians, which, in turn, is linked
to medical audit. The idea of medical audit (both for the assessment of good
general practice and for effective purchasing) was raised by a number of GPs.
However, they were divided as to its efficacy and general desirability. This first
quoted GP intended to undertake an avoidance strategy:
Medical audit - now that's a nasty word. I think we give a reasonable service to our patients -
if they were jumping up and down, we might just look at it but, frankly, we avoid it like the
plague. (TD2)
Whereas another GP regarded audit as essential to safeguard public money:
We should have a medical adviser to go around checking what people [GPs] are doing ...
We've got a prescribing adviser but that's just for prescribing. There should be a way of
dealing with profligate spenders - its all about the proper use of public funds - they're writing
a cheque for public money that may not need to be written. (GDI)
Still another GP distinguished between "clinical" audit and accountability for
purchasing:
Most doctors are keen to participate in clinical audit but accountability for purchasing scares
the life out of me - accountability frameworks are frightening. But we do need to look at ways
of working and prescribing. (NF1)
As in the preceding discussion, purchasing was again a vehicle for enhancing
GPs' control over consultants - in this instance GPs were specifying particular
guidelines (which had emanated from medical research of consultants' clinical
practice) in contracts:
The growth industry in medicine is guidelines and fundholding has enabled us to build into
the contract exactly what we want. We're trying to use guidelines to change clinical practice
then they [the consultants] can't weasel out of it - but the trouble is they won't listen unless
some of their peers are doing it. They weren't going to have someone telling them what to do
but the guidelines are supported by SIGN [the Scottish Intercollegiate Guidelines Network] so
now it's very different - even the medical colleges approve. It means we are getting best
practice as codified by the experts and we expect it. (GDI)
Research on medical audit within the hospitals indicates that the process has
been defined as one ofmedical self-management - particularly in the education
of junior doctors by consultants. Out of 55 audits examined by Kerrison et al.
(1993, p. 164) 18 did not specify any criteria for the audit and, for those that did,
the criteria were technical in nature; moreover only 3 per cent used any cost
data. So far the accountability of the medical profession has not been
significantly enhanced by the audit experience - with the exception of the
accountability of junior doctors to their seniors (Kerrison et al., 1.993, p. 169).
This indicates that there is considerable potential for the accountability of
consultants to be heightened through their contractual relationships with GPs.
These issues relate to what would be a profound change in British medicine:
the introduction of constraints on the clinical freedom of medical professionals.





AAAJ making by individual clinicians unconstrained by protocols or guidelines; the
2 fight to make clinical decisions which result in resource allocations without
reference to costs; and adherence to a medical ethical code which is dominated
by individualistic rather than societal concerns. The use of medical protocols
and guidelines through the introduction of medical audit (particularly where
such audit makes reference to costs) is intended to render clinical decision
54 making more transparent. More open scrutiny of the processes of medical
—~— diagnosis, inference and treatment would reveal levels of professional
uncertainty and expose the lack of medical knowledge on the comparative
efficaciousness of alternative treatments for certain conditions (Katz, 1988). In
medicine uncertainty has been absorbed at the expense of the patient rather
than the clinician (Johnson, 1972, p. 41). Where levels of professional
uncertainty are present, but not publicly visible, clinicians have been able to
define their work so that "failures" are not apparent. In this way the medical
profession used the germ theory of illness to minimize its failures with chronic
conditions such as arthritis, heart disease and cancer (Abbott, 1988, p. 136).
The definition of success is particularly significant to a profession, involving,
first, powers to define what is and what is not a "problem", second, the
measurement of the treatment of problems and, third, the evasion of external
judgements over the comparative efficacy of treatments through arguments
about differential circumstances (Abbott, 1988, p. 137). Where GPs press for
guidelines in contracting, their control over their consultant colleagues is
enhanced but, as in overall contract negotiation, the closer communication
between GPs and consultants (necessitated by their agreement on guidelines)
may imply that control is not lost through audit to external groups such as lay
managers. On the other hand, where guidelines routinely connect diagnosis
directly with treatments, this will diminish the role of inference. Abbott (1988,
pp. 48ff) argues that inference (or professional thinking) makes connections
between professional knowledge, client characteristics and chance. Inference is
a middle game which relates diagnosis to treatment in ways which are known
only to clinicians and keeps uncertainty hidden within the realms of expert
thinking. Hence where inference is essential, routinization cannot occur and
there is less likelihood of the professional group losing control of the work to
outsiders. If the introduction of guidelines results in the routinization of
substantial areas of medical work, then control over this work may well be lost
to managers.
Fundholding as a social structure retains "emergent powers" (Sayer, 1992,
p. 118) in the sense that, although all fundholding GPs are involved in a
structure of exchange with the hospitals and are constrained in some respects
over how they employ their budgetary responsibilities, they remain able to
realize different projects (Giddens, 1984, p. 6) through fundholding. These plans
are complex (and sometimes overlapping) but nevertheless certain distinct
programmes can be identified. The powers over resource allocation which
fundholding confers can be used, first, to enhance equity and enable
accountabilities through capitation-based budgets, the return of any unplanned
savings to the public purse and the practice of medical audit or, second, to Purchasing
"empire-build" by advancing and diversifying on-site primary health care power and
services through seeking to establish generous historic funding levels and professionalism
retaining "savings" in-house, while shunning audit practices which may expose
any inequities in allocated expenditure. The evidence from this study indicates
that the outcomes of a closer alignment between money and medicine are not
fully determinate and are being shaped by the political aspirations of doctors as ^
they use accounting-based measures, such as budgets, to seek to achieve ™
differential projects within medicine.
Concluding comments
The National Health Service is a great British icon symbolizing national pride
and unity,"... foreigners come from all over to get it free ... [it brings together]
... consultant aristos and ward angels; the dialectic of death and deliverance,
stern father, healing mother." (The Guardian, 17 June 1995). As an organization
with such high standing in public affection and esteem the NHS is peculiarly
resistant to change - trading on its reputation as Britain's only immaculate
institution (Klein, 1995, p. 229). Clinicians also possess a certain fascination for
the public; they have a "mystery" not only in the medieval sense of belonging to
an exclusive occupational group but also in the sense of sharing secret esoteric
knowledge (Corfield, 1995, p. 20). "Medicine, after all, was born in magic and
religion, and the doctor-priest-magician-parent unity ... persists in patients'
unconscious." (Katz, 1988, p. 556). Myths of unity have masked considerable
professional tensions, both within the medical profession (as described here)
and between different health professions (see Walby and Greenwell, 1994b, on
the conflicts between clinicians and nurses). Presumptions of the NHS as a
unified entity has fostered policy prescription which has understated the
contrasts (in terms of organizational performance) which exist between
different organizational units, for example, emergency treatment and waiting
list (or "cold") surgery (Walby and Greenwell, 1994b, p. 167). Fundholding
harnessed the professional discontent of GPs and brought it to bear on
particular areas (such as elective surgery and out-patients) where competition
was feasible and delays were common. Hence the early standard fundholding
option was focused on those parts of the NHS where there was potentiality for
improved responsiveness. Emergency health work provides the "crisis" ethos
which generates a high level of goal congruence (Walby and Greenwell, 1994b,
p. 167), as medical staff put aside self-interest to work on "life or death" critical
cases. In the non-emergency sectors of the NHS such work incentives are absent.
Consultants get little satisfaction from routine surgery and, for those with
private clinics, there is a positive incentive to maintain waiting lists to
encourage patients to "go private"; as out-patients are frequently seen by a
junior doctor, the easiest option is to carry out a routine check-up and make the
patient another appointment when the particular junior will probably have
moved on to her/his next post (Glennester et al., 1993).
AAAJ Routine surgery and out-patients constituted areas of under-performance for
10 i the NHS and the accounts of agency related above rationalized how and why
CPs sought change in these areas. Purchasing power, conferred by budgets and
enacted through contracting, enabled CPs to enhance performance in elective
surgery and out-patients by improving care management processes,
introducing guidelines for clinical practice and "taking back" some minor
56 surgery into primary care. There is cross-party recognition of these facets of
— — fundholding, the Labour party document "Rebuilding the NHS" leaked to The
Independent (16 June 1995) stated that, "We fully recognise that there have been
benefits [from fundholding] in terms of responsiveness and change". The
Independent reported that, although intending to phase out fundholding in its
present form,.Labour is keen to see GPs given notional budgets that would
allow them to switch spending not only between drugs and other treatments,
but also between health and social care."
Changing the mode of governance of the NHS to a more market-based
approach reopened the "channels of communication" (Ezzamel and Willmott,
1993, p. 128) between GPs and consultants by re-establishing monetary
exchanges between them. Polarized medical professionals were reconnected
through the medium of contracting. Consultants will now travel to GP surgeries
to conduct "outreach clinics"; regular meetings act as an intra-professional
forum for the discussion of processes of case management and clinical practices
in secondary care. In these areas:
Consultants show more interest in our opinions - that's a big change. (LD2)
The possible development of integrated primary/secondary care settings would
further narrow the differentials between GPs and consultants and, as outlined
above, the community hospitals present as opportune sites for such initiatives.
Fundholding GPs perceive that these developments were achieved only through
the threat of loss of income for the Trusts:
If it takes money out they [the consultants] don't like it, if they see their financial empires
shrinking - that worries them, I think (LD2)
Abbott (1988, pp. 3ff) theorizes the division of expert labour through the process
of jurisdiction, where sequences of jurisdictional control occur. The introduction
to this paper outlined how GPs lost jurisdictional control over medicine through
the following processes: the task specialization which confined them to a
gatekeeper role; their exclusion from the hospitals; their lack of involvement
with the central professional knowledge base; and their static career pattern.
When asked about their initial reasons for taking on fundholding, GPs
emphasized the issue of enhanced control over medicine:
To put control back into general practice, to be in charge of our own decisions. (LD1)
To let us take in our own hands the levers to change things, to give us control over our own
destiny, to enable us to deliver better primary health care to patients. (TD1)
Polarized professionalism in medicine created a division of interest between the
GPs and the consultants - with GPs occupying lesser power positions across
this divide. GPs used fundholding as a mediu
between themselves and the consultants. B
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BOUNDARY WORK: COSTING AND CARING IN THE SOCIAL SERVICES
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Abstract
"Where does it stop on costs?"—this paper offers some responses to this question on the appropriate
boundaries for costing expertise. The question was posed by a contracts officer within a social services
department. The context for the question was an empirical research study in which front line welfare
professionals were asked to comment, first, on costing information which could, possibly, assist in making
"value for money" assessments and, second, on the contracting regime within which such costing infor¬
mation assumes a potentially highlighted significance. At the first stage of the study welfare professionals
were found to be engaged in boundary-work to prevent the encroachment of costs on care activities.
"Costing" and "caring" were being managed as "disengaged domains" through the boundary work of
obfuscation, "reality-defining" and marginalization Consequent upon the initial study the social services
departments were re-visited two years later. By this time it was apparent that boundary-work had allowed
some engagement between costing and caring. The paper argues that processes of alignment between
costing and caring and the reconstitution of organizational tasks (including the creation of care "man¬
agers") have allowed social work professionals to accept some costing work—work which had previously
been defined as "the other". The major themes of this paper are: the exploration of the responses of
operational social services personnel to their new financial roles, and the interpretation of change in the
social services context through the ideas of boundary-work. These themes are developed through a con¬
sideration of the ambiguous tasks of welfare-professionals and the consequent indeterminacy of resour¬
cing decisions. The paper concludes that the limits of applicability of costing are yet to be set in the
domain of the social services. © 1998 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.
Organizational change is expressed through
the dissolution and reconstitution of organiza¬
tional boundaries—through the processes of
blurring, crossing and permeation (Klein,
1993). Boundaries serve, first, to differentiate
mutually-defining points of view (Cooper,
1990) and, second, to shape domains by con¬
trolling the types of difference permitted within
them—thus preventing fragmentation (Messer-
Davidow et al., 1993). A number of different
organizational spheres give rise to boundary-
work: within organizations, boundaries define
internal domains of professional expertise or
competence (Gieryn, 1983); boundaries demar¬
cate the external limits of the organization leg¬
ally and financially; and they also mark the
organization's span of control (Pfeffer & Salan-
cik, 1978). Boundary-work reproduces the
organization as an ordered entity (Llewellyn,
1994).
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This paper has a specific focus on the chan¬
ging constitution of the distinct boundaries of
two types of expertise in the U.K. social servi¬
ces, those of "costing" and "caring". "Costs"
and "care" are cited here as the "entry points"
(Amariglio et al., 1993, p. 164) to the discourses
of public sector accounting and social work
practice. An entry point, although not necessa¬
rily the ultimate truth of any discourse, is the
central concept from which that discourse
flows and is also the concept which will shape
the asking of all questions within the dis¬
course.1 Boundary work (Gieryn, 1983) to
reconstitute a domain must address its entry
point as an entry point is used to define the
limits of a domain and also serves to discrimi¬
nate between activities which are taken to be
appropriately intrinsic or extrinsic to the
domain in question (Amariglio et al., 1993).
Thus "cost" has negotiated the limits of public
sector accounting, and "care" has distinguished
what is or is not appropriate to social work
practice. The paper explores the shift in the
social services between the boundary mainte¬
nance which has separated "costing" and "car¬
ing" (preserving professional autonomy and
discretion in social work practice) and the
boundary-work to integrate "costing" and
"caring" (demanded by public sector account¬
ing).
There is some continuity in the ideas of
boundary-work (to distance costing from car¬
ing) with Weick's (Weick, 1969, 1976) classic
work on loosely-coupled systems2. This work
was somewhat underspecified and the explana¬
tory value of the concept of "loose-coupling"
has remained unclear (Orion & Weick, 1990).
The analysis of boundary-work extends Weick's
thesis by exploring how the separateness of
loosely-coupled systems is maintained and,
conversely, how and under what circumstances
loosely-coupled systems come to be more
closely aligned. Particular observations on
loosely-coupled systems are relevant to this
analysis: Weick cites Glassman (1973) as
arguing that loose coupling lowers the prob¬
ability that the organization will have to (or be
able to) respond to changes in the environ¬
ment; loose coupling also seals off parts of the
organization from pressures in other parts and,
hence, within the "sealed off' parts, enables
enhanced scope for the self-determination of
organizational actors.
Change, through the integration of pre¬
viously loosely-coupled systems, involves the
disruption of boundaries as new organizational
structures, processes and meanings emerge.
Therefore, although boundary-work is often of
an ideational form, it also has significant strands
of power and arbitrariness (Messer-Davidow et
al, 1993). The paper looks at the pressures for
change in the personal social services where,
historically, there have been powerful institu¬
tional incentives (see the discussion below) to
create boundaries around "costing" and "car¬
ing". These incentives have fostered active
boundary-work in order to distance caring
activities from costing information and, in con¬
sequence, to maintain the autonomy of "car¬
ing" (Gouldner, 1959). But the rationalization
of the public sector is threatening "distancing"
by introducing an ideology of cost effectiveness
and, thereby, creating inducements for some
linkages between "costing" and "caring"
within operational decision-making processes.
Although allocative control of the overall fund¬
ing of the social services has made reference to
functional costs, "organized anarchy" (Cohen
& March, 1989; Willmott, 1990) has been the
experience of operational social work profes¬
sionals as "costing" and "caring" have consti¬
tuted diverse organizational practices. As
"organized anarchy" comes under threat the
paper explores the alternative possibilities
invoked by a possible re-alignment of costing
information within the decision-making
'Amariglio et al. (1993) illustrate this concept by siting class as the entry point for Marxian economics and individual pre¬
ferences as the entry point for neoclassical economics.
-'Weick's work on loosely-coupled systems was in the tradition of Lawrence & Lorsch (1967) in so far as it argued that
processes of both integration and differentiation were fundamental to organization
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processes of front-line welfare-professionals in
the social services.
Maintaining boundaries around "caring" pre¬
vents the conflicts engendered by the
encroachment of costing information on "care"
as the core valued activity of the social services.
Accounting "... engenders resistances to the
strategies and interventions which it seeks to
further." (Hopwood, 1987, p.230). When asked
during the first part of this study (described in
detail later in the paper) if cost calculations
ever entered into decision-making on care in
the community one contracts officer responded
as follows,
There might be hidden costs to the carer... and she
might end up in care herself and that would be
expensive... on the other hand the burden on the carer
might be such that she died earlier and that would
be cheaper... where does it stop on costs? (Rl/C)."
This response articulated the essential inde¬
cision, consequent upon a lack of knowledge
about consequences (Weick, 1976), which is
faced by welfare-professionals. Costing infor¬
mation circumvents these perceptions of com¬
plexity and ignores the ambiguity of
consequences as the constitution and construc¬
tion of costs forces the creation of decidables
from indecision (Cooper, 1990). The response
also raised the issue of the intrusion of costs
into domains usually governed by the norms of
professional judgement. As the contracts officer
implies, the ultimate violation of these norms is
committed if costs enter into decisions con¬
cerning "life and death" issues—the defining
arena for claims to "pure" professional status
(Etzioni, 1969, p.xii). This threatened infringe¬
ment of accounting on caring activities has met
with resistance and redefinition in other parts
of the public sector (Preston et al., 1992; Hum¬
phrey, 1994; Laughlin et al., 1994).
This paper portrays a story of initial resis¬
tance in the social services where pre-existing
ways of working and understanding continued
to direct decisions and, also, serve so as to
marginalize costing information. These rational¬
ities encompass both the sum of self-interested,
individualistic motivations and broader societal
purposes which flow from the "formative con¬
text" within the social services. This "formative
context" blends institutional arrangements
with organizational members' imaginative (or
interpretive) assumptions to produce strong
prescriptive notions over the "proper" nature
of the rights and powers which structure social
relations within the organization (Blackler,
1992). Economic decision-making in the social
services is, therefore, "embedded" (Granovet-
Granovetter, 1985, p.487) in social relations.
Hence boundary-work to integrate "costing"
and "caring" has to address the re-constitution
of social relations in the social services.
The structure of social relations in the social
services has been one where formal, quantita¬
tive calculation informed by costs is seen as
dissociated from (or even inimical to) the car¬
rying out of core, caring activities (Clegg, 1990,
p. 155; Morgan, 1990, p.23). Thus, within the
social services, costs have been socially con¬
structed as "the other" or as an outside force
against which "carers" must unite to prevent
invasion (Sugarman, 1995). Such was the con¬
text for the government's intent that the cost
effectiveness of the social services should be
enhanced (see the 1990 NHS and Community
Care Act). This proposed reshaping of the
social services linked the themes of cost ineffi¬
ciency, ineffective management, the vested
power interests of social work professionals,
and a lack of responsiveness to users (Langan &
Clarke, 1994, p.74). Integral to government
thinking was the idea that many of these short¬
comings could be addressed by, first, making
the relationships between costs and activities
more visible and, second, by the proactive
management of services through reference to
costing information (see, for example,
Squaring the Circle: Managing Community
Care Resources, The Accounts Commission,
1994).
Central to this new regime was the creation
of "care managers". Existing social work pro¬
fessionals were renamed as care managers. This
change of title was more than cosmetic, it per¬
formed boundary work by marking out a
distance between traditional social work (as a
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combination between assessment and provision
by professionals) and the new managerialism
(as the management of care services through
assessment and contracting) (Langan & Clarke,
1994). Care managers were expected to follow
a style of care management which mimicked
the "social care entrepreneurship" model
dominant in the United States; implicitly this
approach implied a rejection of the possible
"service brokerage" model (concentrating on
advocacy) which would have had some conti¬
nuity with existing practice (Phillips, 1996).
There was also an expectation that care man¬
agers would assume budgetary responsibilities.
The cost consciousness of care managers was
anticipated to flow both from their awareness
of budget limits and, also, from their new man¬
agerial personae. Care managers were expected
to deliver "more for less" but also to challenge
the "formative context" of the social services
where operational decision making has made
reference to professional rather than managerial
values.
The empirical material in this paper explores
how boundaries had dissociated costing from
caring and, subsequently, how boundary-work
has enabled some integration between them.
The paper has two interlinked themes: the
exploration of the responses of social services
personnel to their new financial roles; and the
interpretation of the change process in the
social services through theories of boundary-
work. These themes are developed through,
first, considering how the tasks of welfare pro¬
fessionals are socially constituted to encompass
a high degree of ambiguity and, second, analys¬
ing how this ambiguity creates uncertainty
which, in turn, impacts on rationalization and
resourcing. The paper then illustrates, through
reference to the empirical data, why and how
boundary-work has contained professional
uncertainty in the social services before looking
at how boundaries have been disrupted and
reconstituted to allow the integration of costing
information.
SITES OF AMBIGUITY IN THE SOCIAL
SERVICES
Various sites of ambiguity can be located within
the social services. Welfare professionals in the
personal social services are also "bureau-pro¬
fessionals"3. They are located within bureau¬
cratic structures and, consequently, the
processes through which their work is carried
out "... are based on Fabian assumptions about
the proper combination of professional exper¬
tise coupled with the regulatory principles of
rational administration as the means of accom¬
plishing social welfare." (Newman & Clarke,
1994, p.22). Whether there is greater reliance
on the bureaucratic or the professional ele¬
ments of this combination depends, first, on the
degree of cognitive (or expert) knowledge
practitioners make reference to, second, on the
ability of practitioners to convince society that
they have a valuable product and, third, on the
extent of the autonomy of practitioners from
state control (Jarn°us & Peloille, 1970). Profes-
sionalization claims are more readily accepted
where practitioners possess expert knowledge,
where they have convinced the users of their
services of their value, and where they enjoy
autonomy.
For example, the institutionalizing of knowl¬
edge in people within the pre-eminent profes¬
sions of medicine and law has remained
relatively secure. Medicine and law, have con¬
stituted "... islands of power relatively uncon¬
nected with the major sources of political and
economic hegemony in society as a whole."
(Esland, 1980a, p.219). Thus, within medicine,
rationalization has produced a set of licensed
practitioners who control definitions of "treat¬
ments" through diagnoses which are based on
an internally credentialed knowledge base.
Clinical practice is no longer reliant on exchan¬
ges with the patient—through the taking of a
detailed history of symptoms. Medical practice
has increasingly dissociated itself from the
patient as the doctor's gaze (and consequent
'The term bureau-professional was first used by Mintzberg (1993).
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clinical inference) takes pride of place over
what the patient reports (Foucault, 1973;
Abbott, 1988; Armstrong, 1993)- Through this
structuring of the medical domain, many medi¬
cal skills of diagnosis, inference and treatment
decompose illness into technical specialisms
which do not differ much between patients
and, hence, which can be treated by standar¬
dized remedies irrespective of the patients' his¬
tories (Whitley, 1995). This professional
knowledge base is trusted to the extent that
doctors are accepted as the only "truth-tellers"4
about medicine. Uncertainty, within medicine,
is denied through these means; uncertainty in
the health service being absorbed at the
expense of the consumer rather than the pro¬
ducer (Johnson, 1972, p.41). Private sector fees
are available as indicators of value and,
although, links between "costs" and "treat¬
ments" are contested in organizational resour¬
cing decisions5 the public worth of medical
care is not subjected to any fundamental chal¬
lenges. In contrast, social workers have never
commanded a fee for their services, thus no
private sector benchmark exists for the price
(or cost) of publicly delivered services and,
importantly in a liberal democracy, there is no
public signal of value made through monetary
payments for what are deemed essential
services.
In the social services claims to a cognitive
knowledge base have rested upon practitioners'
counselling skills derived from clinical psychol¬
ogy and small group sociology (Halmos, 1967,
p.20). Yet social workers have never achieved
full public acceptance for these skills, in part,
because they work mainly with the inherently
disadvantaged and thus successful "outcomes"
are difficult to attain—social work clients are
often seen as "losers" (Eddings, 1992) in com¬
petitive western cultures. Also social workers,
unlike psychotherapists, do not enjoy any asso¬
ciation with the higher status medical profes¬
sion. That their cognitive knowledge base
suffers from charges of subjectivity is linked to
their failure (unlike the more successful clini¬
cians and lawyers) to deliver a publicly
acclaimed "product" (Jamous & Peloille, 1970).
Hence social workers have never captured the
market for the more high status psychotherapy
work practised mainly with middle class clients.
Social service professionals work within state
bodies and they act as "servants of power"
(Baritz, I960 quoted in Esland, 1980a, p.214) in
so far as they are agents for the implementation
of governmental decision-making. Thus their
power and status are both fragile and tied to
their association with government agencies. In
terms of the tripartite typology of professional
control developed by Johnson (1972), pp.45-
46) where the producer-consumer relationship
is governed by either collegiality, patronage or
state intervention, the social services are char¬
acterized by the third form of occupational
control and the state mediates both in the con¬
struction of the consumer "needs" to be served
and in the manner in which these needs are
met. However, this political function as "ser¬
vants of power" for state agencies remains
implicit otherwise it would threaten public
acceptance of their interventions in the name
of therapy. These circumstances combine to
make the role of the bureau-professional
ambiguous.
The ambiguous role of the bureau-profes¬
sional is played out in their work which
encompasses a care/control dynamic. In the
realm of "caring", welfare professionals in the
personal social services are distinguished by
their claims to bring about changes in the per¬
sonalities of their clients through insight. They
aspire to expertise in the decoding and identifi¬
cation of various individual pathologies. Yet in
those liberal democracies which revere perso¬
nal liberty and integrity they must simulta¬
neously claim that their inventions are
non-directive (Halmos, 1970). The service
orientation of social work is also feminized—as
'I am indebted to Maureen Sterling for the use of this phrase in this context.
5See Preston et al., 1992 and Covaleski et al., 1993 on the contested nature of the rationalization and resourcing of health
care.
28 S. LLEWELLYN
front-line staff in operational "lowerarchies"
(Wildavsky, 1986, p278) have been predomi¬
nately female (Abbott & Wallace, 1990). Femi¬
nine professionalism always carries ambiguities
as,
"
[It] is conceived primarily in terms of "nurturant
power"...[and hence] does not carry the same legiti¬
macy as that of the "traditional professional" in Wes¬
tern and indeed almost any known society. The
"power of nurturance" is associated with the "pri¬
vate" and...female sphere, whereas the more presti¬
gious public sector is dominated by men and typified
in established professions i.e. medicine and law.
(Lorentzon, 1990, pp.59-60)"
The power to nurture another person is
linked closely with matriarchy which, in turn, is
conceptualized as belonging to the private
domain. Hence feminine professionalism con¬
veys ambiguity as it transfers into the public
sphere activities which belong "properly" to
the private.
Whilst focusing their attention on individual
needs, welfare professionals also seek to
address the behavioural problems of their cli¬
ents; problems which may give rise to various
social "problems" or "pathologies". In con¬
taining these social pathologies the role of the
welfare professional extends to social control.
Such a care/control dynamic creates an ideolo¬
gical paradox which is constituted by the
claims to be offering therapy and to be peo¬
ple—helping whilst working to readjust people
towards social structures which may be con¬
trary to their interests (Esland, 19806, p.255).
Integral to programmes of readjustment and
therapy are the decisions made by bureau-pro¬
fessionals on the appropriate location of indivi¬
duals within society. Taking a child into "care",
committing an individual to a mental "hospital"
or advising an elderly person to enter a "home"
are all decisions about the "proper place" of
these people in the management of risk both to
themselves and to others. That these places
offer therapeutic programmes obscures their
other purposes both as centres which contain
"difficult" clients and as services which diffuse
discontent (Wilson, 1993). In so far as there is a
public awareness of the control function of
social work there is a consensus that the case
work of the predominately female front line
workers has "... generally failed to bring people
and their situations under sufficient control"
(Howe, 1986, p. 125). This consensus on the
failure of the control tasks of social work reflects
the inherent ambiguity which surrounds femi¬
nine professionalism (as discussed above).
Therefore, on the one hand, social service
professionals work with clients to restore their
self-esteem but, on the other hand, they are
charged to ensure that their clients do not
question the existence of social structures
which are contrary to their self-interest. This
care/control dynamic inherent in the work of
bureau-professionals creates multiple, conflict¬
ing purposes and renders rationalization pro¬
blematic. Greater emphasis on "control" would
undermine professionals' own perceptions of
their integrity and compromise their role as "...
a remainder of the conscience of society."
(Heraud, 1973, p-93). Whilst an extension of
"care", particularly if this encompassed the
empowerment of clients, would threaten the
state sponsorship of bureau-professionals. The
ambiguity of the care/control dynamic fosters
public ambivalence over the function and value
of social work.
"... [Social workers] must seek to hold, and to mediate
in, the multiplicity of conflict in interpersonal rela¬
tionships. They deal in shades of grey where the pub¬
lic looks for black and white. And they are bitterly
resented for it. They are brokers in lesser evils, fre¬
quently faced with the need for choice followed by
action whose outcome is unpredictable. (Stevenson,
1994, p. 173)."
As "brokers in lesser evils" social workers fail
to convince the public that they have a valuable
product and, as the consequences of their
interventions are unpredictable, they are
severely constrained in working towards con¬
sistently higher public esteem.
As a caring agency within the public sector
the social services also have implicit caring
objectives. There are public expectations that
the social services will provide good working
conditions for their employees—as compared
with those that obtain for equivalent activities
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in the private sector. However, as they are
implicit, these objectives do not attract any
resources.
"Demands from public opinion and the legislative as a
whole (acting in a non-budgetary role) often mean
that government agencies are expected to foster
desirable social developments which have little if
anything to do with their specific objectives. These
requirements.... effectively raise public agencies'
internal costs above those of firms carrying out
equivalent activities' (Dunleavy, 1991, p.242)."
The ambiguity which surrounds the pursuit
of implicit objectives does not serve the social
services well. On the one hand the social servi¬
ces attract public opprobrium if they do not
meet these objectives but, on the other hand, as
these objectives are not officially state-spon¬
sored and resourced, they do not receive any
credit for success in fostering desirable public
sector working conditions.
Hence the domain of the social services
remains unclear and permeated with diffuse
and often contradictory purposes. The sites of
ambiguity within the social services are, first, in
the corporate relationship which is character¬
ized by bureau-professionalism, second, in the
feminized nature of social work practice, third,
in the processes through which welfare profes¬
sionals work which are both interventionist and
non-directive, and fourth, in the tasks which
they perform which are both caring and con¬
trolling and which make reference to some
implicit objectives. But although ambiguity is a
necessary component of social work (as it is
presently constructed) such ambiguity creates
uncertainty over the intrinsic value of social
work activities which, in turn, raises issues
about the appropriate levels of resourcing for
social work services.
RATIONALIZATION AND RESOURCING
The conventional societal response towards the
rationalization of unclear domains is professio-
nalization (Meyer, 1994). But for the reasons
discussed above (around links to state agencies
and task ambiguity) in the social services this
response has been incomplete. Under these
circumstances social work professionalism is
vulnerable, it is open to challenge from rival
ways of institutionalizing knowledge. In social
work, professionalism, as the institutionaliza¬
tion of knowledge in people, faces a formidable
challenge from organization, the institutionali¬
zation of knowledge in rules (Abbott, 1988,
p.325). Incomplete professionalization makes
for an uneasy terrain of work. Along several
dimensions of professionalism social work is
weak: claims for an expert knowledge base are
not fully substantiated; public deference
towards social workers is low; and, crucially,
occupational control of work tasks is mediated
by strong state intervention. In these circum¬
stances the rationalization of the social services
remains partial, uncertainty and ambiguity are
publicly visible and, consequently, public
doubts are high concerning social work's pro¬
ductive value.
This situation makes decisions on the neces¬
sary resourcing of activities within the social
services highly problematic (Meyer, 1994).
Without a definitive consensus on what is being
produced, how it is being produced, and why it
is being produced, resourcing questions are
indeterminate across a wide continuum. On the
one hand if attention is foe sed on the coun¬
selling aspirations of practitioners within the
personal social services to restore their clients'
self esteem then, particularly in a society where
the claims of religion and political ideology to
accomplish "wholeness" are diminishing, high
resource inputs are indicated. However, on the
other hand, a focus on the socially constructed
achievements of the personal social services
(where the "new right" attacks on state welfare
have combined with long standing public per¬
ceptions of social work failure6) points to
severe resource constraints.
The social services, as other forms of "politi¬
cal organization", also confront a paradox
when soliciting resources,
6Sheldon, 1986 provides a review of the negative conclusions on social work effectiveness.
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"The political organisation which finances its activ¬
ities from taxes. .. will tell their financiers, i.e. the
citizens, how badly things are going now or are going
to go in the future: it is poor results that demonstrate
the need for more money. Since needs are not being
satisfied, quality is not high enough and the money is
finished, more is obviously needed. (Brunsson, 1994,
p. 326)."
The social services must aspire to higher
levels of resourcing through claims to poor
achievements. They must also, as argued in the
previous section, strive to fulfil the implicit
objective of providing good public sector
working conditions without attracting the
requisite resources. These inconsistencies
create profound tensions within the social ser¬
vices between "aspirations" and formal
"achievements" and augment the high degree
of uncertainty over the public worth of the ser¬
vices offered.
These sections on task ambiguity and resour¬
cing uncertainty have sought to establish the
nature of the social services context within
which boundary-work was active first, in redu¬
cing instrumentality by distancing costing from
caring and second, in insulating social work
practices from decisions on resource allocation
in an attempt to curtail further pressure on
resource limits. The paper now moves to out¬
line the dynamics of boundary-work in these
processes but, first, the research project is
described.
THE RESEARCH PROJECT
The empirical research referred to in this paper
was conducted in the Scottish regional authori¬
ties during 1993/4 and again in 1995/6. Twenty
six social services staff were interviewed in
posts across the social work hierarchy—from
depute director to care manager. The entire
population of the Scottish mainland social ser¬
vice departments were visited (nine in all7),
only the island authorities were omitted8. In
1993/4 the regions were asked to put forward
the personnel responsible for care purchasing
decisions; these staff most usually comprised a
care manager, a contracts officer and a finance
officer. In 1995 the research widened its focus
to explore further the contracting regime
within which costs were being used. Therefore
in 1995 contracts managers were the principal
staff interviewed but, in some regions, more
senior management were also present. In the
accounts which follow these personnel are
identified as follows: the different regions are
given as Rl-9; the post of the particular worker
is referred to as "C" for a contracts manager,
"F" for a finance officer, "S" for a care manager
and "DD" for a depute director9; and if, at the
second stage, the particular person quoted had
been present at the first stage a "1" is added to
the reference. For example, R6/C/1 indicates a
quote from a contracts manager in region 6
who had been present at the first stage inter¬
views.
At the first stage the study used a "real-life
construct" or "RLC" (see Lapsley & Llewellyn,
1995 for a detailed explanation of this research
method) to explore the decision-making pro¬
cesses inherent in the purchasing function of
the social services. The aims of the project at
this stage were first, to discover whether cost¬
ing information was integrated into purchasing
decisions in the social services and, second, to
establish the nature of the contracting regime
within which costing information potentially
assumes a heightened significance. In 1993/4
the response of the participants was, in the
main, one of disinterest (even distrust) of costing
7At the second stage one regional authority declined to participate due to the pressure of work consequent upon the move
to unitary (the merging of regions and districts) status.
"Other research (Stalker et al, 1994) indicates that in respect of their overall response to government legislation the three
island authorities do not differ substantially from the mainland authorities albeit that the Western Isles have declared their
intent to fully devolve budgets to individual care managers — although they have not done so yet for technical reasons.
9If more than one person was present at the interviews from a particular functional area the participants are numbered. For
example, R5/S2 indicates the second care manager in region 5.
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information. However, evidence from English
social service departments indicated that this
situation in Scotland may be transitional. Com¬
parative research conducted in two phases in a
sample of 25 local authorities in England indi¬
cated a shift in responses to purchasing
through "markets" between 1991 and 1994
(Wistow et al., 1994). In 1991 the development
of the purchasing function in English social
services was "embryonic" and there was a dis¬
tinct anti-commercialism, by 1994, however,
Wistow et al. found that 16 directors of social
work perceived overall advantages of social
care "markets" for purchasing compared with
only three who saw overall disadvantages. The
directors cited as advantages, first, the identifi¬
cation of opportunities for cost reduction in
both public and independent sectors and, sec¬
ond, the capacity to purchase strategically and
enhance quality. The main potential disadvan¬
tages cited were, first, the possibility of cartels
and monopolies and, second, the "exploita¬
tion" of staff through the levelling down of
terms and conditions of service.
Whilst this research in England was useful as
a comparator there are certain aspects of the
Scottish situation that arc distinctive. First,
there is a legislative requirement in England
that 85% of money transferred to the local
authorities from the Department of Social
Security for the purchase of residential care
must be spent in the independent (private and
voluntary) care sector. This financial pressure
does not apply in Scotland. Second, Scotland
has had a strong collectivist tradition, hence the
political climate in the Scottish local authorities
is generally less favourable to the introduction
of "quasi-markets" and this circumstance, allied
with the prospect of possible devolution, has
fostered greater resistance to market-orientated
changes in the purchasing function. The gov¬
ernment's response to these circumstances has
been a more cautious approach to the intro¬
duction of change, in particular the pace of
change has been slower than in England, mir¬
roring the more gentle introduction of the
reforms of the Scottish health service (Lapsley,
1995). This more gradual approach to reform
has allowed greater opportunities for Scottish
front line purchasing staff to reflect and learn
from the situation in England; resistance strate¬
gies can be forged in the light of the experience
of the English local authorities. Scottish front
line social work professionals stressed their
view that England was "different" (see the dis¬
cussion later in the paper). This was the con¬
text in which it was anticipated first, that
purchasing care would be a dynamic process in
Scotland and, second, that significant differen¬
ces with the English situation may emerge. In
consequence, the social service departments
concerned in this study were re-visited in 1995
to explore how contracting for social services
was developing. At this second stage semi-
structured interviews were conducted which
placed the use of costing information within the
wider contracting culture of the social services.
The 1990 NHS and Community Care Act set
the context which anticipated the enhanced
use of costing information within the social
services. This act rationalized the previously
fragmented responsibilities for community care
by transferring functions and funds from both
social security and the health service to the
social services. Although these transfers in one
sense strengthened the role of the social servi¬
ces in community care, at the same time their
function as a direct provider of services was
intended to decline (Langan & Clarke, 1994).
Care "managers" were seen as fundamental in
orchestrating this declining provider role as such
managers were expected to purchase cost effec¬
tively. Contracts managers and finance officers
were expected to set the contracting regime in
place and to negotiate with provider establish¬
ments. The next section gives the accounts of
these personnel at the first stage of the research.
USING BOUNDARIES TO DISTANCE
COSTING FROM CARING
At the first stage of this study "care" continued
to be sealed off from pressures on resourcing
but resource pressures were evidenced by
organizational actors' heightened awareness of
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the "cost" issue. As discussed earlier, the many
sites of ambiguity within the social services
render demonstrations of the worth of social
work practice difficult to establish. Hence there
are powerful incentives for social work profes¬
sionals to set boundaries around "costing" and
"caring"—as the explicit calculation of costs
raises questions about the worth of the services
offered. Through distancing, the caring "parts"
of the social services are able to defend their
functional autonomy from encroachment
(Gouldner, 1959) and caring professionals are
free to make decisions which continue to be, in
the main, unbounded by consideration of cost.
Such a separation also maintains public sector
values. Where "costing" and "caring" are kept
apart the "organization is seen as being ulti¬
mately for people rather than the other way
around." (Morgan, 1990, p.23). The disengage¬
ment of "costing" and "caring" reduces instru¬
mentality and maintains an organizational
identity which "puts people first". Organiza¬
tion in the private sector implies instrumental
activities and the accumulation of money or
power in the hands of individuals whereas
organization in the public sector implies the
achievement of collective values as the explicit
purpose of the public domain (Stewart & Ran-
son, 1988). Where the relationship between
caring activities and costs becomes more visi¬
ble, then the stance of "putting people first"
becomes less credible; where resource limita¬
tions have a clear impact on care decisions,
caring becomes more commodified and, in
consequence, is less imbued with substantive
value. This raises the prospect that, ultimately,
"...economic calculation... [could]... emerge as
a substitute for value judgement." (Power,
1992, p.479) and practitioners' claims to self-
determination through the making of authorita¬
tive professionally-informed decisions would be
jeopardized.
In the first stage of the study the following
quotes illustrate practitioners' views on why
(and how) social work practice should be dis¬
sociated from costing. When a finance officer
was asked how devolved budgeting was
progressing in his region he replied,
"The region does not want care placements to
become budget driven. Care managers are not con¬
strained by budgets any overspend is underwritten by
the region. (R4/F)"
In a similar vein a contracts officer remarked
that,
"If care managers were to ring a home and enquire,
"Do you have a place and what's your price?", they'd
be shot at dawn. . their starting point must be [client]
assessment. (R3/C)"
Another contracts officer explained,
"Their [care managers'] process starts with a client
decision on community care against residential care
and then a home is decided upon. They would then
enable the client to go out to the home—not until this
point would price come into it. (Rl/C)"
Care management in the social services
reconstitutes organizational tasks at the exter¬
nal boundary of the organization; the care
"manager" is a new boundary role. This care
manager is a front line welfare professional
charged with assessing client needs and com¬
missioning services to meet those needs. As
discussed earlier, under the new contracting
regime it has been assumed that care manage¬
ment will encompass a degree of financial
responsibility. Devolving budgets to care man¬
agers has been instituted so that "... resources
flow to the point in the organisation where user
needs are assessed." (Langan & Clarke, 1994,
p.81). But if care managers take on budgetary
responsibilities the crucial distinctions con¬
structed between costs and care are threatened
by coupling costing and caring in a unitary task.
Rather than operating as dissociated "internally
circular structures" (Luhmann, 1989, p.15)
costing and caring merge in a publicly visible
way at the external organizational boundary. It
is, therefore, unsurprising that the care man¬
agement task has met with some resistance.
Although limited budgets have been
devolved for home-based care, at this first stage
of the research concomitant financial responsi¬
bilities had not been assumed by care man¬
agers. When asked by her colleague if she cared
if she "busted the budget" one care manager
responded,
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"Not a whit, but, on the other hand, I do care because
they [finance] might pull the plug. I'm constantly
having to meet that argument [on individualised high
cost packages]10 and over certain levels as a practi¬
tioner you have to get agreement. (R5/S)"
Hence the practice of devolving budgets to
front line staff does not necessarily result in
their taking on the responsibilities to manage
any "gaps" between resources and needs. The
expectation that front line staff will be forced
to perform "emotional labour" (Langan &
Clarke, 1994) with clients (when tight budgets
do not stretch to accommodate all assessed
needs) had been negated by the continuity of a
division of labour which shields operational
staff from such tensions.
The purchaser/provider split in social care
carries an expectation that purchasers (in this
study contract managers) will seek out those
providers who can deliver "value for money"
services, the scrutiny of costing information
being a means purchasers can employ in mak¬
ing value for money assessments. However,
participants at the first stage maintained an
attitude of indifference towards costs (only
excepting wage costs). This indifference was
sanctioned by adherence to fixed price contract¬
ing". Fixed price contracting renders costing
information irrelevant and, indeed, the irrele¬
vance of costs to current organizational practice
was one of the responses made in the regions.
"The cost analysis is immaterial to the region, (R4/F)"
commented one finance officer. A contracts
manager said,
"Homes are registered to a common standard, they
are getting an equivalent fee for an equivalent standard
of care. The cost information isn't relevant. (R3/C)"
Another contracts officer stated,
"Costs wouldn't be a determinant. (Rl/C)"
The same officer, when asked if homes' capi¬
tal charges were of any interest, said,
"We'd rather pay for wages. We just pay the price
regardless of costs we don't have to look at it. .. we
are interested in do the staff understand what they are
supposed to be doing, are all the staff part-time and,
therefore, there are no hand-overs, also will the
owner let the manager run it or are they always inter¬
fering? (Rl/C)"
As the above quote illustrates, the distancing
of costs from care seals off caring activities from
cost pressures; "care" as the entry point to
social work practice then shapes the asking of
all questions about that practice (Amariglio et
al., 1993).
The strategy of fixed price contracting was
strongly defended in the regions and the
boundary metaphor of "holding the line" sym¬
bolizes this defence.
"We're trying to hold the line on this one, we're very
averse to setting individual rates—it would be an
administrative nightmare...It may be different in Eng¬
land..Its not in the homes' best interest as inputs
can't vary as quickly as people's needs—it just isn't
that flexible. (Rl/C)"
exemplify the type of favourable comments
made on the simplicity of the fixed price
system. The simplicity of the system was also
cited as a means of avoiding budget "busting",
one contracts officer commented that,
"Placing clients choosing different homes charging
different prices can lead to budget overspend. (R9/C)"
Fixed price contracting provided a "defen¬
sive shield" for operational staff, another con¬
tracts officer remarked that,
"The council has a responsibility to fix its rates so that
operational staff are not exposed to pressures from
pushy managers. (R3/C)"
Fixed price rates softened and civilized the
contracting process and prevented any threat of
10This care manager had a budget of £50000 of which she was currently spending £20000 to support one profoundly
disabled client in the community.
"Only one of the nine Scottish regional authorities operated a form of differential payment and this was based upon the
assessed needs of clients rather than the quality of service provision. In England 18 out of the 25 local authorities sampled
were continuing to use fixed rates, but many more English authorities were intending to build in flexibility' by allowing
market forces to operate (Wistow et al., 1994).
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a descent into a Hobbesian "state of nature",
where "predatory pricing" could be used as a
provider ploy to expand market share and ulti¬
mately to exploit market power (Wistow et al.,
1994). Where private sector managers had
offered prices lower than this fixed rate, such
offers were firmly resisted. In one region the
contracts officer stated that,
"We have chosen to stick with fixed rates. All the
regions' homes charges are equal to or more than this
rate except for three homes owned by the same
owner. He has set his price at .£20 below the going
rate in the hope of encouraging the region to make
placements there. Our attitude is thank you very
much but client choice is paramount. (Rl/C)"
Fixed price contracting was, therefore,
defended through a number of rationales: the
administrative simplicity of a fixed rate; the
ease of budgetary calculations (where compu¬
tational simplicity was thought to avoid budget
overspend); and the defensive shield it provides
for operational staff against the possibility of
"hard-sell" tactics in the private sector. Where
the private sector offered financial inducements
through price cutting these were resisted by
stressing the primacy of client choice.
Social service professionals have a mandate
in society to act as "reality-definers" (Esland,
1980b). Moreover Weick (1976) suggests that
the ambiguity of loosely-coupled systems puts
pressure on organizational members to con¬
struct "...some kind of social reality they can
live with..." (p. 13). In their case work with cli¬
ents this reality-defining role encompasses the
setting of individual standards for adequacy and
competence but, in addition, the personal ser¬
vice professionals have also "... acquired the
right to be consulted on, and to intervene in, a
wide range of issues connected with social
order, social productivity and organizational
efficiency." (Esland, 1980b, p.262). Such a
mandate ensures that bureau-professionals feel
comfortable in defining those circumstances
which enable quality of care. At the first stage
of this study participants expressed their beliefs
in the relatedness of high costs/high quality.
Participants "managed" cost/quality relation¬
ships through reality-defining or truth-telling
about consequences.
When social service personnel were asked to
make choices between residential homes which
offered a range of cost/quality relationships
they maintained an attitude of disbelief towards
those homes which appeared to offer value for
money. Such homes were described as exhibit¬
ing "contradictions". One finance officer com¬
mented that she evaluated costs and quality of
care "in tandem" and considered,
"... running costs to be directly related to quality of
care and rising annual running costs are indicative of
better service provision. (R6/F)"
The attitudes of disbelief towards homes
which seemingly offered value for money were
buttressed by reality-defining comments on the
social services' own high cost residential provi¬
sion which was described as providing "systems
of excellence". One contracts officer remarked,
"High cost and high quality local authority homes pro¬
vide models of best practice for other homes. (R7/C)"
Another contracts officer stated that,
"Homes which don't pay staff well and don't provide
adequate training are likely to provide a lower Stan
dard of care. (R9/C)"
Such a response also reveals how one of the
implicit roles of the social services-offering the
good employment conditions of relatively high
wages, permanent jobs and on going training is
maintained. Implicit objectives must be met by
implicit means. Bureau-professionals do not,
therefore, declare their intentions to keep pub¬
lic sector wage levels high but justify the higher
running costs which higher wage levels imply
by reference to the enhanced quality of care
which they believe is positively related to costs.
There are considerable cost differentials
between local authority homes12. Whilst local
12In 1990 in Scotland the operating costs of local authority residential homes for elderly homes ranged from £125 to £472
per resident week. These cost differentials were not correlated with measured quality of care nor were they explained by
any possible cost-increasing factors such as the extent of the services offered or the nature of the building in which the care
was delivered (Bland et al., 1992).
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authority homes are ostensibly "eost centres",
it is the local authority practice to average the
homes charges to generate a single regional fee,
thereby introducing cost cross-subsidization
between homes. Such practices obfuscate any
relations between costs and the care delivered.
One contracts officer commented favourably on
the straightforward nature of this.
" The present system averages out to the full costs and
its simpler all round. (Rl/C)"
Thus differentials are obscured by organiza¬
tional practices—rendering possible cost effi¬
ciencies in service deliver)' invisible. Monetary-
incentives to contain costs are lacking, more¬
over, "truth-telling" (or reality-defining) work
which portrays costs and quality of care as
positively related enhances the reputation of
those homes which exhibit "high cost" pro¬
files. High cost homes are anticipated to be also
high quality and, therefore, to constitute "sys¬
tems of excellence".
Costing information was also marginalized by
local authority budgetary practices. Costs of
placements in the private and voluntary sectors
were deducted from managers' budgets but
placements in local authority homes were not
similarly charged (being funded either from the
top-slicing of the community care budget or
directly from the departmental budget). Thus
local authority placements appeared as "free
goods". One care manager remarked that,
"We will admit referrals to any local authority run
home as in these cases price does not matter (R9/S)."
Other comments on this were,
"Cost restrictions don't apply to local authority
homes...If we place clients in our own homes the
costs are shifted on to another budget.(R8/C)"
Yet in one or two regions the cost differen¬
tials between the private and local authority
sectors13 were remarked upon, one contracts
officer said candidly,
We pay the private sector £240 but £330 is the cost
of our own homes ... We never keep the costs of our
own homes from the private sector—it's here are the
costs of our own homes and then we duck. (R8/C)"
The remoteness of costs from decision-mak¬
ing processes is explained by a consideration of
how social workers construct their professional
practice. Practitioners in the social services uti¬
lize "tacit" or experiential knowledge rather
than explicit information. They work in poorly
defined situations and,
Their feelings and perceptions about the situation
will be unclear, as the information they are identifying
is ambiguous and confusing. Through discussion with
other social workers and each individual worker's
"gut feel" a picture will slowly emerge indicating
what action to take next... it is not easy to change
information from being tacit to explicit, as tacit infor¬
mation is by its very nature, confusing and ambiguous.
(Kakabadse, 1982, p.132)."
Social workers engage in a great deal of face
to face group linguistic work (Weick, 1976,
quoting Mitroff & Kilman, 1975) in order to
identify their clients' concerns and problems.
As one care manager expressed it,
"Our starting point is always the individual's circum¬
stances. (R5/S2)"
From this "starting point" social workers
construct case histories of
"About 15 pages of detailed information in order to
gain a full appreciation of the clients' needs.(R9/S)"
The sites of ambiguity in the social services
render the consequences of social work prac¬
tice difficult to predict. In these circumstances
the "...intentions of the action serve as surro¬
gates for the consequences." (Weick, 1976,
quoting Salancik, 1975; emphasis in the origi¬
nal). Social workers construct detailed case
assessments in order to inform their intentions
to serve clients' needs. However public sector
accounting does not attach costs to intentions
but only to consequences. Where good inten¬
tions to serve clients' needs do not translate
into good outcomes social workers are likely to
resist accounting's attribution of the conse¬
quences of their actions in financial terms.
'^Across all regions in 1990, the average cost per resident week for local authority homes was £216, for homes run by
voluntary agencies it was £164, and for private sector homes it was £145 (Bland et al., 1992).
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Therefore working with experiential or tacit
information renders the consequences of prac¬
tice ambiguous but such information has, tradi¬
tionally, been the "trusted" knowledge base of
social work. Within this scenario costing infor¬
mation will appear disconnected (from good
intentions) and decontextualized (from prac¬
tice). Accounting information is crucial for
activities which are conducted "at a distance".
But, "When the actor is situated in the context
he or she wishes to influence, then decontex¬
tualized representations assume much less sig¬
nificance." (Robson, 1992, p.701). Social work
is the epitome of a practice which is contex-
tualized. Hence the perceived significance and
relevance of highly structured, representational
information, such as costs, to this practice is
likely to be low. Costs, within the realm of
social work, remain "data". They are not con¬
verted into "information" (Wildavsky, 1978) as
they are not aligned with the tacit, ambiguous
knowledge base of the welfare professional.
This non-alignment is illustrated by the com¬
ment of one contracts officer on how residen¬
tial care establishments in financial difficulties
were identified,
"Our financial people check the accounts periodi¬
cally—not that that tells you much about viability...
usually, though, we will have a feeling that the home
is in financial difficulties. (Rl/C)"
Thus at the first stage of the research the
"feeling" of the experienced professional was
much more to be relied upon than dubious
representational "accounts"—these "didn't tell
you much".
DOING BOUNDARY-WORK TO ALIGN
COSTING WITH CARING
The fundamental assumption underlying the
idea of boundary-work is that "organization"
should be seen as a "process verb" (Parker,
1992, p.6). Organizational boundaries are "...
scenes of potential instability" (Power, 1990,
p. 117) and the process of organizing happens
through inclusion/exclusion at these boundar¬
ies (Llewellyn, 1994). The maintenance of these
boundaries substantiates claims to difference/
similarity and these claims are intrinsic to on¬
going organizational processes (Power, 1995«,
p.31). In the social services the exclusion of
costs from caring activities has disengaged
these domains and prevented the "inconsisten¬
cies" (Brunsson, 1989) and differences
between "costing" and "caring" becoming
problematic.
The creation of these differences, through
the construction of boundaries, can be termed
a "...difference technique" (Luhmann, 1989,
p. 18). Boundaries build distinctions; they
enable perceptions of "this" rather than "that".
It is for these reasons that fundamental change
in the social services is only possible if bound¬
aries are re-drawn with consequent disruption
and reconstitution of difference/similarity dis¬
tinctions. Costing and caring have been per¬
ceived as possessing "significant differences"
(Cooper, 1990) by social workers. Moreover,
any costing of caring raises questions about its
value and, in the social services, where public
perceptions of the worth of the services offered
are not high (see the earlier discussion), expli¬
cit "costing" will be seen as threatening to the
survival of core social work practices. Bound¬
ary-work which will allow for some integration
of costing in a social work setting will bring out
the possible similarities between the domains
of costing and caring, by highlighting any cross-
domain categories of analysis (Klein, 1993) or
common activities (Weick, 1976). However,
this identification of areas of "similarity"
between costing and caring must be accompa¬
nied by some perceptions of how costing may
possibly support, rather than threaten, social
work practice. Without this mutual support,
the survival of valued caring activities is cast in
doubt. In this way costing becomes aligned
with, rather than being defined in opposition
to, caring.
This section makes reference to the second
stage of the study (conducted in 1993). The
first two quotes illustrate how contracts man¬
agers in the social services now think that con¬
tracting may assist in substantiating clients'
rights. "Rights" is cross-domain activity which
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highlights some similarity between care and the
contracting regime in which costs are embedded.
"People do see contracting differently in a more posi¬
tive light—well I think "positive" is the right word,
they are seen as a means of establishing rights and
responsibilities, they spell out roles... a couple of
years ago contracts were thought of as a waste of
time—as just more bureaucracy. Care managers do
come to us now if they're unhappy about some aspect
of the client's care they say "Is there anything in the
contract about this?" (R7/C)"
"Care managers are interested in rights issues, even if
the client is self-funding, they will offer them the
contract anyway. (R3/C/1)"
Once the contracting regime was established,
budgets appeared as a "natural" progression.
"There was more resentment of contracting than of
budgets—contracting came first.(R6/C)"
Some felt that budgeting could free up more
money for caring.
"It's conceivable that the system will produce more
money to spend. The all beating all bleeding hearts
approach is gone....It's a damn good thing in my view.
If we are more cost conscious we should be able to
serve more clients, it's not damaging in any way. It
doesn't affect the client's dignity—the client isn't
compromised in any way. (R6/C/1)"
This quote illustrates the belief that even if
costs permeate the caring domain core values
(e.g. clients' dignity) are not undermined and,
hence, the care domain is not threatened with
fragmentation (Messer-Davidow et al., 1993).
Having a budget for a particular client group
can enhance the profile of that group. Thus
costs can highlight the interests of "Cinderella"
groups—if such groups are seen to attract
resources. Hence it can be argued that costing
can curtail the ambiguity of social work prac¬
tice by countering the tendency of practice to
be driven by public sensitivities rather than
professional decisions which strive for equity
between different client groups.
"It's changed the relative weight of the different cli¬
ent groups. Having a budget for community care has
begun to shift the focus away from families and chil¬
dren—they were the elite group—well maybe that's a
bit strong but there is such public sensitivity about
the response to child welfare and there's the risk ele¬
ment. (R5/C)"
Although front line professional workers
operate at the periphery of the organization
their concerns have centred on the needs of the
individual client rather than on any aggregate
societal benefits. Professionals have never
focused on issues of "... total provision or costs
of service, total quality of results and the like—
even though these have long been measurable
phenomena and matters for occasional public
outcry." (Abbott, 1983, p.860). Boundary-work
to align costing and caring has begun to shift
the focus of bureau-professionals from the indi¬
vidual client to aggregate societal need. Where
resourcing is constrained, such a shift in focus
implies prioritization between different clients.
"If a social worker was continually over spending to
the detriment of other social workers and other cli¬
ents—it wouldn't go on for very long. (R6/C/1)"
"I think that they [social workers] struggle with the
notion of cost—it does conflict with the whole social
work ethos and training. I've always thought that it
was funny to talk about social work teams—because
really it's a very individual thing. They fight for what is
best for their clients and blow other social workers
and blow their clients—they've always competed
with other social workers for resources but now it's
changing because they are beginning to have to
prioritize between their own clients—making choices
about if Mrs Jones gets X Mrs Y won't. But different
social workers see it differently. (R7/C)"
These views indicate the beginnings of some
alignment between costs and care. Costing
practices are seen to be potentially supportive
(or at any rate not destructive) of certain key
social work values such as rights, dignity and
equity between client groups. Also, cost con¬
sciousness is thought to have a potential for
releasing extra resources.
"FORMS OF RECEPTIVITY" ARE
ACCOMMODATED BY SHIFTING
BOUNDARIES
As boundaries are blurred (Klein, 1993)
between caring and costing—if costing is
shown as aligned with social work values—
simultaneously social work is being reconstitu¬
ted in ways which highlight the applicability of
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cost accounting within its boundaries. Power
(1994), p.308) has referred to this process as
the active construction of "forms of receptivity".
"I call it fine tuning the department has had to look
again at what they are doing. There's more effective
financial control. There are cries that we didn't join
social work to fill in forms and how they have to put
down everything that the system wants—it's the dis¬
organised or chaotic individual who is the most upset.
It's re-examination not redefinition. Of course some
individuals will say that they've been professionally
compromised but they're wrong and it's not logical.
(RG/C/1)"
' 'I think we are more organized and more responsible
and accountable [through contracting) although we
were dragged kicking and screaming into it I think
new care managers see contracting as important, the
social worker know best'' model is going. At the
corporate level it's seen as important and it can
inform elected members—it's a useful tool to keep
standards up. (R3/C)"
The above quote illustrates some aspects of
the structural reconstitution of social work,
particularly highlighting the significance of
"new" care managers in challenging "old"
social work values. However, although these
processes of alignment and reconstitution have
produced some engagement between costing
and caring as boundaries are re-drawn, the
values of accountability and responsibility can
still sit in stark contrast to the inherent indeci¬
sion and ambiguity of social work practice.
Where "real" social work (the professional
counselling task) has to defend itself against the
encroachment ofmanagerialism it can find itself
exposed as lacking in substance and as being
devoid of objectives.
"Social workers will feel that it's changed—certainly
their work has become more visible, more accounta¬
ble, more open to scrutiny. There were some sloppy
practices—although some of them will say that they
feel like "sausage machines" and they spend all their
time filling in forms. They say to me that there's no
time to do "real social work" but when 1 ask what
that is they find it difficult to answer. I suspect that
often it was having a cup of tea with the client to no
particular end. (R7/C)"
The insubstantial nature of "real" social
work—reflecting its "soft" epistemological
structure (Klein, 1993) renders it permeable to
discourses of financial control. The above quote
(along with the two preceding ones) also illus¬
trates the changing nature of social relations in
the social services. Whereas previously financial
decision-making was "embedded" (Granovet-
Granovetter, 1985, p.487) in consensual social
relations which "put people first", now con¬
tracts managers express scepticism about the
robustness of professional social work. These
active processes of alignment and reconstitu¬
tion underline that social services departments
are "enacted" (Morgan, 1986, 1990) domains.
The consensual views (between care managers,
contracts managers and finance staff) on pro¬
tecting front line staff from financial pressures
which were apparent at the first stage of the
research had broken down two years later and
differential views on the appropriate reconsti¬
tution of social work practice had emerged.
These changes have fostered a sense of confu¬
sion in some front-line workers which has been
manifested in "... an overwhelmingly defensive
set of concerns about how to hold on to cher¬
ished "professional values", identities and
practices in the emergent new regime." (Lan-
Langan & Clarke, 1994, p.78).
The key structural constraints driving bound¬
ary-work to create "forms of receptivity" in the
social services are, first, the creation of care
managers (discussed in previous sections), sec¬
ond, the transfer of the budget for residential
care from social security to social work depart¬
ments, third, the financial "squeeze" on the
public sector as a whole, and, fourth, the turn¬
over of social work personnel as new people
come to occupy key positions14. Contracts
managers commented as follows on the transfer
of the budget and on the impact of financial
constraints.
"The transfer of cash to the social services was the big
thing so the responsibility lies here When social
security paid [for care] social workers just referred
14At the second stage of this research 4 of the 9 contracts managers in post two years earlier had either transferred within
the social services, left to take up positions in health care, or left public sector service completely.
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clients straight into residential homes—they didn't
have to think about it. (R2/DD)"
"The financial squeeze and the contract culture have
together driven change. (R6/C/1)"
"I think that we have got to become more aware of
the costs of the services we provide. The financial
constraints on the whole of local government are
such that the old ways of doing things can't be per¬
petuated. We've got to have forms of performance
management. (R8/C)"
The practice, which was apparent at the first
stage of the research, of shielding front line
workers from the effects of financial constraints
by underwriting budget deficits had, two years
later, given way to "educating" front line staff
on their budgetary responsibilities.
People do feel constrained—there's only so much
money—line managers told social workers that the
transfer money wasn't enough and that it would get
worse. The money can only be spread so far. (R9/C)"
"There's a heightened sense of limited resources—
that's the result of cuts—they [front line workers]
know there's no longer a bottomless purse. (R6/C/1)"
"The cost issue is more blunt—you can't ignore it,
(R7/C)"
A recognition that change involves boundary
reconstitution explains why the deployment of
new and different management personnel is
fundamental to the accomplishment of change
in the social services—as new managers break
down the cohesiveness of the boundaries of
expertise of professional groups (Gieryn, 1983).
"Ms B (new Head of commissioning and purchasing)
has brought in a commercialism—that's a plus. It's
just experience really, giving the organisation time to
change the culture and, well, the new director will
push a lot harder. (R6/C/1)"
"I think that background affects how financially
aware care managers are. Care managers can be either
nursing, OT [occupational therapy] or social work in
background. 1 think that the ones from nursing and
OT are more financially aware than those from social
work. Is that a terrible thing to say? (R4/F)"
Accountingization, as a problem-solving dis¬
course, also increases the interdependence of
functional areas of expertise rendering bound¬
aries more permeable (Klein, 1993). At the first
stage of this research participants defined
caring work as solely focused on the client's
problems—that these problems were fre¬
quently unsolvable rendered caring work highly
linguistic and hence, the social services con¬
formed to Brunsson's (Brunsson, 1989, 1994,
1996) idea of the "talk" organization. But the
pull of problem-solving creates linkages
between the previously "internally circular
structures" (Luhmann, 1989, p.15) of social
work practice and finance.
"Relationships work well [with finance], we've cer¬
tainly had a lot more to do with them. They're no longer
faceless—we can put names to faces now. (R9/C)"
Once the boundaries between finance and
social work practice are made more permeable,
finance can inform social workers on "what's
do-able" and a "talk" organization becomes
more of an "action" organization (Brunsson,
1989, 1994, 1996).
"Finance Office are a powerful interest group in any
local government service. There's been a deliberate
management strategy to make it work.—we've imple¬
mented commitment accounting systems—before
people only knew what they had spent, now they
know what's left in the budget so they know what's
do-able. (R5/C)"
Commitment accounting (the on-going feed¬
back of financial information on "what's left"
in the budget) now provides a realm of ration¬
ality within the social services where actions
can be appraised as responsible or irresponsi¬
ble, and, hence, where disputes can be adjudi¬
cated (Miller, 1992, 1994). The coupling of
finance with caring through commitment
accounting also dissolves the temporal bound¬
aries which had previously existed between
financial control measures and professional
social work action.
"The time lag, forwards and backwards, in budgets
and accounting reports, makes it difficult to couple
finance and activities. Costs concern either plans
about future activities (budgets), which are contem¬
plated but not yet immediately at hand, or the out¬
come (accounting) reports on the financial effects of
activities that have already been carried out some time
ago. The moment of truth for the professional is,
however, the application of that person's specific
competence to a unique problem, at the present time
(Jonsson & Solli, 1993, P-305)."
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Now social work decisions are conjoined
with an immediate awareness of financial con¬
straints and "moments of truth" (see the above
quote) occur within the context of commit¬
ment accounting.
The transfer of the budget to social work
departments put an additional onus of respon¬
sibility on social work management to deploy
resources in a more cost-effective way and cre¬
ated a potential conflict of interest between
senior social work management and front line
professionals. Reconstituting the boundaries of
social work practice to include costing also rai¬
ses questions about the appropriateness of a
professional social work training which
excludes reference to costing issues.
"It depends on the level in the organization. We've
still got care managers with quaint old fashioned ideas
who say "I've got my principles and I'm going to give
my client the care they need regardless of cost". But
awareness is increasing, social work management
have been acutely aware of cost factors for the last ten
years but costs are not part of the cultural training of a
service deliver. Costs just aren't in the training—they
don't address it at all, it's CCETSW [social work's
professional training body] who put the ideological
bones into social work training—that's where the
fanatics for all the long lost battles are. (R2/DD)"
The conflicts between costing and caring are
less apparent away from the front line of ser¬
vice delivery because social care management
are not in "face to face" situations with clients
and, therefore, do not confront the "emotional
labour" (Langan & Clarke, 1994) engendered if
tight budgets do not stretch to meet particular
clients' needs. Front-line workers depend on
establishing intimacy with clients in order to
conduct their professional practice. The intru¬
sion of "costs" into the professional/client
relationship potentially disrupts the trust which
is necessary for professional counselling tasks,
whereas social work management occurs in a
context which is disengaged from intimate
contact with clients.
"Well the nearer the centre you are the less you talk
about people, well not named clients anyway. When
you don't see the people you're more immersed in
the finances. (R6/C/1)"
However this does not imply that the change
process in the social services is totally top-
down, some contracts managers see change as
"patchy", flowing from previously suppressed
"pockets of entrepreneurship" throughout the
organizational hierarchy.
"I wouldn't describe it like that—of permeating the
organization from the top down—I would describe it
as patchy. It's about political preference but it's also
about people's individual preferences. Some people
enjoy a sense of comprehensive responsibility, some
people enjoy negotiation—they get a gleam in their
eye—they like the entrepreneurial combative thing.
(R5/C)"
Although this does not deny that the reaction
to some dissolution of the boundaries between
costing and caring is varied and some care
"managers" still wish to disregard costs when
they make decisions on care for their clients.
"At the beginning some people didn't think they had
a budget or that's what they said anyway. Also they
didn't think about the on-going commitment—the
rolling commitment of the region. Others took
the choice directive too literally—it's not just what
the client needs but what it will cost... Some people
find it liberating to negotiate on costs and some peo¬
ple have put together some very innovative services.
But some people still think that their job is to ensure
people receive care without regard to cost. (R8/C)"
Change has not addressed the "paradox"
(Brunsson, 1994) of soliciting for resources in
the social services where overspending signals
unmet need.
"I know some team managers who are quite happy if
they can overspend, they think that it demonstrates
the need and gives the right messages. (R5/C)"
But although overspending can give the
"right" messages, by the second stage of the
research commitment accounting curtails bud¬
get deficits and, hence, hinders the practice of
soliciting for resources on the basis of financial
signalling of unmet need. Moreover, at the
second stage, the "reality-defining" role of
bureau-professionals which had portrayed high
cost-high quality local authority homes as "sys¬
tems of excellence" was less in evidence.
Instead there was a felt need to justify the high
cost of local authority homes not through
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"truths" about links with quality but in cost
terms. Thus truth-telling about high cost/high
quality had been superceded by notions that
"high cost" must be defended through refer¬
ence to, for example, higher overhead costs.
"When we justify our costs to the private sector we
say they are higher because of allocated central
administrative costs but I don't really think that it's
true, the director's salary for instance—that wouldn't
be allocated would it? But that's what we say to them.
(R7/C)"
There was also an increased focus on the
costs of service provision in the independent
sector—where two years earlier any cost analy¬
sis was thought "immaterial to the region".
"We would look at assessing "reasonable costs", for
instance, if we were reviewing the accounts of volun¬
tary organisation and we saw a central management
charge of 25% we would quibble but we recognise
that there's got to be a reasonable rate of return in the
independents. (R3/C/1)"
Moreover there was pressure on the "impli¬
cit" (Dunleavy, 1991) objectives of the public
sector as "good" employers to provide better
wages and conditions of employment than are
obtained for equivalent activities in the private
sector.
"There are already changes you could say we were
very liberal employers. If someone was off ill we'd pay
a substitute—if they were off we would pay someone
else—it did end up occasionally we'd be paying three
lots of wages. Then there's additional payments—
sleeping over—basically we've rationalised-steam-
lined staff structures and enhancements—that's the
technical name for them. (R6/C/1)"
Despite boundary-work which has allowed
some engagement between costing and caring,
first, through processes of alignment to reveal
some congruities (where costs support social
work values) and, second, through the recon-
stitution of social work practice in ways which
allow for the application of cost accounting,
some boundaries have been maintained.
All regions (except the one which "broke
ranks" two years ago) continue to "hold the
line", as one contracts officer described it (see
the quote on p. 34), on fixed price contracting.
The metaphor of "holding the line" aptly
captured how this boundary-work contains risk
by continuing to delineate "...the acceptable
domain of activity..." (Simons, 1994, p.39) for
the social services. In this way market beha¬
viour is avoided and the "defensive shield"
fixed price contracting provides for front line
workers is upheld—protecting them from any
upward pressure on prices which social work
managers anticipate as emanating from the pri¬
vate sector. The external boundaries of any
organization are set at the limits of the domain
within which organizational members judge
that they are able to exercise control (Pfeffer &
Salancik, 1978). If this theory is applied to the
social services then organizational members
clearly fear a loss of control to the independent
sector through contracting. Boundaries both
contain risks and constrain opportunities; they
are, simultaneously, constraints and advantages
and, therefore, they constitute sites of struggle
(Cooper, 1992). In this struggle, contracts
managers perceive that significant boundaries
have been breached. One contracts manager
summed up prevailing attitudes consequent
upon boundary-work.
"There's a softening of attitudes [in the social servi¬
ces) it's as if we have been let off a leash, we feel that
now we're able to do business. (R3/C/1)"
Yet although there is a sense of liberation
from old boundary constraints, there is also a
recognition that the indeterminacy of the
resourcing question—flowing from the sites of
ambiguity in the social services—is being
resolved by limiting the aspirations of practi¬
tioners to deliver "wholeness" to their clients.
"We may have to distinguish between quality of life
and care needs—we may have to accept that we may
not be able to commit money to meet certain quality
of life things. (R8/C)"
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUDING
COMMENTS
This paper is microprocessual in its focus. It has
not offered discussion of the historical origins
of the processes observed within the social
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services nor has it explored the political inten¬
tions inherent in the rationalization of the pub¬
lic sector. Instead the paper has focused on
some of the consequences of this rationaliza¬
tion in particular settings. This approach does
not ignore the impact of new structures (the
transfer of the budget from social security to
social work; the financial constraints; and the
contracting regime) on social work practice but
it does imply that the consequences of the
introduction of these structures on organiza¬
tional processes cannot be predetermined by
reference to overarching, totalizing, explana¬
tory theories. If organizational processes cannot
be reduced to essential inner principles then
empirical work is necessary to capture the
complex and contingent conditions in and
through which organizational action occurs. This
implies a close relationship between empirical
work and theory. Boundary-work is a way of
theorizing process which captures how organi¬
zational change is negotiated through people.
At the first stage of this study "costs" (and
consequently public sector accounting) were
subordinated to "caring", and action to defend
"caring" from the encroachment of costs was
in evidence. By the second stage, cross-organi¬
zational collective action was negated by a
diversity in approach to the realignment of
"costing" and "caring". Some participants
clearly sought to align the public sector
accounting categories of "efficiency", "effec¬
tiveness" and "accountability" with some of
the core valued categories of caring—"equity",
"rights" and "dignity". But in these processes
of alignment social workers lack clear profes¬
sional "markers" on where it should "stop" on
costs as they lack clear professional control of
their domain of work. As discussed earlier,
social work professionalism is incomplete along
several dimensions. First, there is strong state
influence over work tasks—as the state med¬
iates in the relationship between the practi¬
tioner and the client. Second, feminized
nurturant skills do not enjoy legitimation as
claims to professional competences. Third,
successful outcomes are difficult to demon¬
strate with a client base composed of disadvan¬
taged people. Fourth, the public is ambivalent
concerning both the value and the function of
social work in dealing with the problems of
social living. Incomplete professionalization
renders social work permeable to the institu¬
tionalization of knowledge in accounting tech¬
nologies. Sites of ambiguity in social work
practice become pockets of receptivity for
public sector accounting and, consequently,
processes of alignment are outstripped by pro¬
cesses of reconstitution.
Medical work, in contrast, possesses a strong
epistemological structure (Klein, 1993) and, in
the UK, has resisted fragmentation through the
intrusion of public sector accounting. Clinicians
have been successful in retaining the power to
define the true nature of their domain of activ¬
ity—the problems of illness (Armstrong, 1993).
The interpretation of clinical expertise being
fixed in the public mind as the outcome of a
technical process mediated through judgement
(Power, 1995b). Therefore clinical expertise is
the publicly accepted discriminator between
effective and non-effective medical treatments.
In medicine, costs only intrude into decisions
on health care treatments where there is no
medically indicated consensus on "success";
that this situation is rare is indicated by the very
low incidence of the use of costs in clinical
audit—Kerrison el al. (1993) reported only 3%
of medical audits making reference to any cost
data. Hence, in medicine, "costs" can still be
excluded from the clearly bounded domains of
accepted clinical expertise. Moreover, profes¬
sional practice is not threatened by the poten¬
tiality for "costs" to disrupt the intimacy of the
doctor-patient relationship. In contrast, in
social work, professional judgement operates in
socially constructed ' 'grey'' areas and the active
co-operation of the client is essential for suc¬
cessful therapeutic outcomes. Hence where a
consideration of costs disrupts an organiza¬
tional identity of "putting people first" the
front line professional practice of social work in
face-to-face encounters with clients is increas¬
ingly jeopardized.
The boundary-work which had dissociated
costing from caring had created gaps which
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served as resources for discretionary, profes¬
sional action (Power, 1994) or for what
Dunleavy (1991) has referred to as "bureau-
shaping strategies". This discretionary or
bureau-shaping action had manifested itself in
activities apparent at the first stage of this
research: reality-defining about high cost/high
quality; the maintenance of good working con¬
ditions in the public sector; and reliance on
tacit, experiential knowledge for decision-mak¬
ing processes. As discretionary "gaps" are
squeezed through processes of alignment and
reconstitution, professionalized discretionary
action in the social services is curtailed: truth-
telling about high cost/high quality is replaced
by justifications of high cost in terms of inputs;
the implicit objective of maintaining good pub¬
lic sector working conditions is deflected by
the rationalization of staff structures and
enhancements; and commitment accounting
marginalizes tacit knowledge as a basis for
decisions about "what's do-able". By the sec¬
ond stage of the research differential responses
to the the curtailment of professional discretion
and the reconstitution of caring had emerged
within the social services. Contracts managers
and more senior management were much more
sanguine about "costs" beginning to direct
social work. This analysis indicates a divergence
of approach between the management core and
the front-line professional periphery of the
organization and is suggestive of organizational
fragmentation as managers become cut-off from
the client-centred concerns of practitioners
(Pahl, 1994, p.199). However, some of the front
line care managers in this study actively
embraced a more entrepreneurial approach;
this may imply that the tasks of advocacy (on
behalf of the client) and resource management
can be combined without undue tensions.
The talk that professional social work's ther¬
apy-orientated interventions have failed and, as
a consequence, government agencies and
administrators have "taken over" social work in
a search for efficiency in service-delivery
(Sibeon, 1990, p.97) suggests that the social
services face threats at the external boundary of
their organization. Moreover, as argued earlier,
social workers fear increased external competi¬
tion from the independent sector in their role
as service providers. Such threats, allied with
severe external resource contraints, imply a
shift in boundary-work activity—from the
maintenance of internal boundaries of expertise
to the shoring up of the organization's external
boundary of control. This research shows how
social workers have ceded the professional dis¬
cretion conferred through the maintenance of
internal boundaries of expertise between cost¬
ing and caring in order to address the instabil¬
ities building up on the external organizational/
societal boundary. Forging linkages between
costing and caring attempts to restore legiti¬
macy in the eyes of funding agencies and may
keep government agencies from even more
interventionist measures in professional prac¬
tice. So far as the challenge from the indepen¬
dent sector is concerned fixed price
contracting continues to ensure that external
providers cannot exploit any competitive price
advantages and the social services' domain of
control over service delivery is upheld. But
attempts to restore a stable domain of control
for the social services have not eased resour¬
cing constraints and, consequently, there is
evidence of a downgrading of service delivery
aspirations as contracts managers speak of
being unable to commit money to fund quality
of life for clients.
Professional control, founded on expertise
and judgement, sets out particular jurisdictions
(Abbott, 1988) but managerialist accounting
control, reliant upon rules and calculative tech¬
niques, "... becomes incapable of defining the
"limits of its own applicability"." (Power,
quoting Gorz, 1992, p.480). If managerialist
accounting controls are not self-limiting it falls
to professionals to define their boundaries. But
professional control of social work is weak and,
moreover, social work practice is already
socially problematized. Hence public sector
accounting presents as a resolution (in Gallon's
1986 sense) to the sites of ambiguity in social
work by providing a disciplinary framework for
containing discretionary professional action.
This disciplinary framework is achieved by
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establishing conduits (Clegg, 1989, p.205) or
obligatory passage points (Gallon, 1986)
through which organizational discourses must
flow. Commitment accounting constitutes such
a conduit; and caring discourses pass through it
on terms which privilege costing. As "costing"
and "caring" (the respective entry points to the
domains of public sector accounting and social
work practice) are reconstituted and costing
conduits are established through which caring
discourses must pass, bureau-professionals are
still struggling with the boundary-work which
would define the limits of the applicability of
costing within the social services.
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Introduction
This paper is concerned with delegated budgets in the social services. The central
intent of the paper is to, first, locate the devolution process as a responsibility
allocator (Brunsson, 1989, pp. 116ff; Brunsson, 1990) and then, to trace how
attributions of responsibility in the social services are dissipated through social
and organizational processes. The concept of responsibility and, in particular, the
processes through which responsibilities are ascripted have been relatively
neglected in the academic accounting literature (but, see Brunsson (1990), who
links organizational decision making with the assignment of responsibilities).
Attention has been focused on exploring accountability (Humphrey et at, 1993;
Roberts, 1991; Sinclair 1995; Townley, 1996, among many others). This is curious
as accountabilities cannot be invoked unless responsibilities have already been
assigned; one can only call for an account (an explanation ofwhat has happened)
from a responsible agent or agency. Responsibility ascription defines who (or
what) is responsible (Hart, 1951; Shaver, 1975). Ascription is necessary as
. .responsibility is born outside of the responsible person. It comes on him
because he finds himself in circumstances that engender it" (Fauconnet, 1920,
p. 91). Once responsibilities have been ascribed, accountabilities can be
constructed. It is in this sense that responsibility is an a priori to accountability
and this leads Hoskin (1996) to argue that, once this a priori is in place,
accountabilities extend assigned responsibilities.
Previous to the public sector reforms the social services had constituted a
strong hierarchy with numerous prescriptive rules; these rules had enabled
collective action (Wildavsky, 1986, p. 23). Strong hierarchies (where, although
actors vary, their decisions do not) cause attributions of responsibility to be
made to the organization, as it is supposed that organization rules have
accounted for the decisions (Shaver, 1975, p. 127). In contrast to this situation,
delegation aims to create budget-holders with individualized autonomy,
calculating selves (Miller, 1992) who transact freely and who allow for the
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unequivocal location of responsibility and blame. For a person is a readily Pushing budgets
identifiable locus for the application of sanctions whereas it is much more down the line
difficult to take restitution from an organization.
The attribution of responsibility and the creation of difference go hand in
hand. The delegation of budgets is a form of disciplinary power which allocates
responsibility, the individualizing effects of this are to internally divide and
partition the organization, these divisions and partitions then act so as to 293
impede any coalitions of collective action in pursuit of common goals (Roberts, '—— -
1991). But the delegation endeavour ignores the dialectic of social relations
(Oilman, 1978) which always contains the potentiality for renewal. The nature
of social relations in the social services is such that attempts to create what
Miller (1992) has termed the triptych of individualization-responsibilization-
calculation will tend to be displaced by the formation of local, informal
socializing forms of accountability or responsibility (Roberts, 1991). As
accounting in general, and devolved budgets in particular, do not have strong
behavioural controls (Armstrong, 1994), focusing instead on making agents
responsible for the economic consequences of their actions, the delegation
endeavour is not constructed to cope well with those social processes which
tend to circumvent its ascriptions. Where social processes are embedded in
institutional arrangements that define the logic of the situation (Popper, 1945),
individuals see particular events in terms of knowledge derived from their
traditions. It is even more difficult for accounting controls to displace these
institutionalized responses.
The paper illustrates the formation of socialized loci of responsibility by
reference to the internal relations (within the social services) between client
services managers, team managers and front line care workers. The allocation
of responsibility to individuals is seen to be mediated, first, by social processes
which delimit the appropriate characteristics of responsible people (or
individuals who can make choices) and, second, by the retention of prescriptive
organizational rules that define the logic of the situation and which, therefore,
negate the creation of autonomous calculating selves.
The paper is structured as follows: first, the paper explores the concept of
responsibility; second, the research method is described along with an outline of
the "why" and "how" of the delegation process in the social services; third,
reference is made to the research sites (and organizational events are theorized
through notions of individual and socialized responsibilities); fourth, the paper
concludes with a discussion of the complexities of using budgetary
mechanisms to attribute responsibility in the social services context.
The concept of responsibility
The idea of a responsible agent arises with the modern division of labour and
differentiation of function. Evaluation of whether or not agents are responsible
and about whether or not they are acting responsibly follows from role
specialization, for any role can be filled well or badly and any traditional role
behaviour can be continued with or broken away from (Maclntyre, 1967, p. 84).
AAAJ In pre-modern societies the concept of responsibility remained marginal as role
] ] 3 specialization was not sufficiently developed to prompt reflection on its
implications for morality.
Once responsibility has been assigned it may be said to have two faces:
"...responsibility is 'to' others 'for' certain activities" (Spann, 1978, p. 493
quoted in Thynne and Goldring, 1981, p. 197). The latter involves "having
294 assigned tasks" while the former implies "answerability" or responsiveness to
ot]iers_ B0th jn the carrying out of assigned tasks and in terms of
responsiveness to others, agents are expected to act responsibly - in the sense
of appropriately (or in accordance with an awareness of circumstances and
moral codes).
The corollary of responsibility is authority. The concept of authority is
derived from the old idea of an "auctor" or one who produces, invents or causes
in the sphere of opinion, counsel or command (Benn and Peters, 1959, p. 18).
Where authority resides in an individual this person is designated as the
originator of decisions and, therefore, can be held responsible for the
consequences of that decision making. Where responsibility and authority are
conjoined in an agent, this person becomes a "producer of effects" (Shaver, 1975,
p. 95). Anyone who produces effects is a responsible, causal agent.
Responsibilities can be assigned not only to individuals but also to collective
agencies. Shared or collective responsibility can be considered to be ethically
more compelling than individualized responsibility. Responsible individuals
must be aware of the moral codes of their society but they need not, necessarily,
adhere to them. In contrast, shared responsibility implies individuals
participating in a normative order and being bound by its principles (see
Rousseau (1913), for an early exposition of this thinking). Moreover, where
individual organizational roles contribute towards the common good, shared
responsibility for activities carries morality in the same way as does collective
responsibility to others.
Where the collectivity does not share basic moral values or where it seeks to
promote the wider public interest (but that public interest presents a number of
conflicting demands) then prescriptions for the common good cannot emerge
and collective responsibility will become problematic. If the public interest
cannot be made "conceptually and politically specific" (Jos, 1990, p. 229) it
cannot embody an unambiguous set of aspirations for public policy. Liberal
theories of responsibility reject communal prescriptions of the common good on
the grounds that internal criticism cannot distinguish between good and bad
communal practices (Badhwar, 1996). Given these perceptions, either the liberal
ideal of the autonomous responsible individual imbued with moral sensitivity,
understanding and courage will hold sway Qos, 1990) or collective responsibil¬
ity will be seen to lie in the processual rules which define the logic of the
situation. If a sovereign person emerges this person will be seen to make choices
which are not bound by prescriptive rules; as these choices will reflect
judgement, the decision maker can be considered the cause of subsequent
events and, therefore, can be praised or can be blamed for them. If
responsibilities are seen to be embedded in organizational rules then the Pushing budgets
organization, as an entity, will be held responsible. down the line
However, there remain circumstances where responsibilities cannot be
assigned either to persons or to collectivities. Where causality (or the
production of effects) cannot be established and where it is unclear as to
whether any moral agent (or agency) is at work responsibility will be assigned
to the "situation" (Shaver, 1975, p. 98). Here the "situation" is conceptualized as 295
being a juxtaposition of chance events, as being transitory in nature, or as being — ■
composed of elements where too little is known about their interconnections,
their causes and their possible solutions for responsibilities to be ascripted
(Brunsson, 1989, p. 146). But where there are no ascriptions of responsibility to
people (or entities) events appear to be random or uncontrollable, giving rise to
anxiety and denying beliefs in a just world (Shaver, 1975, p. 106). As
attributions of responsibility to "situations" do not make events more
meaningful they are avoided if at all possible.
In the empirical material which follows the next section, shifting attributions
are seen as responsibility for devolved budgets passes between individuals,
collectivities and situations. The links between responsibility and authority
that are necessary for the production of responsible causal agents are not
demonstrated. Moreover, there is ambiguity over whether responsibility for
meeting the basicmoral values implicit in the social work culture can be aligned
with the new financial responsibilities of devolved budget holders. All of these
difficulties problematize the delegation of budgets in social work departments.
The research method and the delegation process
The research aims are twofold, first, to discover the organizational and social
issues that negotiate the level of delegation in the social services and, second, to
determine (once ascriptions of responsibility have been made) if these
ascriptions remain individualized or whether they are dissipated - becoming
socialized or collectivized in nature. In order to answer the question about the
level of delegation eight regional social service departments were visited and
the person responsible for commissioning and purchasing was interviewed
(using a semi-structured format). At this first stage of the research, ten
personnel were interviewed in all (as two regions put forward two people for
interview under the remit of commissioning and purchasing). In order to
ascertain how far budgetary responsibilities remain individualized, four areas
of one particular social services department)!] were identified and practice
team managers (the lowest level of delegation found) were interviewed in a case
study on issues around their sense of budgetary responsibility. At this second
stage of the research, five staff in all were interviewed (as in one authority a
person from the team managers group was present). In the sections that follow,
participants interviewed at the first stage are anonymized, but their region of
employ is numbered from 1 to 8 and their occupation is distinguished as
follows: C = contracts manager; DD = deputy director. At the second stage, all
participants were employed in region 5. They were all (excepting one) practice
AAAJ team managers (PTMs) but they were assigned to different areas - accordingly
11 3 they are designated as from Al-4.
The processes of ascribing financial responsibility for purchasing to social
service departments began with the transfer of the budget (for clients requiring
residential care) from social security. Prior to this transfer, the responsibility for
funding residential care lay with social security but the decisions on entry to
296 this care (for publicly funded clients) were made by the social services. This
situation gave rise to a "perverse incentive" (Wagner, 1988) for social services
personnel to make placements in residential care rather than providing services
to support them at home because the cost of community care would be met by
the social services whereas the cost of residential care would be passed on to
social security. The budget for residential care usually lies at client services
manager level (see Figure 1) but in some authorities practice team managers
work to nominal budgets for residential care.
The 1991 NHS and Community Care Act provided resource to the social
services to enable care in the community. The budget for this was split between
purchaser and provider functions. The purchasing budget is termed the "care at
home"[2] budget whereas the provider budget is the "home care" budget. In the
sections that follow, unless it is indicated otherwise, the "budget" under
discussion is always the "care at home" purchasing budget. The sums ofmoney
allocated to this budget at the area level are generally quite modest - being in
the order of £50,000-£80,000[3]. The 1991 Act anticipated that resources (for
care at home) would flow to the point at which user need is assessed (Langan
and Clarke, 1994). The legislation also directed that the front line social workers
who assess care needs should assume new titles of "care managers"; titles

















































Organizational issues which negotiate the level of delegation Pushing budgets
In the eight regional social work departments visited the anticipated devolution down the line
of budgets to care managers has not occurred. There are anxieties which
surround the creation of the "care manager" role and in the authority visited in
the case study the title of "care manager" had not been introduced:
A lot of people were very resistant to the care manager title. I think that they thought it meant 297
deprofessionalization - that they would bring anyone in under that title (A4).
The deprofessionalization issue was also linked to concerns over the
disappearance of "real" social work as front line workers were increasingly
focused on administrative tasks to the exclusion of therapeutic work with
clients:
Social work has been all about the professional personal relationship with the client which
sought change on an individual level. It's not about that anymore - there just isn't enough
money ... [But] social workers see files as an intrusion and they aren't used to thinking about
the financial implications of what they are doing ... Workers are very resentful of this - of
having to interpret government policy directly to users. They are working with people with
very extreme needs and all they can do is just patch things up. It's a case of "shoot the
messenger" and people are worried about being shot (A4).
Harmon and Mayer (1986) define problems such as "meeting needs" as "wicked"
(as opposed to "tame") problems, by this they mean to imply that such problems
"...have no definitive formulation, hence no agreed on criteria to tell when a
solution has been found; the choice of a definition of a problem, in fact, typically
determines its 'solution'.. .[moreover],. .the solution itself potentially becomes a
part of the problem..." (pp. 9, 11). In the social services the very definition of
client "needs" (rather than, for example, "rights") both encompasses certain
sorts of solution (for example, therapeutic support) and can exacerbate the
problem (by ignoring the social structures of inequality which give rise to the
disadvantage that is linked with client "need"). This analysis demonstrates that
"wicked" problems are not amenable to standardized treatments nor can they be
resolved through instrumental action. This implies that personal responsibility
gains in relevance as the wickedness of problems becomes more evident. For
wicked problems, personal commitment to the client is especially salient.
Where social workers are personally committed to their clients, accepting
attributions of financial responsibilities will be particularly problematic.
Practice team managers stressed the "emotional labour" (Langan and Clarke,
1994) involved if workers in face-to-face relationships with clients took on
budgetary responsibilities for attempting "match" limited resources with
unlimited client need. Consequently, there were pressures to avoid that burden
by passing any difficult decisions over the acceptability of costly care packages
to practice team managers (as they are at one remove from the front-line of care
delivery). In this way practice team managers absorb responsibility for difficult
financial decisions, reducing or deleting the responsibility of front line workers
and preserving their advocacy roles:
AAAJ Workers would hate that [devolved budgets]. They disagree with some of the restrictions and
they can still say "If it was up to me I would do this but it's not so I can't" (Al).
I think that they [front line workers] would find the budget intrusive in terms of their
relationship with the client. Also if they had an awareness that they could only fund, say, a £60
a week service then there would be pressures to trim the assessment of need to meet that. It's
much easier when they are advocates for the client and the manager makes the decisions (A3),
298 In some regions, in addition to the issue of protecting front line staff it was felt
1 ™ * that the authority implied by holding a budget was inappropriate at the front
line social worker level. This could be assessed by reference to the remuneration
level of workers:
Practice team managers are paid about £20,000, so it seems OK for them to have budgets
(R2/DD).
In other regions the finance office was reluctant to cede financial control to
social workers who they perceive as lacking authority in the area of finance:
Also there's the finance office - they were anxious - they wanted to make sure that people
knew what they were doing. Social workers don't have a great reputation for dealing with
finance, there was a fear that we would get it horribly wrong. Also there's the control issue.
Finance thought information is power and we've got it and you [social work] are not going to
get it (R3/L).
Some social workers were also eager to preserve the boundaries between
costing and caring (Llewellyn, 1998):
Workers don't like working with money, full stop. They find the whole concept of money
difficult. People perceive that they are starting to be like accountants or auditors and that sits
very uneasily with them - I just think that social work doesn't attract mathematicians -
people who are numerate. As soon as you mention pounds, shillings and pence it gets people's
backs up (A2).
The other main set of issues in determining the level of delegation and in
keeping budgets away from the front line of service delivery were around fears
that highly disaggregated, fragmented budgets would overly reduce flexibility
in commissioning and impede the development of innovative practice based on
a "wider" picture:
It's a balance between the feeling that it gives some useful flexibility when the budget is close
to the client and the need to be consistent and have the ability to manage. You can decentralize
until you haven't got the money to commission anything. Say every area got £5 to commission
a fire service, well it just wouldn't happen but if those £5s came together at a higher level then
it will (R5/L).
I think there are problems if decisions about money are taken a long way away from where the
information is but then again it's not meaningful and smooth if you've only got the local
picture (Al).
The above issues have all been implicated in negotiating the level of devolution
of budgets in the social services. Budgetary responsibilities have not passed to
front line workers, in part to shield them from the emotional labour with clients
which having the authority to refuse or accept care packages would imply and,
in part, to prevent the fragmentation of commissioning which would be
involved if budgets became too small. These issues have resulted in practice Pushing budgets
teammanager level emerging as the lowest organizational tier to which budgets down the line
have been delegated. The next section explores the issue of how the
individualized autonomies of practice team managers have been dissipated.
How individual responsibilities are diffused and recast as
collective ones 299
The first issue examined is that of the authority-responsibility conjunction. In "
the social services authorities and responsibilities are often disconnected. The
severing of the link between authority and responsibility occurs through
vesting authorization for particular care packages at a different level of the
organizational hierarchy from that of the financial responsibility for those care
packages. In this way authority and responsibility become out of sync. In the
areas visited the client services manager must authorize all "Level 1" care
packages (a Level 1 care package meets the domiciliary needs of clients who
would have to be accommodated in residential care if their needs were not met
at home):
The other craziness is that I don't really have control over it [the budget], X [the client services
manager] effectively has control because he has to authorize all Level 1 packages. If we used
Level 2[4] then I can agree it but we don't, so I don't have control. Really I'd prefer to be doing
it or not doing it but as my personal relationship with X is good it works but with a different
manager it would be impossible - but because of the way he works it's OK (Al).
While the above team manager construed the authorization/responsibility split
as a "lack of control" issue, the person quoted below saw it as a negation of his
responsibility:
Really the responsibility for the spend lies with the client services manager because all the
Dlacements are Level 1 and she has to authorize them (A3).
This team manager thought that authorization levels should be aligned with
devolved budgets:
Budgets aren't truly devolved. We [PTMs] are perfectly able to make decisions about spending
£500 but at the moment it's ludicrous because the client services manager has to authorize
everything. Really it's about levels of authorization as opposed to levels of devolved budgets.
If devolution is to be real authorization levels have to be freed up. At the moment it's ridiculous
because she [client services manager] is even further removed from the field than I am (A3).
In contrast, the next team manager saw the authorization as "rubber-stamping"
and perceived that he retained responsibility for the budget:
Strictly speaking only the client services manager can authorize Level 1 - that's just been
introduced in the last couple of weeks. But, personally, I feel responsible, I meet with the local
administrator [in-service support] on a monthly basis to go through things (A2).
The second issue which diffuses individualized responsibilities for budgets is
the existence of multiple sources of budget access. Clients who are discharged
from hospital are assessed by the hospital social work teams but "hospital"
budgets only cover the first four weeks after discharge, subsequent to this the
cost of the package is transferred to the client's geographical area of domicile:
AAAI There are demands that I have no control over. Discharges from hospital, for example, I just
11 q have to accept as a charge on my budget. I could, in theory, challenge the assessment but itJ-To would be very unusual for me to do that and I'd have to challenge the assessment in order to
argue about the cost (A2).
The area hospital practice team manager expressed it this way:
Really I'm committing money from other people's budgets without asking them. If I wanted to
300 be particularly courteous I might ring someone up but I certainly don't have to ... Really I'm
—— ■ in a lucky position because I'm only making commitments for a four week period and then the
responsibility reverts to the area team of origin. Also people tend not to question the
assessment because that would take forever and the discharge would be delayed. It means that
the locus of responsibility is moved outwards (A3).
Another non-controllable charge on the "care at home" budget is the resourcing
of community service volunteers:
Before reorganization we had a budget for community service volunteers but with
reorganization that budget disappeared and they are now paid out of the "care at home"
budget. Now for the particular client I'm thinking of there is no way that she meets the Level
1 criteria but the care for her is being paid out of the budget because she is cared for by these
volunteers - these are things I don't feel comfortable about but there's nothing I can do (Al).
Yet another access issue which diffuses individualized responsibility is the
practice of borrowing from the purchasing budget to resource the provider
budget:
There are lots of other sorts of madness around. The "care at home" budget [purchasing] is
sometimes paid into the home help budget [provider] because the home care service is under-
resourced. That bit of under-resourcing would show up on the home care budget if it was all
one pot - the distinction is often silly (Al).
The existence of these multiple sources of access to a budget which is
supposedly only to fund "care at home" exemplifies how attempts to further
internally divide and partition the organization (through the creation of
individual loci of responsibility within the purchaser/provider split) are diffused
through sharing strategies.
A third source of diffusion of responsibility is through the use of prescriptive
organizational rules on how moneys can be spent:
Really there's no sense of a devolved budget that allows me to do what I want because I have
to go with departmental policy. I've got to spend on our own services first. If I go to the private
sector they have to be a listed supplier that we [the department] have agreed to contract with
and there are things I can spend money on and things I can't - for example, I can't buy nursing
care - that comes out of the health budget (A3).
My political views are of the left but there is a dogmatic adherence to socialist views which
makes the home care service totally ineffective and a bad use of resources. The private sector
are barking at the gate but there is a political imperative to use our own services first, then the
voluntary sector and then the private sector (A4).
Such rules avoid the situations of attribution of individual blame which can
occur where calculating selves (Miller, 1992) transact in a market. The retention
of prescriptive organizational rules "...protects collective action from the
intrusion of irreconcilable personal differences, and it also realizes a presence in
local contexts that threaten to uncover and thereby perhaps inhibits the Pushing budgets
personal abuse of power" (Roberts, 1991, p. 364). In this context adherence to the down the line
rule which dictates that the local authority's own home care services must be
privileged, prevents the personal, politicized differences in opinion between
team managers on this issue becoming publicly apparent; the rule also stops
differing decisions being made on the extent of the use of the independent sector
and deflects any possibility of inducements to make placements being offered to 301
team managers from providers in the independent sector: .======_.
If at all the pressures are likely to come from the opposite direction [from providers rather than
purchasers], homes offering a £5 discount or social workers being given backhanders, God
forbid, I must say I've never heard of it (R6/C).
The price to be paid for the reduction of conflict between team managers and
the containment of potential abuses is a service which is less than fully effective
and does not make the best use of resources. However, the blame for a less good
service cannot be attributed to any particular team manager as all decisions on
the allocation of resources in the independent sector will be similar. Roberts
(1991, p. 364) points out, "The paradox is that abuses then reappear in the other
sphere [in this context, the service delivered to clients] in the form of the
apparently unintentional injuries of inequality and disadvantage which are
personally damaging but whose origin, or causality is difficult to specify". If
there are to be individualized attempts to secure the "best deal" for clients
within the constraints of a strictly limited budget, the result will be
individualized attributions of responsibility:
For devolved budgeting to be real there should be no artificial ring-fencing. It should be that's
your budget and you try to get the best deal for your client in the marketplace. I think we could
put some very creative arrangements in place if it was like that. But the downside would be
that it would be terrifying if you've got a budget which has run out and you are left wringing
your hands and you've got people screaming at you (A3).
The above evidence demonstrates how the processes of disengaging levels of
devolution from levels of authorization, of allowingmultiple sources of access to
budgets and of using prescriptive organizational rules result in the dissipation
of individualized autonomies and the continuance of shared forms of
responsibility. Within this context budget-holders are not held responsible for
budget overspends and tend not to experience a sense of ownership of the
budget:
Really if someone overspent on their budget there was a feeling that it would be wiped away
in the blink of an eye (A2).
I don't know how responsible the other area PTMs feel for their budgets - a lot have said that
this is the department's money and I've been allocated it in name only. They don't feel that this
is a budget that they have to worry about (A3).
I informed him [the client services manager] about the budget overspend and said I was
anxious but there was no response and things just carried on as normal. The culture is that we
have covered our backs because we have expressed concern ... There was no sense that this
was important, it was as if the budget was something in the ether (A4).
Budgets are ethereal because overspends can be lightly dismissed; they don't
carry weight in the social services context because they are not aligned with
operational activities. Ultimately practice team managers put their responsibil¬
ities to meet client need before their responsibility to manage a budget. The
impossibility of balancing the moral imperative to meet needs with the
financial responsibility to apportion very limited resources in relation to that
need is the basic unsolvable problem (Brunsson, 1990) in the social services.
The result is a budget that is not meaningful:
There has not been a departmental culture where being underspent or overspent has meant
anything (A3).
The next section extends the discussion of the complexities of using budgets to
ascribe responsibilities in the context of the social services.
Discussion
The evidence from the social services is that there are still boundaries in place
(Llewellyn, 1998) between the responsibilities for operational, social work
activities and the responsibilities for the budgets that resource these activities.
These boundaries are maintained through adherence to various rationales (the
avoidance of "emotional labour" for front-line staff; perceptions of how far it is
appropriate to trust lower level employees with budgets; and prevention of
undue budget fragmentation). These issues support a separation of duties
between face-to-face work with clients and financial management. The result is
that budgets are held away from the front line of service delivery and team
managers are the lowest organizational tier to which budgets are delegated.
Consequently, in terms of responsibility for "assigned tasks", the task of
"matching needs and resources" anticipated by the Audit Commission (1992)
has not been allocated to individuals but remains as a series of responsibilities
fragmented between client services managers, practice team managers and
front-line workers. It is understandable that social work personnel in the
context of matching needs and resources reject the assumption of individual
moral agency, for the result of an explicit matching of needs and resources will
be a denial of service to certain clients. Individuals are unlikely to wish to be
seen as moral agents in these circumstances.
The previous section has discussed how the formal individual financial
responsibilities of team managers are recast as collective ones. These diffusion
processes operate vertically; both through authorization being passed back up
the hierarchy to client services managers and through adherence to top-down
rules that prescribe what moneys can be spent on. Diffusion processes also
operate horizontally, through allowing multiple sources of access to the budget.
These diffusions of financial responsibility result in the differing perceptions of
personal responsibility reported on in the previous section. Some team
managers feel responsible for their budgets; some do not - thinking that their
personal responsibility has been dissipated either by allowing other people
some control over "their" budgets or by having to follow organizational rules Pushing budgets
that constrain their decisions: down the line
There is a lot of ambiguity. There was no clear statement about where the cut-off point is.
There's a real lack of clarity and the department gave out very mixed messages. The results
are that people feel differently - some people take a very personal view of the spend and their
responsibility for it but in other cases there is no ownership and no anxiety even though there
are massive overspends (A3). 303
This quote demonstrates that even where there are severe effects (i.e. "massive ——— .
overspends") these do not always give rise to feelings of personal responsibility.
This situation violates the commonly held assumption that more responsibility
should be attributed when the effects of action are serious than when they are
relatively trivial (Shaver, 1975, p. 109). This discrepancy seems to be explained
by differential perceptions of the extent of the personal control of the budget-
holder; people feel more responsible where they think that they have more
control over the effects of action (Shaver, 1975, p. 104). Where budget holders do
not think of themselves as "producers of effects" they attribute the responsibil¬
ity for the budget to the ambiguous situation within the department, but, as the
above quote demonstrates, such attributions are unsatisfactory as they do not
make organizational events more meaningful.
Despite all the ambiguity there does remain a sense in which team managers
are primarily responsible for managing financial resources, but two main issues
confound their responsibilities for this financial management task. First, front¬
line workers are charged to carry out need assessments without regard to their
cost consequences or to the availability of resource to meet the assessments:
Of course we fall between the twin stools of having a finite amount of money and having an
open-ended service to meet ends (A4).
The problem is, where does the responsibility lie if need is assessed at a certain level and then
we can only provide the money to meet a part of that need? Then what if something goes
wrong, how do we explain that to people? (A3).
In these circumstances numbers of clients with assessed need accumulate
without regard to whether or not resource is currently available to meet those
ends.
Second, there are no agreed rules on prioritization to allow for any rational
ordering of these clients:
We should have clear priorities and time scales and we should publish them as information for
clients but when it came to it the director wouldn't agree to any publication of information. We
have people on the waiting list who applied in 1994 and they haven't heard a word since - we
have to say to them that we can't tell you when you will be seen. There is a culture of paranoia.
We are not prepared to publish priorities and time scales because of a fear of exposure - of
appearing to be unfair and so generating a complaint. So what happens is that if people do
complain then they get, but if they don't then they don't get, which is unfair (A4).
I don't know who decides how the budget is shared out. We should have more clarity and
consistency to work out clearly who gets what but it won't happen because you have to make
clear public statements. Instead we have muddle and it boils down to whether you argue in the
right way to the right person (Al).
AAAJ The above quotes illustrate the point which Brunsson (1993) makes about
things which can be done but cannot be said, "Ethical norms tend to limit what
we can say more than what we can do. It is easier to implement actions which
are regarded as immoral, than acknowledge them openly; and it is even more
difficult to defend them or to propose that they be adopted" (p. 492). In the social
services context the director fears that the open discussion and publication of
priorities would lead to accusations of unfairness, hence there are no such
(:|jscussjons or publications and no clear priorities - arbitrariness reigns.
The Audit Commission (1992) appeared to anticipate that the implementa¬
tion of prioritization would be unproblematic, "Members must decide on
competing priorities between dependency levels and user groups, setting
criteria for different levels of assessment, care management and services"
(p. 26). The problem with such statements is that they ignore the possibility of
reactions from "de-prioritized groups" if they become aware of their position
though publicly available information.
Where resources do not match with assessed needs and prioritization is not
implemented, budget overspends can only be avoided by queuing or by a denial
of service. Waiting times were lengthy in all the areas visited (with the
exception of discharges from hospital) but any decision to withhold services to
avoid budget overspend is seen as unacceptable and, in any case, one which
would have to be taken at departmental level:
No one says that you have spent your money so the shutters are coming down (A2).
Basically I would see it as a departmental policy decision if we decided to pull down the
shutters if the budget was overspent (A3).
Where responsibility cannot be clearly attributed to delegated individuals and
there are no unambiguous rules for collective responsibility, loci of responsibil¬
ity shift arbitrarily. In these circumstances responsibilities may be seen to lie
ultimately with a central ruler (Wildavsky, 1986):
There is a climate of fear in the department. People are afraid that the Director will pick up the
phone and given them a b...ing. The hierarchy is very steep and people are scared to do
anything without getting permission from their manager as things get fed up and down the
hierarchy. Ultimately it's a dictatorship where the Director says "No" (A4).
But, as the above quote demonstrates, rather than generating perceptions of the
director as a sovereign leader, the absence of unambiguous attributions of
delegated responsibility gives rise to a dictatorial ethos. Within this ethos the
notion of hierarchy implies that financial responsibility can still be vested in the
organizational leader (Brunsson, 1996). But these perceptions of the ultimate
financial responsibility of the director are at variance with the principles of
delegated budgets.
Where there are neither clearly responsible agents with individualized
autonomies to set priorities nor unambiguous sets of rules to underpin
collective responsibility, devolved budgets cannot be used to plan service
delivery nor can they be used to control processes of prioritization. In these
circumstances budgets are disengaged from organizational activities and Pushing budgets
responsibilities focus on service delivery: down the line
You can't say that you are managing a budget because at the end of the day we are meeting
needs (A2).
I suppose I'm ambivalent about my budgetary responsibilities. I'm a member of a social work
department with a range of responsibilities but I see myself first as a manager responsible for
service delivery. Within that I should seek to maximize efficiency and to do that I see it as
perfectly appropriate for me to have responsibility for the budget. But first I should be
confident that the assessments that are made are accurate and no one is, say, going into care
who shouldn't be. You can't say that being accountable for a budget means that you will stop
making residential home placements (A3).
The message I have given staff is that I don't want needs not to be met (A2).
In the beginning we were given strong warnings about what to do if we were over-committed
but now we are and no one says anything. People argue on the basis of need and that's the end
of story (Al).
Despite some perceptions of the ultimate personal responsibility of the director,
the day-to-day responsibility for care packages is a collective one, where a front¬
line social worker devises and costs the package, the team manager then looks
at the costs in relation to the assessed needs (and may attempt to negotiate the
costs downwards) and the client services manager gives the authorization.
Thus, although the practice team manager is nominally responsible for the
budget, the operational activities which the budget resources are the preserve of
front-line workers, with the final authority for operations lying with the client
services manager. A socialized collective responsibility exists for care
packages:
Really the budget responsibility is shared.. .We accept that we are all singing from the same
hymn sheet (A4).
Therefore, despite attempts to use budgets as mechanisms to attribute
individualized financial autonomies there remains a strong sense of collective
responsibility - albeit that these collective responsibilities are not currently
underpinned by any consensual normative principles.
Concluding comments
Delegating budgets in the social services has failed to create individualized
responsibilities. Having noted this, the question remains of whether this is a
residual control problem or whether there are more fundamental issues at stake
here. If the former, a tightening up of management practices would be
prescribed, so that authority and responsibility become conjoined in one person,
multiple sources of access to the budget are not permitted, and prescriptive
organizational rules are relaxed to permit more individualized choices. This
approach would view the issues outlined here as difficult, but ultimately
transitory ones, as individualized responsibilities emerge. On the latter view,
the introduction of devolved budgets into social work departments in a context
of resource constraint and a lack of clear prioritization will fail, because, in
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these circumstances, the responsibilities which workers feel for basic social
work values cannot be successfully aligned with their new financial
responsibilities. This latter view would indicate that, as individualized
responsibilities will not work, accounting systems must seek to support
collective responsibilities.
In balance, it is judged here that the narrative account in the paper supports
the view that there is a fundamental problematic here. If this is the case is there a
contribution which accounting can make to the dilemma? One approach would be
to argue that accounting should, in circumstances of collective responsibilities,
return to the values of narration and acknowledgement (along with a jettison of
any exclusive focus on control), so that informative accounts emerge that clarify
who got what and when and how (Nelson, 1993). There is certainly scope for such
narratives in the social work context where the number, cost and complexity of
the care packages funded would be informative in terms of planning and the
written acknowledgement of multiple access (and borrowing) would make visible
practices which are currently anecdotal and not always quantified. Another
approach would be to recognize that in an ambiguous situation, such as that
portrayed here, accountingmeasures should be focused on being communication-
efficient (Lindkvist, 1993). Communication-efficient accounting would provide for
measures that are simple, unambiguous and predictable in how they mirror
various contingent events. Simply that team managers always know where they
(and colleagues) are against budget and that they are aware of the magnitude of
next year's budget in good time would provide some accounting certainties in a
very uncertain situation. Recognizing that in ambiguous situations there is a limit
to the sophistication that accounting can assume, provides more organizational
space for talk (or socializing communication) in an attempt to rebuild consensual
normative principles.
From the two approaches suggested above, commonalities emerge. One can
conclude that in professionally based, decentralized work organizations where
ambiguity is inherent, accounting measures should jettison control for
communication, seek simplicity over complexity, and be tied up with
informative narratives rather than focused on isolated representation.
Appropriate accounting practices to support collective responsibilities or co¬
operative models (Lindkvist, 1996), rather than individualized autonomies, are
yet to be developed, but the argument of this paper is that such practices should
be based on communication, simplicity and narration.
Notes
1. There was some restructuring of the social services departments between the first and
second stages of the research. Regional authorities have been split into smaller "unitary"
authorities so although the authority which is the focus of the more intensive investigation
had participated at" the first stage, by the second stage it had been split into four unitary
areas.
2. The types of expenditures allowed under the "care at home" budget cover any items which
will support a client in staying in their own home (rather than entering a residential home),
and include moneys for home-helps, meals on wheels, night-sitting, and the provision of Pushing blldgPtS
equipment (such as stair-lifts). , ft-, r
Although these sums are relatively small at the area level, purchasing is an increasingly
important activity within social work. There has been a doubling of the percentage of the
total social work budget spent on purchasing in three years and this percentage now
stands at over a third (Purchasing Strategy, 1995-6).
A Level 2 care package is devised to meet the needs of a client who has been assessed as
requiring support in order to enjoy a reasonable quality of life in the community but whose oU /
needs are not so great as to immediately precipitate entry to residential care if the package
is not authorized.
References
Armstrong, P. (1994), "The influence of Michel Foucault on accounting research", Critical
Perspectives on Accounting, Vol. 5 No. 1, pp. 25-56.
Audit Commission (1992), The Community Revolution: The Personal Services and Community
Care, HMSO, London.
Badhwar, N.K. (1996), "Moral agency, commitment and impartiality", Social Philosophy and
Policy, Vol. 13 No. 1, pp. 1-26.
Benn, S.I. and Peters, R.S. (1959), Social Principles and the Democratic State, George Allen &
Unwin, UK.
Brunsson, N. (1989), The Organization ofHypocrisy, John Wiley & Sons, Chichester.
Brunsson, N. (1990), "Deciding for responsibility and legitimation: alternative interpretations of
organizational decision making", Accounting, Organizations and Society, Vol. 15 Nos 1/2,
pp. 47-59.
Brunsson, N. (1993), "Ideas and actions: justification and hypocrisy as alternative to control",
Accounting, Organizations and Society, Vol. 18 No. 6, pp. 489-506.
Brunsson, N. (1996), "Institutionalized beliefs and practices the case of markets and
organizations", Paper presented at the ESRC/CIMA Public Sector Workshop, Edinburgh.
Fauconnet, P. (1920), La Responsabilite, Alcon, Paris.
Harmon, M.M. and Mayer, R.T. (1986), Organization Theory for Public Administration, Little,
Brown and Company, Boston, MA.
Hart, H.L. (1951), "The ascription of responsibility and rights" in Flew, A.G.N. (Ed.), Logic and
Language, Vol. 1. (Reprinted from the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society.)
Hoskin, K. (1996), "The awful idea of accountability", in Munro, R. and Mouritsen, J. (Eds),
Accountability: Power, Ethos and the Technologies ofManaging, International Thomson
Business Press, London.
Humphrey, C., Miller, P. and Scapens, R.W. (1993), "Accountability and accountable management in
the UK public sector", Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, Vol. 6 No. 3, pp. 7-29.
Jos, P.H. (1990), "Administrative responsibility revisited: moral consensus and moral autonomy",
Administration and Society, Vol. 22 No. 2, pp. 228-48.
Langan, M. and Clarke, J. (1994), "Managing in the mixed economy of care", in Clarke, J.,
Cochrane, A. and McLaughlin, E. (Eds), Managing Social Policy, Sage, London.
Lindkvist, L. (1993), "Accounting in hierarchies. A TCA-interpretation of internal reporting",
Scandinavian Journal ofManagement, Vol. 9 No. 1, pp. 45-66.
Lindkvist, L. (1996), "Performance based compensation in health care - a Swedish experience",
Financial Accountability and Management, Vol. 12 No. 2, pp. 89-105.
Llewellyn, S. (1998), "Boundary work: costing and caring in the UK social services", Accounting,
Organizations and Society, Vol. 23 No. 1, pp. 23-48.
Maclntyre, A. (1967), A Short History ofEthics, Routledge, London.
AAAJ Miller, P. (1992), "Accounting and objectivity: the invention of calculating selves and calculable
spaces", Annals ofScholarship, Vol. 9 Nos 1/2, pp. 61-86.11,3
308
Nelson, J.S. (1993), "Account and acknowledge, or represent and control? On postmodern politics
and economics of collective responsibility", Accounting, Organizations and Society, Vol. 18
No. 2/3, pp. 207-29.
Oilman, B. (1978), Alienation:Marx's Critique ofMan in Capitalist Society, Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge.
Popper, K. (1945), The Open Society and Its Enemies, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London.
Purchasing Strategy (1995-1996), Regional Council Social Work, Scotland.
Roberts, J. (1991), "The possibilities of accountability", Accounting, Organizations and Society,
Vol. 16 No. 4, pp. 355-68.
Rousseau, J.J. (1913), The Social Contract and Discourses, Cole, G.D.H. (Transl.), Everyman,
London.
Shaver, K.G. (1975), An Introduction to Attribution Processes, Winthrop Publishers, Inc., MA.
Sinclair, A. (1995), "The chameleon of accountability: forms and discourses", Accounting,
Organizations and Society, Vol. 20 No. 2/3, pp. 219-37.
Spann, R.N. (1978), Government Administration in Australia, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, Australia.
Thynne, I. and Goldring J. (1981), "Government 'responsibility' and responsible government",
Politics, Vol. 16 No. 2, pp. 197-207.
Townley, B. (1996), "Accounting in detail: accounting for individual preferences", Critical
Perspectives on Accounting, Vol. 7 No. 5, pp. 565-84.
Wagner Committee (1988), Residential Care: A Positive Choice, HMSO, London.
Wildavsky, A. (1986), Budgeting: A Comparative Theory ofBudgetary Processes, 2nd revised
edition, Transaction Books, New Brunswick, NJ.
ResearchinHeilthoreFinancialManagement
Vol. 5, No. 1, 25-40.





The University of Edinburgh (UK)
.ABSTRACT
The financial management of health care poses difficult challenges. Resource allocation isdrive by the decisions of senior medical professionals who have enjoyed a high degree of
autonomy in their decision-making and who have not been accustomed to being subject to cost
constraints. In an attempt to imbue doctors with a more managerial ethos the clinical
directorate structure was introduced into hospitals in the UK. This initiative created some senior
doctors as clinical directors with budgetary responsibilities for their particular specializations.
This article draws on interview material to explore the responses of clinical directors to
management, particularly focussing on the differences between surgeons and physicians in this
respect.
It was found that surgeons had more alignment with managers in so far as they displayed
the putative managerial characteristics of strength, boldness and aggression with a bias for
decisive action. Surgical work was also found to be more penetrated by the management
categories of standardization, centralization and bureaucratization, leading to the easier
establishment of efficiency and productivity criteria. These conclusions indicate that in an
environment characterized by resource scarcity, surgeons will be able to demonstrate their
resource needs in management terms. In contrast, physicians showed less enthusiasm for
management tasks and medicine was less transparent in both activities and outputs, than was
surgery. Physicians still argue for financial resources in the traditional way—i.e. on the basis of
increased need. The article concludes that surgery is more open to the techniques of scientific
management whereas managing medicine will be more of an art than a science.
Surgeons are trained to count numbers. I have been coding every operation since / started here. I
was trained to do this. (BCDIS)
It is curious how different specialisms attract different personalities. Also principles and time
scales can vary. For example, physicians are philosophers... (CCD4S)
Health care presents a unique and problematic context for implementingmanagement techniques (Bates & Brignall 1993; Howes 1994; King et al. 1994;Ellwood 1995, 1996; Jones 1999; Jones & D wing 1997; Soderlund et al. 1995,
1997). However the very perception that the management of health care is unique has
fostered the adoption of blanket approaches to cost control, as if the problem of
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managing medicine has a single solution. Overall prescriptions for cost control, for
example, devolved budgeting or diagnostic related group (DRG) costing, have been
applied across all medical specializations. Such a generalized approach to the
management of medicine reflects the contemporary myths of unity that characterize
health care (Llewellyn 1997). Such myths have militated against an understanding of
the very varied types of work that take place within medicine. In contrast, recognition
of the heterogeneity of clinical work opens up the possibility of differentiated
approaches to management control for the very different types of activity and output
across the health care area. This paper explores some differences between surgery
and medicine with respect to management.
As surgery and medicine have the same focus—the human body—differences
between them have been obscured,
...we think that fixing a broken thumb is "closer" to curing typhoid feuer than it
is to building a bridge, because of the common object of the first two tasks, the
human body. But in purely theoretical terms, broken bones are close to bridges
because both involve the science of mechanics. Indeed, the physicians who
handle the fever and the surgeons who fixed the thumbs had little to do with
one another before the nineteenth century. (Abbott 1988, p. 36).
Clinical work operates through techniques that are part art, part science (Klein 1995, p.
250). In this mix surgery is a technical craft of applied science whereas medicine is
more an art of applied science. The distinction between surgery and medicine
operates through the recognized division of labor attached to the bodily systems they
both investigate. For example, for the cardiovascular system, cardiac surgery and
medical cardiology are established; for the respiratory system there is thoracic surgery
and chest medicine; for the gastrointestinal system, abdominal (or general) surgery
and gastroenterology and so on (Armstrong 1993, p. 237). Abbott's perception that
surgery is aligned with the science of mechanics fosters the view that greater
standardization is possible in surgery. Moreover in terms of scientific advance,
technology is likely to further transform all clinical work, but most particularly the
practice of surgery (Klein 1995, p. 247). Hence surgery looks set to be even more
driven by rationality and standardization and to become the firmly established
"technical core" (Macintosh 1985, p. 164) of clinical work. Protocols and guidelines on
best practice are most easily applied in standardized situations of technical rationality
(Klein et al. 1996) and, therefore, may be expected to penetrate surgery to a greater
extent than they do medicine. In turn the increasing use of protocols and guidelines
will lead to more convergence in practice as surgery is delivered to pre-specified
standards.
Medicine is characterized by greater uncertainty, as diagnosis tends to be more
problematic and the links between diagnosis and treatment more difficult to establish.
Physicians often deal with patients (especially older ones) who have multiple
problems with unclear prognoses. In situations of uncertainty Abbott (1988, p. 49)
argues that inference (reasoning from problem to solution) works by exclusion or
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construction. Medicine works by exclusion. If a case is unclear than doctors maintain a
general supportive treatment while ruling out areas by using special diagnostic
procedures. Physicians (unlike, for example, the military who work by construction—
hypothesizing enemy responses to their tactics) have the luxury of "second chances"
they can find out what does not work and then move on in the hope of finding
something that does (Abbott 1988, p. 49). Surgeons do not have the same opportunity
(as do physicians) for second chances; surgery tends to be focussed on a single
diagnosis with a specified operative procedure, usually an operation is performed only
once and there is an expectation that it will be done correctly first time. As physicians
reason by exclusion and take advantage of second chances, factors like length of stay
and number of diagnostic tests are less easily standardized in medicine (as opposed to
surgery). The higher uncertainty in diagnosis and treatment in medicine gives rise to
the greater use of "...experience, trial and error, intuition and muddling through."
(Schon 1991 p. 43). In turn this is likely to result in less predictable, more idiosyncratic
practices in medicine and, hence, greater cost variability. In turn this implies that cost
control will be more problematic in medicine than in surgery.
Differences both in the practice of medicine and surgery and in the character of
physicians and surgeons affect the relationship between clinical and management
agendas. This article explores how these differences impact on the ways in which
clinical directors (doctors with management responsibilities) approach their work and
the ways in which cost management techniques have penetrated surgery and
medicine. These differential effects indicate the likelihood of greater success in the
management control of health care if different strategies are applied in surgery and
medicine. Before these differences are discussed the research method of the paper is
explained.
THE RESEARCH METHOD AND THE RESEARCH SETTING
This project involved interviews with sixteen clinical directors from three different
Trust1 hospitals in the UK. The directorate structure at the hospitals varied. The first
Trust has eight directorates, two at specialty level, five sub-specialties and a support
service: surgical; medical; neurosciences; oncology; theatres and anesthetics; imaging;
laboratories; and (at a separate site) a geriatric unit. The second Trust has three:
medical; surgical; and a support directorate. The third Trust has five directorates, two
at specialty level, one sub-specialty, and two support directorates: general surgery;
medicine; obstetrics and gynecology; clinical resources; and diagnostic and
paramedical services. A consultant heads up all the directorates, with the exception of
one—the clinical director of clinical resources at the third Trust has a background in
pharmacy. In the empirical material cited below the Trusts take the letters of "A," "B"
or "C." The clinical directors are numbered and identified as surgeons (S), physicians
' Trusts are semi-autonomous self-governing hospitals that are directly accountable to the Secretary of
Stare for Health in the UK. They may set their own levels of remuneration for their workforce but are
subject to external financing requirements that limit total borrowing for capital projects. They must also
earn a 6 percent return on assets in use.
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(P), anesthetists (A), obstetricians (0) or doctors in charge of a support directorate
(SU) e.g. ACD1S is one of the eight clinical directors at the first Trust and is a surgeon.
This labeling, while preserving public anonymity, gives the reader knowledge of the
clinical director's specialization and allows comparison of response on different issues
if the doctor is quoted more than once.
Each clinical director assumes total responsibility for her/his department, reporting
directly to the medical director (also a clinician but a member of the executive team
that includes directors of other functional areas such as finance, nursing, human
resources and corporate services). The executive team (along with the non-executive
directors) report directly to the Chief Executive. This structure gives the clinical
directors two management roles: first, as directors of clinical units and, second, as
members of the corporate management of hospitals. Within each directorate there are
a business manager and a nurse manager both ofwho report to the clinical director.
Clinical directorates are management units formed around clinical specialties. The
intention is that each unit has its own budget for financial management purposes and
seeks contracts with purchasers to supply hospital services (Walby & Greenwall 1994a,
p. 149). This stmcture was inspired by the John Hopkins Hospital at Baltimore in the US
and sought the active involvement of clinicians in resource management in the
recognition that hospital costs are largely determined by the decisions made by or
authorized by senior doctors (Hunter 1992; Preston 1992; Jones & Dewing 1997).
Clinical directorates are governance structures which put medical (rather than non¬
medical) managers in positions which have some authority over the decisions made
by their colleagues under the assumption that clinicians will be more likely to respond
positively to management agendas set by medical (rather than non-medical)
managers. The underlying logic is to make doctors into managers by giving them the
freedom to conduct their directorates as semi-autonomous, self-managed units
(Ezzamel & Willmott 1993); along with this freedom comes a measure of financial
responsibility.
The research design was qualitative and exploratory. This was felt appropriate
given the relative brevity of the clinical directorate stmcture for the hospitals
concerned (being about three years in duration) and the still dynamic nature of the
processes under consideration. Semi-structured interviews of two hours duration were
undertaken with the clinical directors and included the following areas: a history of
clinical directorate involvement; the role of clinical budgeting and the relationship with
non-medical management. The interviews took the form of guided conversations
(McNeill 1990) where the clinical director pursued topics and raised themes of interest
within the broad prompted areas indicated above. The aim of the interviews was to
discover what was "in and on" the minds (Patton 1990, p. 278) of the clinical directors
regarding the conditions and consequences of their involvement in management
tasks. In order to discover what was "in and on" the respondents' minds, the clinical
directors controlled the introduction and flow of topics2 and no attempts were made to
2 With the exception of a first question which asked for a history of their involvement in the clinical
directorate stmcture.
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keep the respondent "to the point." The key theme of the differences between surgery
and medicine with respect to management emerged during the research. This theme
was subsequently highlighted as significant through the use of context appreciation
and narrative analysis (Agar& Hobbs 1982; Mishler 1986).
The next section addresses the evidence from the clinical directors on their
experiences as doctor-managers and their relationship with non-medical
management, particularly focussing on the differences between surgeons and
physicians. The narratives of the clinical directors have been shaped into "meta-
stories" (Reissman 1993) that transcend their personal experiences. The aim was to
edit and shape the interview material in such a way as to bring out the organizational
significance of what were, originally, individual accounts.
SURGERYAND MEDICINE ARE DIFFERENT (AND SO IS THEIR RELATIONSHIP WITH
MANAGEMENT)
One of the clinical directors (a surgeon) introduced a discussion on the differences
in attitude between surgeons and physicians through reciting a joke:
Have you heard the one about a physician, a psychiatrist and a surgeon
shooting ducks?—it just about sums up the differences... Well a physician, a
psychiatrist and a surgeon go out to shoot ducks. The physician raises his gun,
aims, then lowers it, saying "I'm not sure if that was a duck." The psychiatrist
aims but then pauses, saying "But does that bird know that it's a duck?"
Meanwhile the surgeon fires and the bird falls to the ground, he turns and says
to the pathologist "Go and make sure that that's a duck." (BCDIS)
The great techniques of medicine: inference, the taking of the patient's history and
clinical examination (Armstrong 1993, p. 236), map onto the practices of medicine,
psychiatry and surgery. This joke plays upon these classic divisions in clinical work
through puns on their associations with uncertain supposition, patients' self-
knowledge and clinical foresight. It also conveys clinicians' perceptions of the
personality differences between surgeons and physicians, differences that reflect (and
are reflected by) their work. The implications are that physicians hesitate and,
therefore, miss opportunities, that psychiatrists cannot act unless their interventions
are validated by their patients but that surgeons have a bias for bold actions, are
content to take risks and are accustomed to discovering whether their actions are
completely appropriate (or not) after the event.
The action-oriented nature of surgical work is aligned with the male values of
heroism and efficacy that pervade the management literature (c.f. the work of Dmcker
1968 and Peters & Waterman 1982, portraying the super-hero leaders of business). The
characteristics of strength, boldness and aggression implied by management and
leadership (Mills 1993) are also displayed by surgeons. "Super-hero" surgeons rely on
the cultural values of strength, heroism and efficacy to legitimate their interventionist
health care (Abbott 1988, p. 188). These similarities in values, beliefs and practices
imply that surgeons are more "naturally" aligned with management's bias for action
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than are physicians. The action-orientation of surgeons was mentioned by the
anesthetist and physician (respectively) quoted below:
Surgeons are doers, their clinical skills make them more direct people, they have
a clear view ofwhat they are doing and they aren 7 too philosophical. (ACD6A)
There is a big difference in mentality. People joke about it—surgeons—if in
doubt, cut it out, but as in all jokes there is an element of truth. Although
physicians are becoming more intewentionist so there's a blurring of the
boundaries. But surgeons do want to do something to sort things out. (ACD2P)
The putative managerial attribute of decisiveness is linked to surgeons' more practical
mentality. The interventionist nature of surgery allows surgeons to actually see the
pathology they have diagnosed and this visualization confirms their expertise, "....in
cutting the surgeon was [also] able to see the disease (Armstrong 1993, p. 236). As
surgeons have more opportunities to visualize than their colleagues in psychiatry and
medicine do they tend to be more confident people; seeing engenders more certainty
than history or inference. Surgeons also exercise their practical skills in theatres
(arenas for public display) where they are accustomed to their professional
competence being immediately visible to their colleagues. This requirement to
demonstrate competence in front of others and under time pressures involves
surgeons in making (and defending) quick decisions, often ones with important
consequences.
There is an element of truth in that there are major personality differences
between surgeons and physicians. Surgeons make faster decisions and their
decisions can be more far-reaching. One could say that that's more in keeping
with management. Physicians can think too long and miss the boat. (ACD3S)
As their work involves rapid decision-making the surgical clinical directors valued what
they perceived to be the more efficient management structure to support decision¬
making that Trust status (and the health care reforms in general) had conferred.
/ would say that this used to be a very democratic place, decisions never
happened because they got bounced around all over the place. Now the Trust
management group can make a commitment, the whole process is less
cumbersome. It used to be that if there were two people missing from a
meeting, well someone would say so and so's not here and then you would be
talking four months before anything happened and even then it probably
wouldn't, people knew that no answers everpopped out. (BCD IS)
In so far as management involves action, intervention, leadership and decision-making
(Newman & Clarke 1994), surgeons have more alignment with managers than do
physicians. However management extends more widely than this and encompasses
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tasks that may be better adapted to the personalities of physicians (or as in this quote,
psychiatrists).
Actually I think that clinicians are suited to different types of management role.
Physicians are deeper people. If you want someone who has the patience to
negotiate with the health board and who can think through the issues then I
would go for a physician. If you want someone who can say, "You should move
8 beds and knock down that wall" then you need a surgeon. If you want
someone to deal with difficult people then you should go to a psychiatrist.
(BCD1S)
The above quote expresses the notion that surgeons and physicians should be
channeled into different management tasks. The idea that the practice of management
may penetrate and impact on surgery and medicine differently is explored next.
As surgery involves an action sequence, is of an interventionist nature and takes
place within a limited time period it has clearer outcomes (than does medicine).
Surgical work is, therefore, more amenable to counting and measurement.
Surgeons are trained to count numbers. I have been coding every operation I do
since I started here. There is a history of 50 years of surgical audit in this region,
it started in 1946, there's a database going back to then. I've got information
about the numbers of types of operation I have done, things like for 500
consecutive operations I have a 1% mortality rate. I was trained to do this. Our
outcomes are more clear cut than physicians', you can count the number of
operations, for example. Physicians sit in offices and speak to patients much
more and their outcomes are much more ambiguous. (BCDIS).
As surgical outcomes can be counted and measured the possibilities for
standardization and, the consequent penetration of cost-effectiveness discourses into
clinical work look to be greater for surgery than for medicine. The practice of medicine
is more complex and open-ended than is surgery and tends to involve multiple ,
treatments rather than a single operation for a specific condition.
Also physicians are intrigued by pharmacology, they work with a lot of drugs
and their patients tend to be older and have lots of diseases in one bddy. Here in
obs and gynae it's more of a screening exercise to rule out specific maladies, it's
more circumscribed. (CCD40)
A clinical director who heads up a support directorate commented on the
consequences of the complexity of medical practice in terms of trying to establish an
agreed volume of laboratory tests with the physicians.
Physicians can't manage their work load so the labs have to roll over, we have
no way to limit the volume. I have said to the physicians that they must establish
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a volume with no re-openers. / know sewice level agreements use a lot of
resources but otherwise clinicians work by relaxing into clinical mode. We could
start them [sewice level agreements] with historical activity. (BCD2SU)
This clinical director is proposing a management-type solution (service level
agreements) to the problem of limiting the volume of laboratory tests but the actions of
the physician quoted next indicate that managerial solutions (in this case, devolved
budgets) have not, so far, worked well in medicine.
I am totally concerned with providing good clinical care within the constraints of
clinical practice. I had a &300,000 overspend last year but I don't really care
because if I stayed within budget I wouldn't be able to function. (CCD2P)
Clinical directors who are physicians (as opposed to surgeons) are more inclined to
emphasize their clinical advocacy role within management and to play down (or even
reject) their financial responsibilities.
I see my role as representing the views ofmy medical colleagues very forcibly to
the management team and the chief executive. (CCD2P)
In contrast to this, the following comment exemplifies the view of the surgical
directorates where surgeons are more willing to look at issues from a "corporate"
standpoint.
We all know the reality of the situation. To an extent I have to distance myself
from general surgery. Sometimes I have to follow a path which is not in the best
interests ofgeneral surgery because what we are doing is in the best interests of
the Trust. (BCDIS)
The stronger advocacy of the medical clinical directors is linked to their aspirations for
clinical excellence in their field (such aspirations are, of course, shared by the
surgeons but in the surgical directorates there is a greater propensity for advocacy to
be mediated by perceptions of corporate and financial responsibilities). Hence the
medical clinical directors were more likely to feel that health care financial
management reforms should be, always and only, directed toward the enabling of
excellence in clinical practice. While the surgical clinical directors expressed more
opinions on the importance of the reforms in integrating clinical and management
agendas in order to develop health care into a more effective allocative system. In this
sense the surgeons showed more interest in the "macro" problems of health care {i.e.
care focused on the characteristics of populations as opposed to "micro" care which is
governed by satisfying the needs of individual patients [Scott 1982]). In terms of the
likelihood of clinicians turning their attention from medical practice to the problems of
the larger health care domain (Schon 1991, p. 14) the surgeons did this more often.
The first quote below is from a physician, the second and third are from surgeons.
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You are asking me about the reforms? What's important? I'll tell you what's
important. What's important is trying to run a sewice for people with cancer that
is second to none in the world, to be at the forefront in oncology treatment, to
aspire to excellence and to look after patients in the best way possible. (ACD7P)
We started with management budgeting back in the early 80s but it went down
the tubes because there was no clinical involvement. I've always felt that clinical
and management teams should work as one unit rather than working on
parallel tracks. (CCD40)
It has to be a two-way process, why should we expect managers to understand
what we do ifwe don't understandmanagement. (ACD3S)
Surgeons have higher hopes of productive two-way exchanges with management than
physicians do.
We have a good dialogue with the non-medical managers. We [the clinicians]
were involved right from the start [of the reforms]. I think it's been different in
other Trusts. We set up the management stmcture, which is a good one. Also
there's been an interchange of ideas and receptivity on both sides. From the
beginning we had a very open exchange which I don't think exists in all the
other Trusts. (CCD 1S)
I'm not entirely convinced that we talk about the things that need to be
addressed—like how do we retain good staff in today's environment, how do
we motivate people, the important issues. The level of discussion is not as
fecund as it might be—it's a little bit sterile. (CCD2P)
Overall the medical clinical directors hold a generally less positive attitude toward
management than do the surgical ones. The argument of this section has been that
this stems, in part, from differences in character between surgeons and physicians
and, in part, from the nature of medical work, which is more open-ended, involves
more trial and error in treatment and, hence, is less easily standardized than surgical
work. The trajectory of medical work is more difficult to compartmentalize into
managerial categories such as efficiency and productivity and, therefore, physicians
cannot argue for more resources in scientific management terms. The result of this is
that physicians are skeptical about the value of management techniques such as
devolved budgeting.
I am disillusioned because a lot of the change has remained theoretical....We've
never looked at budgets...in tmth there has never been anything like
transferring a block of money from surgery to medicine, everything is pre¬
arranged. (ACD2P)
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The medical clinical directors also express more dissatisfaction with budgetary
constraints,
The degree of autonomy which is theoretically awarded to clinical directorates
just doesn't exist. The yearly negotiations—really there is no negotiation—we
are told that we are getting this. Budgets aren't geared to activity levels, which
are 25% up. (CCD2P)
and even speak of the "perversions" of cost pressures.
There is a process ofpeers being pewerted by cost pressures, it's a very negative
holding back type of feeling. I don't know why we can't concentrate on some
positive goal like expanding our services into X region but they [managers]
always seem to be holding back, there's a certain inevitability about it. (ACD7P)
Whereas the surgical clinical directors, while naturally not pleased by budget cuts,
were more positive about the advantages of devolved budgets,
In obs and gynae we were pleased to get control of the budget. It meant that we
could decide on our own priorities even if it was against a backdrop of overall
budget cuts. Mind you we weren't pleased to be asked to meet the 3% efficiency
savings (which were across the board) because we thought that we were more
efficient in the first place. (CCD40)
and more willing to accept that cost awareness and cost control are now elements in
the practice of clinical work.
I think that there has been a sea-change in clinicians' attitudes—quite a
material change from there being a small core of clinicians interested in
budgeting and costs and so on to there being a much more general feeling that
these things are important. (CCD40)
The greater enthusiasm of surgeons for management is borne out by the differential
take-up of the post of medical director3 (the doctor who leads the group of clinical
directors and who sits on the Trust management board) between surgeons and
physicians.
3 The title of medical director does not reflect any links with the medical specialization—as opposed to the
surgical one—but is merely as a generic term to indicate affiliation with clinical activity rather than, for
example, finance.
ResearchinHealthcareFinancialManagement,Vol. 5, No. l, 1999
Managing Surgery and Medicine Differently 35
It's funny but all the medical directors in Scotland are surgeons, I know because
they are all my friends. That's except our medical director and he has only just
started, he is the one exception. (BCDIS)
MANAGING SURGERY AND MEDICINE DIFFERENTLY
The field of management has been characterized by two competing modes of
professional knowledge. First, managers have been seen as technicians, who derive
their knowledge from the principles and practice of management science and,
second, managers have been perceived as exponents of a craft (or art) of managing
that cannot be reduced to theories and explicit principles (Schon 1991, p. 236). Hence,
management, as medicine, can be seen as a practice that is part science, part art (see
the earlier discussion). These perceptions suggest that the scientific practice of
management is more suited to surgery whereas the art of management looks to be
more appropriate to medicine. The scientific practice of management—in terms of
techniques to promote organizational efficiency, value for money, and accountable
performances has already enjoyed more acceptance in surgery than in medicine. The
following quotes demonstrate a favorable response from surgeons to these
management techniques.
I've always had an interest in the efficient delivery of services since my registrar
days and when I became a consultant I started to sit on a few little committees
to get things agreed and sorted out—organized—I like things to be organized.
(CCD40) ^
This place is properly managed now, a lot of driftwood has been cast out, this
was traditionally a place for passengers and there were a lot of hangers-on and
a succession of managers got rid of them. Now we are getting value for money
on all areas. (BCD 1S)
There has been a very similar trend [to more accountability] on audit. It used to
be that some clinicians who were interested in research and publishing papers
would audit one little project but now everyone is more aware that clinical
actions have a more empirical element and there is a much more general
willingness to question what everyone is doing. (CCD40)
The surgical directorates had been more amenable to rationalization than the medical
ones.
The surgical directorate reorganised their wards to create an acute admissions
ward and we wanted the medical directorate to do the same thing but it hasn't
happened. It would have speeded things up and reduced length of stay for acute
admissions by concentrating resources. Also it would have created opportunities
to upskill nursing staff and release juniormedical time. (CCD3SU)
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In the surgical directorate a decision was made to appoint a specialist urology
nurse and at the same time they did away with a few surgical beds. Now that's
appropriate but I'm not sure that everyone goes about things in the same way.
It's about the perception that you have to reduce a service in order to expand on
something else, the surgical directorate grasped that issue a lot quicker than the
medical. (CCD3SU)
Surgeons were more likely to recognize that although clinical judgement has to be
paramount in such issues as the timing of patient discharges,
The problem is that there is a risk management aspect, the doctor takes the
decision as to whether it is safe to discharge and if anyone questions their
judgement a doctor will say well if you are asking me to discharge earlier then
you [the TrustJ will have to take responsibility and, of course, they [Trust
management] won't want to do that. It's in this way that clinical things always
take precedence overmanagement things. (BCD1S)
there can be some agreement between doctors and managers in terms of the overall
trend to higher activity and throughput.
But there as been symbiosis [between clinicians and managersJ and it's
changed the way we work. There has been a 40% increase in workload over the
last 5 years and the average length of stay has dropped from 7 to 4 days. Now if
anyone had asked if that was attainable 6 out of 7 clinicians would have said
"No." People wouldn't move from entrenched positions which was bad.
(BCD3S)
Moreover the "symbiosis" between doctors and managers extends to a generalized
approach to problem solving.
I went on a course for middle managers, we were all from different
backgrounds but we had the same problems—how to control costs, deciding
how much to spend on IT and still get a pay-back and how to motivate staff. >
(CCD4S)
Surgeons also anticipated some advantage to the practice of surgery from the
managerial techniques of centralized control and performance evaluation.
a
In the place of Trusts we should have a managed care model, in this context we
could persuade people that it is a good idea to centralize. This way we would
overcome the technical variation between surgeons and, potentially we could
introduce certifications of competence. We should concentrate resources on high
tech procedures to give quality, we should support specialist surgeons and we
shouldprioritize health care. (ACD1S)
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Scientific management (or Taylorism) is equated with standardization, centralization
and bureaucratization (Walby & Greenwell 1994b). Surgery indicates its receptivity to
scientific management through being amenable to these processes. In contrast the
prospects for managing medicine in these ways are not promising. If medicine is to be
managed, management as an art rather than a science looks to be the way forward. So
far the response from physicians to the science of management has been muted.
IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUDING COMMENTS
Professional work derives from long training, is driven by custom and practice, and
is autonomous in direction; it has long been recognized that such characteristics make
professional work difficult to manage (Mintzberg 1983). Consequent upon confronting
these difficulties, the clinical directorate structure was introduced in the UK to imbue
senior medical professionals with more managerialist values and attitudes, to manage
doctors from the "inside" (Hunter 1992; Ezzamel & Willmott 1993; Jones & Dewing
1997). Management of the medical profession from the "outside" having had been
deemed a failure (Pollitt et al. 1988; Preston et al. 1992; Harrison & Pollitt 1994).
Attempts to manage the medical profession from the outside had never been
promising as managers require at least the tacit support of a high proportion of senior
doctors—as it is only through the actions of senior clinicians that the aims of
management can be realized (Ackroyd 1996). The potentiality for extending
managerialism into the clinical realm has always been there as management is a
generic discourse. As such a management ethos can permeate the conduct of many
different organizational actors, rather than being limited to a sub-set of actors—called
management (Walby & Greenwell 1994b; Du Gay et al. 1996).
This paper has argued that managerialism sits more easily with surgeons and
surgical work than with physicians and medical work. The articulation between
surgery and management looks closer as the "entry points" (Amariglio et al. 1993), or
central organizing ideas, of the two domains are more similar. Therefore "forms of
receptivity" (Power 1994) to management are easier to establish in surgery. Previous
studies in this health area have found that the development of clinical directorates is
incomplete (Jones & Dewing 1997). This finding being a particular instance of the
more generalized conclusion than in health (and in the public sector more widely)
"...managerialism's impact is uneven and remains open to contestation, negotiation
and resistance." (Clarke et al. 1994). Surgeiy is more easily analyzed as a rational
scientific process involving the transformation of inputs into outputs, than is medicine,
and, consequently the management categories of efficiency and productivity are easier
to establish. This implies that the "labour cost-productivity equation" (Langan & Clarke
1994) is more readily established in surgery, and, once understood, this relationship
can, at least potentially, be enhanced. Medicine, in contrast, is not as transparent as
surgery and, therefore, is not open to transformation in terms of scientific
management. The "arts" of management look to be more appropriate in medicine,
where physicians are inspired to strive for excellence and the production of quality
health care. If scientific management continues to penetrate surgery and the art of
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management starts to be more systematically applied in medicine, what
consequences may be anticipated?
Surgeons look to be better positioned in terms of demonstrating their resource
requirements—at least in terms of the categories that managers revere—for example,
those of productivity and efficiency. Doctors have tended to argue their case for more
resources through "shroud waving" (Harrison & Pollitt 1994) i.e. advocacy based on
worse case scenarios for patients if more monies are not forthcoming. As with other
organizations in the public sector, health care has traditionally put forward a case for
more resources on the basis of poor results, "Since needs are not being satisfied,
quality is not high enough and the money is finished, more is obviously needed."
(Bmnsson 1994, p. 326). Unlike in the private sector, where good results have to be
demonstrated in order to elicit more resources, the paradox of soliciting for monies in
the public sector has been that under performance has been the key. Surgery looks to
be able to break out of this mode through demonstrations of technical efficiency (in
the sense of the optimal relationship of inputs to outputs). But policy-makers in health
care have also been concerned to enhance allocative efficiency—to ensure that
resources flow to those who can make best use of them. There has been a policy
across the Western world to transfer resources away from acute services (most often
surgery) to primary care and preventative medicine but this intent has not been fully
realized (Day & Klein 1987; Llewellyn 1997). Surgeons have been more amenable to
making their work transparent to management, this response may, in part, be
consequent upon this threat of resource loss. In this study the expectations of the
medical specializations that more monies would be made available to them in
transfers from the surgical directorates (see earlier discussion) were not met. If
demonstrations of technical efficiency become paramount in resource allocations
then medicine looks to be at a continuing disadvantage.
On the other hand medicine may be more able to avoid cost constraint measures
by being less transparent to managerialism than surgery. This study indicated that the
medical directorates had so far been more successful in resisting budgetary pressures
and the rationalization of practice than the surgical ones. Previous research has
indicated that cost variability is greater in medicine than in surgery (Llewellyn et al.
1998). As argued earlier in this article, this cost variability may be seen as consequent
upon the greater inherent uncertainty in medical practice. One facet 'of
professionalization has always the license to exercise judgement in uncertain domains
(Scott & Meyer 1994, p. 222). Consequently trends toward the deprofessionalization of
certain groups have been linked with processes of rationalization and
bureaucratization (Murphy 1990). In this respect medicine looks to be more stable as a
highly regarded professional domain than does surgery. Moreover, if the science of
management is seen to have failed, the art of management may come to the fore in
medicine. The art of managing, as developed throughout the 1980s, emphasizes
human resource development, total quality and the pursuit of excellence (du Gay et al.
1996). The exercise of such strategies may result in professional standards being more
enhanced in medicine than in surgery.
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